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Is a tractor bad? Is the power that turns the long 
furrows wrong? If this tractor were ours it would 
be good - not mine, but ours. If our tractor turned 
the long furrows of our land, it would be good. 
Not my land, but ours. We could love that tractor 
then as we have loved this land when it was ours. 
But the tractor does two things - it turns the land 
and turns us off the land. There is little difference 
between this tractor and a tank. 
- John Steinbeck, 1939, The Grapes of Wrath - 
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The study of land systems aims to disentangle and understand the range of 
interactions between humans and the land they use. It takes, among others, 
environmental, biophysical, economic, political, technological, and social 
perspectives to comprehend how coupled human-environmental systems work, who 
decides over them, and how they could or should be transformed. Land systems take 
a central position in human livelihoods and environmental issues, and are a crucial 
parameter in many Sustainable Development Goals. 
This thesis starts from the premise that land systems are increasingly changing in 
ways that are poorly understood from a conventional land system science 
perspective. Conventional land system science rests on assumptions of mostly 
gradual processes, driven by a somewhat narrow range of actors, such as family 
farmers or local land administrations. However, large-scale land acquisitions, 
arguably the most dramatic land system changes of the 21st century, are definitively 
non-gradual, operate at scales that are orders of magnitude larger than typical 
smallholder dynamics, and are instigated by an international group of actors with a 
very different set of priorities than traditional actors. Pejoratively known as land 
grabs, large-scale land acquisitions globally cover an area over double the size of 
Germany, yet as a process, they have not been introduced in land system change 
models.  
This lacuna is significant, not only because large-scale land acquisitions cover large 
areas, but also because they profoundly change the relation that humans have with 
land as a resource. For example, the conversion of swidden landscapes to rubber 
monocultures in Southeast Asia causes a significant loss of agro-environmental 
diversity, but also a complete overhaul of livelihoods, culture, tradition, diets, and 
more. Furthermore, the constellation of decision-making concerning land is 
changed, and therefore, the possibilities for sustainable transitions are different. 
Upon closer inspection, large-scale land acquisitions are merely the most visible 
manifestation of a more general trend of new actors, changing land systems at new 
scales. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a trend is being signaled of an emergence of medium-
scale farms replacing smallholders, and, as a consequence, commercial agriculture 
replacing semi-subsistence agriculture. With limited empirical data, it is unclear 
whether this is an organically appearing structural transformation or an elite capture 
of land with similar characteristics as large-scale land acquisitions, nor is it clear what 




scales are not perceivably shifting, decision-making concerning land is: value chain 
actors usurp some of the agency concerning land management from smallholders or 
state actors, for example by using contract farming.  
Land system science wishes to understand why land systems have the characteristics 
they have and change the way they change. To do so, new actors and new scales of 
changes can no longer be disregarded as mere aberrations. This leads to the overall 
objective of this thesis, which is to develop concepts and methods to integrate 
new actors and scales of agriculture into land system science. In pursuing this 
objective, four research questions are posed. 
RQ1: What are the land system characteristics related to new agricultural 
actors? 
RQ2: How can new agricultural actors, and associated scales of land system 
change, be integrated in land system models? 
RQ3: What are the objectives of new actors in agriculture and how do these 
objectives align or misalign with environmental or rural development 
objectives? 
RQ4: How do new actors and arrangements in agriculture provide 
opportunities for environmental management and rural development?  
Chapter 2 gives a broad overview of the new actors and scales in global land system 
changes, introduced above. The geography and characteristics of large-scale land 
acquisitions, medium-scale farming and related processes, and value chain 
coordination, are presented, and they are conceptually linked as processes that 
bestow more agency to value chain actors, at the expense of land managers and state 
actors. The importance of this agency shift for land system science is demonstrated 
by assessing its role as an enabler of land degradation processes. The chapter shows 
that the ambitious goal of achieving land degradation neutrality could face significant 
challenges because of the power of new actors to break institutional and ecological 
barriers against agricultural expansion, while creating incentives for often 
unsustainable forms of land management. However, value chain actors also have 
tools and business cases to be a positive force in the push towards land degradation 
neutrality, and their position enables them to catalyze such action across value 
chains. Governments and other brokers can unlock this potential by triggering the 
motivators for value chain measures against degradation, while also (re-) instituting 




Chapter 3 focuses on the data-scarce topic of medium-scale farms, a process which 
is claimed by some to be of similar or larger significance as large-scale land 
acquisitions. The few empirical field studies on medium-scale farms have mostly 
used overly targeted sampling frames and did not allow for a comparison with small 
farms because of this. Still, such studies are used to make claims about medium-scale 
farms, presenting them as innovative, commercial farms led by urban entrepreneurs, 
or, alternatively, as an elite capture of land originally controlled by people with an 
insecure land tenure status. Chapter 3 shows the results of a systematically sampled 
study in the Kenyan Rift Valley, and compares small-, medium-, and large-scale 
farms in terms of land tenure, farm characteristics, crop mixes and yields, labor, and 
market outlets. While the findings partly corroborate some of the claims made 
around medium-scale farms (e.g. they are, on average, more cash crop-oriented and 
have a higher labor productivity), the survey finds a large diversity within classes. 
The high amount of entrepreneurial small-scale farms, and the high amount of very 
traditional medium-scale farms, puts into question the usefulness of farm size 
brackets to make broad claims on agricultural development. 
Chapter 4 aims to enhance land system models so that they can incorporate large-
scale land acquisitions simultaneously with ongoing small-scale land system 
dynamics. This represents a technical challenge to allow for changes to take place at 
multiple scales in the model. It also requires a reconsideration of the drivers of land 
system changes. Using the Lao PDR as a case study, a modified version of the 
CLUMondo model is deployed to parameterize large-scale land acquisitions and 
assess future land system distributions for three different policy scenarios. By doing 
this, the implications of large-scale land acquisition policies for smallholders is 
demonstrated. Model outcomes show that a scenario with an intensive push for 
more large-scale land acquisitions results in smallholders reverting back to 
subsistence farming, while a ban on new large-scale land acquisitions finds 
smallholders transitioning to cash crops. This model shows that including large-scale 
land acquisitions in land system scenarios is possible and relevant, and it carries the 
message that large-scale land acquisitions are a policy choice with consequences that 
are likely not fully considered today. 
Chapter 5 builds on chapter 4, representing a use case of the improved model for 
Cambodia. Cambodia aims to harbor a new population of tigers in the near future, 
and has the habitat to do so. However, at the same time, the large-scale land 
acquisition policies of Cambodia threaten to fragment this habitat. The chapter 
highlights how large-scale land policies (i.e. for large-scale land acquisitions and for 




the model is further enhanced by including a new layer of decision-making in the 
model procedure: The model simulates how large-scale land acquisition managers 
make decisions on the extent to which they convert their concession area to 
plantations, and how governmental actors regulate this dynamic, in an interactive 
feedback. Results suggest that, if new large-scale land acquisitions are opted for, they 
can only coexist with tigers under very strict nature protection schemes, and non-
conversion of concession areas, which leads to inefficient land use distributions, has 
to be discouraged. If such strict land governance is not feasible, the reintroduction 
of tigers in the Eastern Plains (the preferred habitat) is jeopardized. The Cardamom 
and Virachey forest are less suitable as tiger habitat, but because their poor 
agricultural suitability and accessibility makes them unattractive for large-scale land 
acquisitions, they are a safer tiger habitat in the absence of strong land governance. 
Taken together, these chapters represent progress in characterizing new actors and 
scales in agriculture as land systems and land system changes. The chapters 
additionally engage with questions on the decision-making and the distribution of 
benefits and harms related to novel land system changes. Lastly, they offer entry 
points towards alternative pathways, thereby identifying how transformation can be 
leveraged. This thesis invites us to reckon with the diversification of land-related 





Onderzoek naar landsystemen heeft als doel om de vele interacties tussen mensen 
en het land dat ze gebruiken te begrijpen. De discipline gebruikt milieu-, biofysische, 
economische, politieke, technologische en sociale perspectieven om te begrijpen hoe 
gekoppelde mens-milieu-systemen opgebouwd zijn, wie erover kan beslissen, en hoe 
ze kunnen of zouden moeten getransformeerd worden. Landsystemen zijn van groot 
belang voor het levensonderhoud van mensen en voor milieuproblematieken, en zijn 
een cruciale parameter in veel Duurzame Ontwikkelingsdoelen. 
Deze thesis start vanuit de premisse dat landsystemen steeds meer veranderen op 
manieren die, vanuit een conventioneel landsysteem-wetenschapsperspectief, niet 
goed begrepen worden. conventionele landsysteemwetenschap gaat uit van 
doorgaans graduele processen, aangedreven door een weinig diverse groep actoren, 
zoals landbouwfamilies of lokale landadministraties. Echter, grootschalige 
landacquisities, wellicht de meest dramatische landsysteemverandering van de 21ste 
eeuw, zijn absoluut niet gradueel, werken op schalen die ordegroottes groter zijn dan 
typische kleinschalige landbouwdynamieken, en worden aangedreven door een 
internationale groep actoren die een sterk afwijkende prioriteitenlijst hebben. Beter 
gekend onder de pejoratieve term “landroof” nemen grootschalige landacquisities 
op globale schaal een oppervlakte in die meer dan dubbel zo groot is als Duitsland, 
maar als proces zijn ze nog niet geïntroduceerd in landsysteem-
veranderingsmodellen.  
Deze lacune is significant, niet enkel omdat grootschalige landacquisities grote 
oppervlaktes innemen, maar ook omdat ze de relatie tussen mens en land 
fundamenteel veranderen. De conversie van rotationele brandlandbouw naar 
rubbermonoculturen in Zuidoost Azië houdt bijvoorbeeld een groot verlies aan 
landbouwlandschappelijke diversiteit in, maar leidt ook tot een her-configuratie van 
het levensonderhoud van mensen, hun cultuur, tradities, diëten, en meer. Verder 
verandert ook de constellatie van verhoudingen omtrent beslissingen over land, 
waarmee ook de opties voor duurzame transities veranderen. 
Bij nadere inspectie zijn grootschalige landacquisities slechts de meest zichtbare 
manifestatie van een meer algemene trend van nieuwe actoren, die land veranderen 
op nieuwe schalen. In zuidelijk Afrika wordt de opkomst van mediumschalige 
boerderijen gesignaleerd, die kleinschalige landbouwers vervangen en daarmee ook 
quasi-zelfvoorzieningslandbouw vervangen door commerciële landbouw. Door een 




structurele transformatie is, of een elite-overname van land met gelijkaardige 
kenmerken als grootschalige landacquisities, noch is het duidelijk wat de mogelijke 
consequenties kunnen zijn voor het levensonderhoud van geaffecteerde mensen of 
het milieu. Zelfs wanneer de schaal van boerderijen niet zichtbaar verandert kan het 
beslissingsproces omtrent landbouwland wel veranderen: Actoren in 
bevoorradingsketens usurperen gezag over landbeheer van kleinschalige 
landbouwers of overheidsinstanties, bijvoorbeeld door middel van contractuele 
landbouw. 
De landsysteemwetenschap wil begrijpen waarom landsystemen de kenmerken 
hebben die ze hebben, en waarom ze veranderen op bepaalde manieren. Daartoe 
kunnen nieuwe actoren en nieuwe schalen van verandering niet langer opzij 
geschoven worden als deviaties. Dit leidt tot de algemene doelstelling van dit 
proefschrift: Het ontwikkelen van concepten en methoden om nieuwe actoren 
en schalen van landbouw te integreren in de landsysteemwetenschap. Hiertoe 
worden vier onderzoeksvragen gesteld:  
OV1: Wat zijn de landsysteemkarakteristieken gerelateerd aan nieuwe 
landbouw-actoren? 
OV2: Hoe kunnen nieuwe landbouwactoren, en hun geassocieerde schalen 
van landsysteemverandering, geïntegreerd worden in landsysteemmodellen? 
OV3: Wat zijn de doelstellingen van nieuwe landbouw-actoren, en hoe 
verhouden die zich tot milieudoelstellingen of rurale 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen? 
OV4: Hoe bieden nieuwe actoren en constellaties in de landbouwsector 
mogelijkheden voor milieubeleid en rurale ontwikkeling? 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een breed overzicht van de nieuwe actoren en schalen in globale 
landsysteemveranderingen, hierboven geïntroduceerd. De geografie en kenmerken 
van grootschalige landacquisities, mediumschalige boerderijen en gerelateerde 
processen, en bevoorradingsketen-coördinatie worden gepresenteerd en 
conceptueel gerelateerd als processen die gezag afstaan aan actoren in 
bevoorradingsketens, ten koste van landbeheerders en overheids-actoren. Het 
belang van deze gezags-shift voor landsysteemwetenschap wordt aangetoond door 
de vaststelling van de rol die dit speelt in het mogelijk maken van landdegradatie. 
Het hoofdstuk toont dat de ambitieuze doelstelling om landdegradatieneutraliteit te 
bereiken in het gedrang kan komen door de macht van nieuwe actoren om 




doorbreken, terwijl ook nieuwe stimulansen tot niet-duurzaam landbeheer gecreëerd 
worden. Actoren in bevoorradingsketens hebben echter ook instrumenten en 
business cases om een positieve bijdrage te leveren voor landdegradatieneutraliteit, 
en hun positie stelt hen in staat om actie te katalyseren over hele 
bevoorradingsketens. Overheden en andere belanghebbenden kunnen dit potentieel 
ontgrendelen door in te spelen op de motivatoren voor bevoorradingsketen-
management tegen degradatie, en door de actoren van die ketens in te perken. 
Hoofdstuk 3 focust op het data-schaarse onderwerp van mediumschalige 
boerderijen, een proces waarvan door sommigen wordt geclaimd dat het van 
gelijkaardig of zelfs groter belang is als grootschalige landacquisities. De weinige 
empirische veldstudies over mediumschalige boerderijen gebruiken doorgaans een 
te doelgerichte steekproefmethode en laten dus niet toe om een vergelijking te 
maken met kleinschalige boerderijen. Toch worden er op basis van deze studies 
stellige beweringen gemaakt, en worden mediumschalige boerderijen gepresenteerd 
als innovatieve, commerciële boerderijen geleid door stedelijke ondernemers. 
Alternatief worden ze gepresenteerd als een elite-geleide overname van land dat 
toebehoord aan mensen met een precaire grondbezit-status. Hoofdstuk 3 toont de 
resultaten van een systematisch genomen steekproef in de Keniaanse Riftvallei, en 
vergelijkt klein-, medium-, en grootschalige boerderijen op vlak van 
grondbezitsrechten, boerderijkenmerken, gewassen, productiviteit, landbouwarbeid, 
en landbouwmarkten. Hoewel de bevindingen deels in lijn liggen met de beweringen 
omtrent mediumschalige boerderijen (bijvoorbeeld zijn deze gemiddeld inderdaad 
meer gericht op opbrengstgewassen en bereiken zij een hogere 
arbeidsproductiviteit), toont het onderzoek ook dat er een grote diversiteit bestaat 
binnen categorieën. Het hoge aantal ondernemingsgezinde kleinschalige boerderijen, 
en het hoge aantal traditionele mediumschalige boerderijen, stellen de bruikbaarheid 
van afgelijnde categorisaties om grote beweringen te maken over 
landbouwontwikkeling in vraag. 
Hoodstuk 4 heeft als doel om landsysteemmodellen te verbeteren door 
grootschalige landacquisities te incorporeren, simultaan met kleinschalige 
dynamieken. Dit is een technische uitdaging, om processen die spelen op 
verschillende schalen te modelleren. Ook verreist het een heroverweging van de 
drijvende krachten achter landsysteemveranderingen. Gebruik makend van Laos als 
casestudy worden grootschalige landacquisities geparametriseerd in het 
CLUMondo-model, om zo toekomstige landsysteempatronen te verkennen in drie 
beleidsscenario’s. Het model demonstreert dat beleid omtrent grootschalige 




landbouwers. In een scenario waar grootschalige landbouw sterk aangemoedigd 
wordt, worden kleinschalige landbouwers terug naar zelfonderhoudende landbouw 
geduwd, terwijl in een scenario met een  moratorium op nieuwe grootschalige 
landacquisities de kleinschalige landbouwers overschakelen op opbrengstgewassen. 
Het model toont aan dat het inbouwen van grootschalige landacquisities in 
landsysteemmodellen mogelijk en relevant is, en het bouwt op het idee dat deze 
grootschalige landacquisities een beleidskeuze zijn met consequenties waarvan men 
zich wellicht niet ten volle bewust is. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat verder op de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 4, en geeft een 
implementatie van het landsysteemmodel voor Cambodia. Cambodia wil een nieuwe 
populatie tijgers herintroduceren in de nabije toekomst, en heeft hiervoor habitat ter 
beschikking. Terzelfdertijd dreigen beleidskeuzes omtrent grootschalige 
landacquisities deze habitat te fragmenteren. Het hoofdstuk belicht hoe grootschalig 
landbeleid (grootschalige landacquisities en natuurbescherming) vaak in tegenstrijd 
is met zichzelf. Het model is verder uitgewerkt door een beslissings-parameterizatie 
toe te voegen: Het model simuleert hoe managers van grootschalige landacquisities 
beslissingen maken omtrent de mate waarin ze hun concessies benutten als plantage, 
en hoe overheidsinstanties dit reguleren, in een interactieve teugkoppeling. 
Resultaten suggereren dat, als in de toekomst gekozen wordt voor grootschalige 
landacquisities, deze enkel kunnen samengaan met tijgers wanneer habitat strikt 
wordt gereguleerd, en wanneer niet-conversie van concessies, wat tot inefficiënt 
landgebruik leidt, aangepakt wordt. Als dergelijk strikt beleid niet haalbaar is, dan is 
de herintroductie van tijgers in de Oostelijke Vlaktes (de geprefereerde habitat) in 
gevaar. Het Cardamom- of Viracheybos zijn minder geschikt als tijgerhabitat, maar 
door hun schamele agrarische bruikbaarheid en slechte bereikbaarheid zijn ze ook 
niet aantrekkelijk voor grootschalige landacquisities, en daardoor vormen ze een 
veiligere tijgerhabitat wanneer krachtdadig landbeleid ontbreekt. 
De hoofdstukken representeren voortgang in het beschrijven van nieuwe actoren en 
schalen in de landbouw als landsystemen en landsysteemveranderingen. Verder 
worden vragen omtrent beleid en de verdeling van lusten en lasten gerelateerd aan 
nieuwe landsysteemveranderingen behandeld. Ten slotte bieden de hoofdstukken 
aanknooppunten naar alternatieve trajecten, waarmee hefbomen voor 
transformaties worden geïdentificeerd. Deze thesis nodigt ons uit om rekenschap te 
nemen van de toenemende veelheid aan land-gerelateerde maatschappelijke 













Container term to denote a removal from family farming 
towards more capital-intensive, larger-scale farming controlled 
by domestic elites. Medium-scale farms the Sub-Saharan 
African manifestation of domestic larger-scale farms. 
Land control The capacity to make decisions concerning the use and 
management of land. 
Land 
degradation 





A state whereby the amount and quality of land resources, 
necessary to support ecosystem functions and services and 
enhance food security, remains stable or increases within 
specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems. Under 
Sustainable Development Goal Target 15.3, the aim is to, on 
balance, maintain or increase the amount and quality of land 
resources by compensating any land degradation with land 
restoration, within specified time- and spatial-scales.  
Land 
governance 
The processes by which decisions are made regarding the access 
to and use of land, the manner in which those decisions are 
implemented and the way that conflicting interests in land are 
reconciled. 
Land manager People with rights to control land. 
Land system 
(concept) 
A representation of all activities and processes pertaining to 
anthropogenic land use in a given geographical area, 
encapsulating local land use/cover with reigning socioeconomic 
and institutional arrangements, technology use, and the benefits 







Typical combinations of land cover, land use, and land 
management. 
Land tenure The relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among 








(Broadly) Acquisition through lease, concession or sale of large 
(relative to the local context) tracts of land for agricultural or 
forestry purposes. Working definitions differ in different 
chapters of this thesis. 
Medium-scale 
farm 
(Broadly) Farms that are relatively larger than what is usual in 
their immediate context, yet smaller than large-scale land 
acquisitions. (Specifically in Chapter 3): Farms with sizes 
between 5 and 50 hectares. (In other empirical literature) See 
section 3.3.2 for an overview. 
Smallholder Broad term to denote farmers who generally operate relatively 
small farms using motly family labor. 
Small-scale 
farm 
(In Chapter 3): Farms smaller than 5 hectares. 
Swidden Rotational agriculture characterized by a long fallow period 
followed by a short cultivation period 
Value chain 
actor 




Interactions and arrangements in value chains (e.g. contract 
farming) by which actors along these value chains influence 




COP Conference of the Parties 
DLSF Domestic larger-scale farm 
ELC Economic Land Concession (Cambodian term) 
GoL Government of Laos 
LCM Land change model 
LDN Land Degradation Neutrality 
LSF Large-scale farm 
LSLA Large-scale land acquisition 
MSF Medium-scale farm 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
RQ Research question 
SDG Sustainable Development Goal 
SLM Sustainable land management 
SPI Science-Policy Interface 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
VCA Value chain actor 
VCC Value chain coordination 






1.1. Land control dynamics and value chain 
coordination in the 21st century 
The past two decades have seen momentous changes in actors and scales of 
agriculture around the world. Land control has increasingly shifted towards non-
local actors, who have in many instances altered rural land systems beyond 
recognition (Margulis et al., 2013; Sikor et al., 2013). While globally, smallholder 
farming is the dominant mode of farming, especially in the Global South (Samberg 
et al., 2016), novel constellations of land control are on the rise in the 21st century. 
These land control dynamics are often characterized by large, non-gradual shifts in 
farm scales, with farms that may be several orders of magnitude larger than the farms 
that precede or neighbor them. Apart from drastic farm scale shifts, which are most 
readily observable, a more general shift in decision-making processes and actors in 
land use and land management issues is taking place, the consequences of which are 
not fully understood. 
Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) are the most visible new actors that have 
arisen, and have received ample academic and societal attention (Scoones et al., 
2013). Their scale and the speed at which they have proliferated have led some 
scholars to name them “the most radical land use change in the history of 
humankind” (Mann and Bonanomi, 2017). LSLAs are acquisitions through lease, 
concession or sale of large (relative to the local context) tracts of land for agricultural 
or forestry purposes1. They started appearing in high numbers following the global 
food price crisis and financial crisis in 2007, although earlier instances are reported. 
By 2016, the global area covered by LSLAs, as reported in the Land Matrix 
repository, plateaued at 79 million hectares, and as of yet it is unclear to what extent 
this represents a true leveling-off or merely a reporting time lag (Land Matrix, 2019). 
LSLAs are typically located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe 
and Latin America, while the acquiring parties tend to originate from wealthier 
                                                     
1 This definition is inexplicit concerning minimum size requirements or the nationality of 
land acquirers, in order to accommodate the many shades of grey found in large-scale land 
acquisitions. A commonly used minimum size used in global databases is 200 ha (Land 
Matrix, 2019). The different chapters of this thesis use different working definitions to best 
suit their conceptual and methodological frameworks. 
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countries, countries that lack sufficient arable land and depend on imports, and elites 
from within the LSLA’s country (Deininger et al., 2011; Seaquist et al., 2014). They 
may be an investment group, an agribusiness, domestic elites, domestic government 
actors, or foreign states or state companies. 
New actors also emerge in less eye-catching forms. The shift away from smallholder 
family farms does not always materialize in the form of LSLAs, and the focus on 
LSLAs may have unduly shifted attention away from less dramatic, but more 
widespread dynamics. In Sub-Saharan Africa, survey data from multiple countries 
and at multiple times indicates that the share of land in the hands of medium-scale 
farms (MSFs – defined in the referenced study as farms with sizes between 5 and 
100 hectares2) is rising sharply. This rise of a new class of farmers combines to a 
process of larger spatial proportions, potentially impacting more people, compared 
to LSLAs (Jayne et al., 2016). Contrary the development of LSLAs, much less is 
known about the rise of MSFs. It is unclear to what extent MSFs are the product of 
an organic consolidation process, where successful smallholders expand their farms 
by buying land of exiting farmers, or, alternatively, an elite capture of rural land, 
where domestic investors find opportunities to leverage power relations to acquire 
land. The former option would essentially represent an agricultural transition process 
(Byres, 1977), while the latter option is akin to LSLAs in smaller form, risking the 
arising of similar negative externalities. Case studies have found corroborating 
evidence for both options (Anseeuw et al., 2016; Chapoto et al., 2013; Chimhowu, 
2018).  
Apart from the origins of MSFs, it is also unclear if and how MSFs are functionally 
different from small farmers and if the signal observed in national-scale censuses has 
implications for rural development or the environment. Farm scale is a readily 
available metric in agricultural censuses, yet this does not necessarily make it an 
informative metric to classify farmers with. Whether MSFs grow different crops, for 
different markets, using different amounts and sources of labor, is unclear.  
The land control dynamics outlined above do not imply the end of the smallholder 
farmer. In all their diversity, smallholders persist and have engaged with urban and 
international value chains in a myriad of ways (Barrett et al., 2012). This can be 
captured under the umbrella term of value chain coordination (VCC), denoting the 
many ways in which up-and downstream actors in agricultural value chains 
                                                     
2 Note that this is not a standard definition. Chapter 3 of this thesis uses 5 – 50 hectares as 




coordinate with smallholders and thus influence their farm management and crop 
choices (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). The most common form of VCC is contract 
farming, where a processor or supermarket sets out an agreement with supplying 
farmers. These contracts may stipulate quantities and minimum requirements of 
products, but can also make demands on certain prerequisite land management 
requirements (Bellemare and Lim, 2018; Cramb et al., 2016). In some instances, 
contracts may cover upfront costs of inputs, thus enabling land system changes 
which would otherwise be impossible. Where such contracts induce debt, or yield 
very high short-term profits, this may lead to boom-and-bust cycles. 
1.2. A land system science approach to new actors in 
agriculture 
The emergence of new actors has hitherto been studied from many disciplines, 
including political ecology (Borras et al., 2012b; Messerli et al., 2015; Meyfroidt, 
2017a), rural development (Deininger et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2017; Li, 2011), land 
governance (Chitonge et al., 2017; Schoneveld, 2017), human rights perspectives 
(Mann and Bonanomi, 2017), and more. These disciplines have not necessarily 
worked in an integrative, interdisciplinary manner. Bridging knowledge across 
disciplines can increase understanding of emerging dynamics and inform the design 
of more sustainable pathways. Land system science can act as an integrative 
platform, bringing together insights of various disciplines (Verburg et al., 2015). 
Studying LSLAs, or agricultural value chains more generally, from a land systems 
perspective has the potential to increase our understanding of the causes and 
consequences of observed dynamics, and may enable the envisioning of alternative 
land futures (Messerli et al., 2013). Such contributions have, for example, highlighted 
the multifaceted relationship between food security and environmental concerns 
(Meyfroidt, 2017a), or the role of agribusinesses in environmental stewardship 
(Folke et al., 2019).  
A land system is a representation of all activities and processes pertaining to 
anthropogenic land use in a given geographical area. As a conceptual boundary 
object, land systems bring together local land use/cover with reigning 
socioeconomic and institutional arrangements, technology use, and the benefits and 
consequences of land use (Verburg et al., 2013)3. The emergence of new actors in 
global agriculture can be framed as a land system change: to varying extents and in 
                                                     
3 This definition pertains to land systems as a conceptual framework. In later chapters, land 
systems are deployed as a mapping device, similar to van Asselen and Verburg (2012).  
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varying ways, LSLAs, MSFs and VCC alter the land cover, land use, land 
management, and societal relationship to land. Land institutions undergo changes 
(e.g. from customary land tenure arrangements to private land ownership), new 
technologies are disseminated (e.g. new crop varieties, agrochemicals), and the mix 
of benefits reaped from land and negative consequences caused by its use are 
redistributed. 
In land system science, Messerli et al. (2013) distinguish three types of knowledge 
that provide a framework for the understanding of land system sustainability: (1) 
systems knowledge, which concerns the status, dynamics, drivers and impacts of the 
land system (changes), (2) target knowledge, which concerns matters of agency to 
decide over a land system and the distribution of benefits and negative 
consequences, and (3) transformation knowledge, which concerns pathways of 
future development and leverage points to shape alternative land system futures. 
This thesis aims to contribute to systems, target, and transformation knowledge on 
new actors in global agriculture. In what follows, a state of the art is summarized 
and knowledge gaps are identified (Table 1.1). 
1.2.1. Systems knowledge 
Considerable efforts have been undertaken to gain systems knowledge on LSLAs. 
At the global scale, the Land Matrix serves as a crowd-sourced repository of 
intended, concluded and failed land deals (Anseeuw et al., 2013; Land Matrix, 2019). 
An increasingly rigid triangulation system aims to ensure data quality and minimizes 
errors of commission (Nolte et al., 2016). However, the crowd-sourced nature of 
the data implies that areas with, for example, low press freedom or limited NGO 
activities are often omitted. This, combined with spatial inaccuracies (Eckert et al., 
2016), implies that the Land Matrix is currently insufficient to use as input in global-
scale land system analysis (Edelman, 2013) and that any assessment of the impact of 
land systems made using Land Matrix data should be interpreted as a lower limit 
rather than a precise estimate (see comment and reply in Rulli and D’Odorico, 2013).  
Still, the Land Matrix and other inventories have enabled the identification of broad-
scale drivers, contexts and impacts. Concerning drivers, the timing of the 
proliferation of LSLAs coincides with the 2007 food price crisis (Watson, 2017) and 
the financial crisis. By disseminating and reinforcing a narrative of land scarcity 
(Lambin, 2012; Scoones et al., 2018), the food price crisis triggered a number of 
import-dependent countries to secure food supplies by acquiring land abroad 
(Cotula et al., 2009). Many host countries further drive the rise in LSLAs by 




2017). The financial crisis amplified this trend: amidst distressed markets, the global 
agricultural markets, and land markets specifically, maintained positive prospects 
(Cotula et al., 2011). The contexts in which LSLAs are situated are mostly either 
densely populated croplands or sparsely populated forests (Messerli et al., 2014). 
LSLAs appear to value agro-ecological productivity and are not typically found to 
target supposed “idle land reserves”. They are furthermore overrepresented in, and 
likely attracted to, poor land governance and land tenure security (Arezki et al., 
2011). The impacts of LSLAs on rural livelihoods (Davis et al., 2014; Oberlack et al., 
2016), the global commons (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017b), water availability (Rulli et al., 
2012), and socio-environmental systems in general (Agrawal et al., 2019) have been 
summarized and often quantified by building on inventory data. 
A key missing aspect of systems knowledge concerning LSLAs is how they cause 
land use and land cover changes. First, the assumption that the acquisition of land 
will always be followed by land clearing and plantation development has proven to 
be unfounded. A great number of LSLAs do not materialize into plantations or only 
succeed to develop a small fraction of the acquired area (Agrawal et al., 2019), and 
many operations fail (Schönweger and Messerli, 2015). Second, where LSLAs claim 
smallholder farmland, they may generate a displacement of land use (Lambin and 
Meyfroidt, 2011). Their immediate land system changes are thus followed by 
secondary effects. This is further complicated as smallholders and LSLAs are 
operating in overlapping land resources, but also in overlapping market outlets 
(Byerlee, 2014). The space in which smallholders farm and the markets they serve 
are therefore to a large extent indirectly influenced by LSLA policies. Neither the 
incomplete implementation of LSLAs nor their influences on smallholders have 
been assessed from a land system science perspective. This has also resulted in the 
absence of LSLA dynamics in land system change models (Rounsevell et al., 2012; 
Verburg et al., 2019a). Such models can be instrumental not only to formally 
summarize systems knowledge, but also to assess the importance of various impacts 
as they emerge from diverging policy scenarios. 
The same level of systems knowledge found in LSLAs is not present for MSFs: with 
the exception of a handful of case studies, MSFs are studied by proxy through census 
data with insufficient qualitative detail to deduct drivers or impacts with certainty 
(Jayne et al., 2016). Case studies find that MSFs tend to be located in highly 
accessible, highly productive areas (Hall et al., 2017; Sitko and Chamberlin, 2015). 
The rise in MSFs, as reported in census data, is found to be synchronous with a rise 
in non-family farms (i.e. corporate farms) and ownership of rural land by urban 
people (Jayne et al., 2016; Lowder et al., 2016). However, neither the existence nor 
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the direction of a causality is immediately evidenced from these observations. The 
paucity of case study evidence is aggravated by the tendency of case studies to only 
sample farms meeting preconceived ideas of MSFs. In this way, stereotypes of 
entrepreneurial, urban-owned MSFs are recycled rather than validated.  
To better understand MSFs, more case study work is needed. However, such case 
studies should go beyond verifying that entrepreneurial, urban-owned MSFs exist. 
Instead, more may be learned from a mapping of the diversity in MSFs, and a 
comparison with other farm scales. For this, a naïve sampling strategy is crucial. 
Furthermore, MSFs are currently understood as a Sub-Saharan African 
phenomenon. It is unclear if and how similar processes may exist in other continents. 
VCC similarly suffers from a poor systems knowledge base: contract farming is 
mostly studied from a micro-economic perspective (Otsuka et al., 2016). There is 
uncertainty on the importance and extent of VCC, owing to definitional and data 
issues (Oya, 2012). Land system science perspectives on VCC are only found where 
it generates dramatic land system changes. This is particularly the case for boom-
and-bust cycles, where high levels of lucrativeness and/or indebtedness generate 
rapid expansive land system changes (Hall, 2011). Because contract farming is often 
argued to be a more responsible and less damaging alternative to LSLAs (Cramb et 
al., 2015; Hall et al., 2017), knowledge on occurrence, drivers, and impacts is urgently 
needed. This knowledge base is currently emerging, for example under the banner 
of the TRASE initiative which aims to link agricultural commodities to their 
environmental impacts (Paitan and Verburg, 2019), but insights into how VCC 
drives land management decision-making remains limited.  
1.2.2. Target knowledge 
Target knowledge on LSLAs is relatively rich, although significant gaps remain. 
Inquiries into who decides on LSLAs, who defines which land is available, and who 
benefits and loses are many (Keene et al., 2015). Still, the scope of host governments 
to set out LSLA policies and how these policies are married with other land use 
policies is not well-understood. Land, especially in the Global South, is increasingly 
under pressure to meet food demands, biodiversity targets, and other ecosystem 
services. Governments are trying to accommodate these demands, but often fail to 
acknowledge and address trade-offs. Instead, a silo mentality is found to dominate 
land use planning, where disparate governmental agencies and ministries set out land 
use policies that are, as a result, often mutually exclusive (Rudel and Meyfroidt, 
2014). This way, LSLAs may for example be part of a governmental strategy to 




strategy to preserve biodiversity hotspots (Souter et al., 2016) or support smallholder 
farmers (Brent et al., 2017). While the risks related to this lack of coordination are 
often flagged (African Union et al., 2014; FAO, 2012), the implications of LSLAs’ 
uneasy relationship with other land-related targets are rarely assessed beyond the 
case study level (Liao et al., 2016; but see Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). This highlights 
the need for integrative, scenario-based, spatially explicit assessment tools that can 
accurately represent LSLAs amidst other land claims and simulate implications of 
policy choices in one domain of land governance on other domains of land 
governance. 
For MSFs, any target knowledge remains speculative and lacks sufficient empirical 
backing (i.e. a sufficiently large systems knowledge base is missing). The rise of MSFs 
is alluded to be either an elite capture of land benefiting urban-based entrepreneurs, 
or a rural consolidation process led by successful smallholders (Sitko and Jayne, 
2014). The role of agricultural lobbies, processors and supermarkets as a driving 
force behind MSFs is believed to be large (Neven et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2009), 
but remains hypothetical. MSFs are reported to leverage statutory land tenure to 
overrule customary land tenure, thus victimizing customary land users (Sitko and 
Chamberlin, 2016), but to what extent such findings are generalizable across SSA is 
uncertain. In short, we know only that MSFs are on the rise as a category, yet we do 
not have a clear profile of MSFs (if such a typical profile exists), nor do we know 
who benefits and loses from their emergence or which policies and power relations 
are behind it.  
VCC is better understood in terms of target knowledge. There are multiple lines of 
inquiry into how contract farming may be beneficial to participants (Ton et al., 2018) 
and how it leads to overall gains in value chain efficiency (Wang et al., 2014), leading 
some to proclaim contract farming as being a prerequisite for “modern farming” 
(Bellemare and Lim, 2018). However, VCC is also criticized for being exclusionary 
to already disadvantaged farmers, either intentionally or as a side-effect of contract 
prerequisites that are difficult to attain for underprivileged farmers (Colen et al., 
2012). Furthermore, while contract farming can be an equal partnership, it often 
takes the form of an exploitative relation (Luo et al., 2017; Ochieng, 2010). Thus, 
target knowledge on VCC is relatively well-developed, yet what is still unclear is to 
what extent the goals and priorities of contracting businesses translate to 
environmental change. Contracts could be hypothesized to induce degradation 
where they spread damaging land management techniques. However, they may also 
enable participants to adopt more sustainable practices, for example by providing 
security and thereby allowing longer-term planning (Minten et al., 2009). This 
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depends in large part on the goals and priorities of the contracting business as well 
as the participants, yet knowledge on this subject is largely missing.  
1.2.3. Transformation knowledge 
While transformation knowledge concerning LSLAs is quite abundant, it tends to be 
unidirectional. LSLAs are virtually always found to represent a radical shift to an 
unsustainable, hyper-intensive land system with negative consequences for local 
livelihoods (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017a; Friis et al., 2016). Proponents of LSLAs 
proclaim their potential to bring rural development and modernize agriculture 
(Collier and Dercon, 2009). However, even if LSLAs would bring benefits, that does 
not mean that an LSLA pathway is therefore optimal to tackle issues of rural poverty 
and rural development vis-à-vis a smallholder-support pathway (De Schutter, 2011). 
Any benefits remain largely in the hypothetical, and whether LSLAs have the 
potential to be leveraged towards sustainability and livelihood improvements, and if 
so, in which contexts, is much less studied. LSLAs have been found to generate 
technological spillovers to neighboring smallholders in Mozambique (Deininger and 
Xia, 2016), but whether these results are generalizable to other contexts remains 
unclear. Potential sustainability leverages related to LSLAs have rarely been studied, 
although such leverages can be hypothesized (Cotula et al., 2011). For example, if 
LSLAs would be a part of a national or international integrated land use planning 
effort, they could be used to channel agricultural expansion requirements to produce 
sufficient food. In this way, environmental damages of agricultural expansion could 
be minimized. While such planning infrastructure may seem unattainable, it is 
precisely this reasoning that underpins the narratives of “available, idle land” that 
are used to justify LSLAs (Deininger et al., 2011). Surprisingly little research has been 
devoted to formalizing such narratives and to sincerely questioning the land 
governance needed to direct LSLAs to least-damage pathways (but see Dwyer et al. 
2015). 
MSFs are championed to be a transformative power that may bring dynamism to an 
otherwise stagnant African smallholder agriculture (Jayne et al., 2016). Such claims 
are stated hypothetically. Apart from the underlying, questionable assumption that 
smallholders are not dynamic, it is at this point not possible to portray MSFs as such 
because there is insufficient knowledge on their profiles (i.e. target knowledge) and 
multi-temporal assessments have not been performed. Here, again, the more 
important question to ask is not whether MSFs bring beneficial sustainability and 
livelihood outcomes, but whether they are the most efficient pathway towards such 
outcomes. However, to make such an assessment, more systems and target 




orientation and labor requirements of MSFs must be mapped and compared to 
smallholders. 
VCC can be transformative through a range of pathways of change (Sikor et al., 
2013; Zimmerer et al., 2018). For example, where it acts as a provider of agricultural 
inputs such as artificial fertilizer or improved seeds, it may enable land system 
intensification (Otsuka et al., 2016), which may have sustainability implications. 
Alternatively, by providing a more direct link between consumers and producers, 
sustainability concerns of consumers can be transferred through the value chain and 
result in on-the-ground changes in land management (Rueda and Lambin, 2013). 
This pathway is being formalized through eco-certification, which is found to be an 
effective tool towards reaching sustainability targets (Defries et al., 2017). The extent 
to which VCC contributes to environmental issues or the solution thereof is context-
dependent. Much depends on the priorities of the businesses that engage in such 
schemes (Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016), as well as the consumers’ willingness 
to pay for sustainability. While this field has progressed significantly, questions 
remain on the effectiveness of various tools of private land governance (which may 
range in stringency from issuing strict production demands to voluntary farmer 
trainings), and how these interact with public land governance tools (Lambin et al., 
2014). If such tools are effective, their use in the attainment of sustainable 
development goals should be assessed.  
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Table 1.1: State of land system science knowledge and knowledge gaps concerning new actors 
in agriculture. More explanation is given in text. 
  Systems knowledge 
Status, dynamics, drivers and 




definition, distribution of benefits 
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Globally coordinated efforts 
to build knowledge 
repositories have led to a 
good understanding of the 
geography, contexts, drivers 
and impacts. 
Rich knowledge on the 
decision-making, power 
dynamics, and roles of 
various actors. 
Evidence of LSLAs as 
unsustainable rural 
development pathways. 
Implementation of LSLAs 
are rarely in line with 
narratives of “bringing idle 





- Land use/cover changes 
post-acquisition 
- Indirect land changes via 
impacts on smallholders 
- Representation of land 
use/cover changes in land 
change models 
- Trade-offs between LSLA 
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based goals 
- Representation of LSLA 
actor decision-making in 
land change models 
- Least-damage LSLA 
pathways 
- Scenarios of future LSLA 
development 



















A strong signal emerging 
from census data in a limited 
number of countries, 
combined with sporadic case 
study evidence. 
The role of agricultural 
lobbies, processors, and 
supermarkets as drivers of a 
rise in MSF is debated. Land 
tenure issues are sometimes 
found to enable a rise in 
MSF, and vice versa. 
Theories of change present 
MSFs as either a new land 
rush with detrimental impacts 
on local priorities, or as 
sources of dynamism that 
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dynamics outside of Africa 
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- Land tenure issues related 
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- MSF as a transformative 
power 

























Intensifying efforts to assess 
value chain architectures and 
sustainability (e.g. TRASE), 
and specific land system 
research into boom-and-bust 
crops 
VCC is often found to 
benefit participants, but risks 
of exploitation can arise. 
VCC can be exclusionary to 
already disadvantaged 
farmers. 
Depending on the context, 
VCC is found to either 
encourage unsustainable 
practices or enable transitions 





- Geography of VCC 
- Drivers of VCC 
- Impacts of VCC on land 
management 
- Motivation towards 
Sustainability of value 
chain actors 
- Choice of value chain 
interventions 
- Effectiveness and 
suitability  of private land 





1.3. Objective and research questions 
Because the changes in actors and scales of agriculture as described above can have 
considerable socio-economic as well as biophysical consequences, it is important to 
better understand the underlying land system change processes and contribute to 
filling the identified knowledge gaps. Understanding the drivers, impacts, threats, 
and opportunities they may represent requires a multi-scaled, interdisciplinary 
approach, which land system science may be able to deliver. Therefore, the overall 
objective of the thesis is to develop concepts and methods to integrate new 
actors and scales of agriculture into land system science.  
From the land system science knowledge gaps identified in Table 1.1, four research 
questions can be distilled that can be seen as logical next steps towards this objective. 
RQ1: What are the land system characteristics related to new agricultural 
actors? 
RQ2: How can new agricultural actors, and associated scales of land system 
change, be integrated in land system models? 
RQ3: What are the objectives of new actors in agriculture and how do these 
objectives align or misalign with environmental or rural development 
objectives? 
RQ4: How do new actors and arrangements in agriculture provide 
opportunities for environmental management and rural development? 
1.4. Thesis outline 
This thesis starts with a broad overview of the new actors and scales of agriculture, 
questioning what conceptually links them and how they are geographically 
manifested (Chapter 2). The chapter discusses how new actors and new 
constellations of land control may present a threat or opportunity to the attainment 
of Land Degradation Neutrality, and presents a number of policy responses for 
governments, international organizations, and private actors. Land Degradation 
Neutrality is one of the Sustainable Development Goals targets under the ‘Life on 
Land’ overarching goal and is adopted under the auspices of the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Chapter 3 zooms in on MSF, and 
aims to broaden the systems knowledge base on this relatively poorly described 
dynamic. The chapter specifically questions to what extent MSFs are functionally 
different from small-scale farms, and creates a unique dataset for the Kenyan Rift 
Valley to do so. Chapter 4 summarizes empirical understanding of LSLAs in Laos in 
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a land system change model. This model is developed specifically to simulate non-
gradual, large-scale dynamics alongside gradual, small-scale dynamics, and can make 
the competition between LSLAs and smallholders for land and market shares 
tangible. The aim here is to fill the knowledge gap of the lacking representation of 
LSLA in land use models. Chapter 5 further expands the work in chapter 4 to be 
able to represent the land use decision-making of LSLA managers and governmental 
decision-makers. This model is deployed to confront LSLA policies with biological 
conservation targets for Cambodia, a country that has seen rapid LSLA proliferation 
while also aiming to reintroduce tigers. Chapter 6 synthesizes the findings from the 
various chapters and reflects on the research questions. 
While the thesis chapters have chapter-specific objectives and questions and have 
been published as standalone, peer-reviewed research papers, they all contribute to 
the general objective of this thesis. Figure 1.1 visualizes the connections between the 
knowledge domains, research questions, and chapters.  
 
Figure 1.1: Research questions (RQs) and thesis chapters, and their relation to the systems, 






2.  Agency shifts in agricultural land 
governance and their implications 
for Land Degradation Neutrality 
Given current land degradation trends, Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN, 
SDG Target 15.3) by 2030 could be difficult to attain. Solutions to avoid, reduce, 
and reverse land degradation are not being implemented at sufficiently large scales, 
pointing to land governance as the main obstacle. In this paper, we review dynamics 
in agricultural land governance, and the potential this may have to enable land 
degradation or provide solutions towards LDN. The literature reveals agency shifts 
are taking place, where value chain actors are given increasing decision-making 
power in land governance. These agency shifts are manifested in two interrelated 
trends: First, through agricultural value chain coordination, such as contract farming, 
value chain actors increasingly influence land management decisions. Second, 
international large-scale land acquisitions and domestic larger-scale farms, both 
instances of intensified direct involvement of value chain with land management, are 
overtaking significant areas of land. These new arrangements are associated with 
agricultural expansion, and are additionally associated with unsustainable land 
management due to absent landowners, short-term interests, and high-intensity 
agriculture. However, we also find that value chain actors have both the tools and 
business cases to catalyze LDN solutions. We discuss how governments and other 
LDN brokers can motivate or push private actors to deploy private governance 
measures to avoid, reduce, and reverse land degradation. Successful implementation 
of LDN requires refocusing efforts to enable and, where necessary, constrain all 
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Figure 2.1: Graphical abstract for Chapter 2. Land governance arrangements are changing (left 
panel) as value chain coordination implies a larger role of value chain actors in land 
management issues, and land control is given to novel actors through LSLA and domestic 
larger-scale farms. This threatens progress towards LDN unlocking new areas for agricultural 
expansion and by disseminating unsustainable land management practices (upper right 
panel). However, it also enables new ways to address land degradation, with responses by 
value chain actors, state actors, and LDN brokers. 
2.1. Introduction 
Land degradation, defined broadly as a reduction of biological productivity and a 
decrease in ecosystem complexity, has affected over 20% of the global vegetated 
land area and 1.5 billion people in the last two decades (UNCCD, 2017). On 
agricultural land, land degradation is mostly anthropogenic, due to unsustainable 
agricultural practices and ill-adapted land and water management. Underlying drivers 
include both socio-economic and political factors (Vorovencii, 2016). On a global 
scale, degradation of agricultural landscapes undermines food security, reduces 
carbon storage in soils and biomass, and causes major economic losses, especially in 
already poor areas (Muchena et al., 2005; UNDP/UNCCD, 2011). 
A structural answer to the land degradation issue has been proposed by the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) through the concept of 
Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN). LDN has been adopted as a target under the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as target 15.3. A range of LDN brokers, 
actors aiming to drive progress towards the attainment of LDN, help countries to 
set targets and their implementation, including international NGOs, knowledge 
institutes, and funding mechanisms. Conceptually, LDN sets out the ambition to, 
Agency shifts in agricultural land governance and their implications for LDN 
 39 
 
on balance, maintain or increase the amount and quality of land resources by 
compensating any land degradation with land restoration, within specified time- and 
spatial-scales (Cowie et al., 2018). Technical implementation of LDN interventions 
occurs at a national scale, by compensating any ongoing land degradation within a 
land type by restoration and rehabilitation of the same amount of land of this type 
elsewhere. To this end, National Action Programmes are developed to envision 
pathways towards LDN, and concrete actions are outlined in Target Setting 
Programmes (Global Mechanism, 2019a).  
LDN on agricultural land is feasible from a technical standpoint, as sustainable land 
management (SLM) and restoration techniques are readily available to counteract a 
wide range of land degradation issues. Yet, the bottleneck is the adoption of these 
techniques (Pacheco et al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2018). Land management decisions 
are made and influenced by a diverse set of actors, including for example 
smallholders, agribusinesses, agricultural cooperatives, and local to national land 
administrations. All of these need to be enabled and incentivized to avoid, reduce 
and reverse land degradation. Policy makers therefore face the challenge to create an 
enabling environment, i.e. a context that allows progress towards LDN (Akhtar-
Schuster et al., 2017).  This challenge is essentially an exercise of land governance 
(i.e. the processes by which decisions are made regarding the access to and use of land, the manner 
in which those decisions are implemented and the way that conflicting interests in land are reconciled 
(Borras and Franco, 2010; GLTN, 2018). Land governance encompasses elements 
of land use policy (the laws and regulations around land use and management) and 
land tenure (the bundle of rights endowed on various users and user groups). 
Consistently, a lack of effective and responsible land governance has been cited as a 
major constraint for large-scale adoption of SLM and restoration/rehabilitation 
projects (Nkonya et al., 2016; Verburg et al., 2019). 
Traditional land governance assessments assume that agency over agricultural land 
management (i.e. the capacity to make decisions on land use and management) lies 
primarily with local or national actors, such as farmers or public land administrations 
(Sikor et al., 2013). However, land governance can be influenced by a much broader 
range of actors, including for example agribusinesses, retailers and other value chain 
actors (VCAs) (Lambin and Thorlakson, 2018), as well as consumers. As land 
systems globalize, agency over rural land management decisions has expanded to 
include urban elites and non-local actors along commodity value chains (Peluso and 
Lund, 2011). 
Recent literature points to major dynamics in land tenure and agency over land 
management decisions in the agricultural sector over the past two decades. 
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Noteworthy are recent developments in large scale land acquisitions (LSLA), where 
(often foreign) investors acquire large tracts of land (Nolte et al., 2016), medium-
scale farms in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jayne et al., 2016), land concentration in South 
America (Gómez, 2014), and contract farming (Otsuka et al., 2016). These trends 
point to a drastic diversification of actors relevant in contemporary land governance.  
While the wider range of possible actors in land governance and environmental 
management is increasingly being recognized (Peluso and Lund, 2011), knowledge 
on their characteristics and geography is limited and scattered across disciplines. 
Furthermore, understanding of the implications for global environmental change 
issues, both in terms of threats and innovative solutions, has emerged only recently. 
Yet, new actors and value chain coordination are found to be associated with both 
severe land degradation (e.g. Liao et al., 2020), and with innovative solutions for 
environmental stewardship (e.g. Rueda et al., 2017). Because the heterogeneity of 
contexts of land degradation makes scalable LDN governance solutions highly 
needed (Ariti et al., 2019; Seppelt et al., 2018; Sparrow et al., 2020), it is pertinent to 
identify new ways to make progress towards LDN with a full consideration of the 
threats and opportunities that new actors present. 
Most current efforts to combat land degradation and create an enabling environment 
for LDN are poorly reconciled with the changing land governance context. Geared 
towards state actors and local land managers, they remain somewhat inattentive to 
the role VCAs could play. For example, the National Action Programmes made by 
UNCCD’s parties contain plans for governmental agencies, scientific institutions, 
and local communities (UNCCD, 2020), and rarely consider the role of VCAs as 
drivers of or solutions to land degradation.   
The objective of this chapter is to quantify and map recent dynamics in agricultural 
land governance and assess the implications of these dynamics for the attainment of 
the LDN target, both in terms of new drivers of land degradation and innovative 
governance solutions towards LDN. We review evidence from recent peer-reviewed 
and grey literature on agency shifts in land governance and their consequences for 
enabling land degradation or leveraging LDN. The study focuses specifically on 
agricultural land and agricultural value chains. Three steps are taken towards this 
goal: (1) to quantify and, where possible, map current dynamics of land control and 
value chain coordination, and link these hitherto disparate dynamics within a 
framework of agency in land governance, (2) to describe the mechanisms by which 
they may act as an enabler of land degradation, and (3) to present ways for LDN 
brokers and actors along agricultural value chains to reposition themselves in this 
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changing reality, so as to unlock novel, catalytic governance solutions for the 
attainment of land degradation neutrality. 
2.2. Methods 
2.2.1. Analytical framework and definitions 
LDN requires major transitions in land use and land management, raising the 
question on who decides on these issues. This chapter adopts the perspective of 
agency to formulate answers to this question. Agency is defined as the capacity of 
an actor to instigate changes in land use and land management. This agency is usually 
not wielded by a single person or institution, but rather distributed across multiple 
actors. As the focus is primarily on the agricultural sector, other land-based activities 
(mining, forestry, etc.) that are relevant for LDN are not considered. 
Conceptually, we distinguish three actor groups in land governance: individual land 
managers, state actors, and VCAs. First, we consider land managers, defined as 
people with rights to control land (Table 2.1). Control rights are an element of land 
tenure next to use and transfer rights (FAO, 2002). We use the term land manager to 
denote people who are entitled to change land use and management (setting them 
apart from land users, who do not enjoy such rights). Land managers can be land owners 
if they also enjoy land transfer rights, but in many situations, the land owner and 
land manager of a specific parcel are not the same.  
Table 2.1: Distinction between land user, land manager, and land owner in terms of their 
respective land tenure rights. Definitions are based on FAO (2002). In these definitions, rights 
may be formal, customary or assumed. 
 






Right to use 
use land 
Right to control 
use land 
change land use 
manage land 
grant use rights 
Right to transfer 
use land 
change land use 
manage land 
grant use rights 
grant control rights 
sell/transfer land to 
others 
Land user Yes Optional Optional 
Land manager Yes Yes Optional 
Land owner Yes Yes Yes 
 
A second actor group are state actors, defined as governmental institutions at any 
administrative level that decide on land-related issues. This is in itself a 
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heterogeneous group, consisting of, among others, municipalities, agricultural and 
environmental ministries, and landscape planners.   
VCAs (i.e. actors up- and downstream of the farm in agricultural value chains) 
compose the third group. These actors include, among others, agribusinesses, 
retailers, processors, and land investors, and influence land management by setting 
production requirements, providing agricultural technologies, and in some cases 
claiming full land control and/or land transfer rights. 
The relative agency of these actor groups in a given land system can be visualized in 
an agency diagram (Figure 2.2). This diagram shows how agency is shared among 
the three groups, with each corner representing full agency of a single actor group. 
For example, the top corner represents a land system where state actors hold all 
authority over land-related issues, a situation that may be found in strictly protected 
natural reserves. In the bottom right corner, a land system of pure land manager 
agency is depicted, which is perhaps most closely approximated by subsistence-
focused communities in remote places where state actors have no effective power. 
The bottom left corner represents a context where land decisions are made only by 
VCAs, a situation that is approximated by certain instances of plantations in 
countries with weak land governance institutions. In reality, however, agency is 
usually shared by at least two actors, and is therefore situated more centrally in the 
diagram. For example, most smallholder farmers act with relative autonomy but are 
subjected to the land laws set out by state actors insofar as these are effectively 
enforced, and will respond to land management requirements set by VCAs insofar 
as following these requirements is beneficial to them. 





Figure 2.2: Agency diagram. Land governance in a given land system is characterized by the 
extent to which either of three agent groups have agency over the land management decision-
making process. Smallholder or family farms are a heterogeneous group of land systems, which 
are dominated by individual land managers but may have significant state or value chain 
agency. Novel land systems such as international LSLAs or domestic larger-scale farms, 
occupy different positions on the diagram. The position of a given land system on the diagram 
informs the design of interventions to, for example, avoid, reduce or reverse land degradation, 
and indicates the primary partner(s) to address. Positions on the diagram can shift through 
time. 
2.2.2. Synthesis of agency shifts and their implications for LDN 
We combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to synthesize the extent and 
geography of agency shifts in land governance and their implications for LDN, in 
three steps.  
First, we quantified and mapped agricultural land governance dynamics. Value chain 
coordination was approximated by the scientific literature describing contract 
farming arrangements. Recent literature (2007 and onwards) on contract farming 
was collected using Keywords “Contract farming” and “Contract Farm” in Web of 
Science. Papers were screened on relevance, retaining only those describing pre-
harvest agreements between farmers and buyers. A cartography of retained papers 
was prepared by pinpointing the location of the case(s) described, and a timeline of 
publications was made. A distinction between local, regional and national case 
studies was made, with local case studies describing a relatively small area (e.g. a 
village), regional case studies describing a larger subnational area (e.g. a province) 
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and national studies characterizing a country. Where a single paper described 
multiple cases, these were mapped separately.  
International LSLAs were mapped and quantified using data available in the 
crowdsourced Land Matrix (Land Matrix, 2019) database. We used this database to 
map transnational land acquisitions for which contract negotiations have been 
concluded. Domestic Larger-Scale Farms (DLSFs) are not mapped, as this highly 
heterogeneous process is not easily captured under a single, quantifiable 
denominator. Instead, we discuss the various shapes DLSFs take in different parts 
of the world, and provide statistics where these are available. 
Second, to describe the mechanisms by which agency shifts can lead to land 
degradation, we synthesize the current state of knowledge on the environmental 
impacts of value chain coordination, LSLAs, and DLSFs. We searched academic 
search engines and repositories, including Google Scholar and Web of Science, using 
keywords including “large-scale land acquisition”, “land grab(bing)”, “land tenure”, 
“agricultural commercialization”, and more, and identified papers or grey literature 
that address environmental impacts of LSLAs, DLSFs, and the many instances of 
value chain coordination. Retained documents were used for forward and backward 
snowballing to retrieve additional entries. The information gathered was used to 
distill key processes by which agency shifts cause or enable land degradation. 
Third, to identify ways for VCAs, governmental actors, and other LDN brokers to 
reposition themselves and unlock novel, catalytic governance solutions for the 
attainment of LDN, we similarly performed a synthesis exercise on literature 
retrieved using keywords including “private land governance”, “corporate 
sustainability”, as well as keywords relating to specific instruments (e.g. 
“certification”). Adopting and combining existing frameworks (Rueda et al., 2017; 
Schaltegger and Burritt, 2018), we question to what extent VCAs can be instrumental 
for LDN, and how LDN brokers can leverage motivators to move VCAs to do so. 
2.3. Land governance dynamics 
Two interrelated trends of the 21st century, with relevance to the questions 
surrounding the distribution of agency to decide over land management, are of 
interest. We present literature on value chain coordination, where downstream and 
upstream actors in agricultural value chains use contracts and other mechanisms to 
influence land management of farmers embedded in the value chain. Subsequently 
we present evidence of the shift of land control rights have towards new actors. 
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Here, we focus specifically on LSLAs and DLSF, two highly visible trends that 
introduce new actors and break away from the family farming structure. 
2.3.1. Value chain coordination: supermarkets, processors, and 
contract farming 
Agricultural value chains can shape land management of farmers embedded within 
them, through predicating inputs and technologies that are available to farmers, and 
standardizing agricultural production (Reardon et al., 2009; Zagata and Sutherland, 
2015). A major restructuring of the global agrifood industry is taking place, 
characterized by a closer direct involvement of VCAs with the land management of 
their producers, especially in areas near urban centers (Lee et al., 2012; Masters et 
al., 2013). Such value chain coordination can lead to on-the-ground land 
management changes (Rueda and Lambin, 2013). A highly visible symptom of this 
trend is the global rise of supermarkets (Blandon et al., 2009; das Nair, 2018; 
Reardon and Gulati, 2008). Supermarkets tend to set specific standards for how 
crops should be produced and impose quality standards on the products themselves 
(Hazell et al., 2010). This has the potential to influence land management practices 
(Handschuch et al., 2013; Neven et al., 2009). 
Agricultural processors and large-scale trading firms are also increasing their market 
share and are increasingly engaging in closer relationships with supplying farmers. 
Documented sharp increases are reported in Kenya and Zambia, but the full extent 
of this dynamic is not yet fully understood (Sitko et al., 2018). Large-scale trading 
firms are often found to provide agricultural inputs and farmer trainings, thereby 
influencing land management (Sitko et al., 2018).  
The relations between VCAs (supermarkets, trading firms, processors) and land 
managers are increasingly formalized through contract farming; which encompass a 
variety of agreements between farmers and buyers (Meemken and Bellemare, 2019). 
Three types of contract arrangements exist, each with increasing control over the 
land management of the contracted farmers (Prowse, 2012). Through marketing 
contracts, a processor and farmer only specify the quantity, price and quality of the 
product in a contract; resource-providing contracts require the processor to provide 
inputs (seeds, fertilizer, specific hardware), often as a loan, thereby exerting some 
control over the use of these inputs; whereas production-management contracts 
include specific production preconditions. A special form of contract farming 
associated with frontier contexts are crop boom-and-bust cycles (Hall, 2011; 
Ornetsmüller et al., 2019), often described in Southeast Asia. These cycles see 
smallholder farmers offered contracts which are to some extent predatory in nature, 
Chapter 2  
 
 46 
to grow cash crops. After a surge in contract adoption, a combination of land 
degradation and indebtedness creates a crop bust (Mahanty and Milne, 2016). 
A global overview of the extent of contract farming is currently lacking. Data from 
the United States, Japan and Europe indicate that roughly more than a third of total 
agricultural production is produced under contracts (Otsuka et al., 2016). In the 
Global South, contract farming is important in some countries, (e.g. in Kenya, where 
40% of farmers produce under contract), while in other countries (Vietnam, Ghana, 
Uganda), scarce evidence suggests that 5% of farmers produce under contract (Oya, 
2012).  
While empirical evidence is scarce, most literature reports on a rising importance of 
contract farming, both in developed and developing countries (Bellemare and Lim, 
2018; Otsuka et al., 2016). Furthermore, a wealth of case studies (Figure 2.3) 
scrutinizing the micro- and macro-economic impacts of contract farms signals their 
increasing importance (Smalley, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). These case studies indicate 
that value chain coordination through contract farming is a global phenomenon, 
with case study hotspots in East Africa, Ghana, Southeast Asia and the Indian 
subcontinent. 
Contract farming case studies 
 
Figure 2.3: Timeline and locations of case studies reporting on contract farming as a proxy for 
the geographical extent and importance of value chain coordination. Hotspots of literature on 
contract farming are apparent in East Africa, Ghana, Southeast Asia, and the Indian 
subcontinent. Relative cold spots are Latin America and Australia. Developing countries are 
more often covered by local case studies, while developed countries have more national-scale 
studies.  
2.3.2. Land control dynamics: international LSLAs and DLSFs 
Concurrent with the trend towards increased value chain actor involvement with 
land management, major land control dynamics are taking place. Land control 
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2.1), and can therefore decide on land use and land management. These land control 
dynamics introduce international actors (e.g. international LSLAs), or a variety of 
novel domestic actors that diverge from typical family farming operations. 
International LSLAs are acquisitions through lease, concession, or sale of large 
tracts of land to international agribusinesses, investors, and foreign countries. The 
most extensive global repository of verified LSLAs indicates that, since 2000, over 
80 million hectares of land has been acquired (Land Matrix, 2019). A timeline of 
LSLAs (Figure 2.4) shows a very rapid rise between 2007 and 2014, after which an 
apparent stagnation is observed. This stagnation could represent an actual trend, but 
is also partly explained by time lags between the land acquisition and its reporting in 
the Land Matrix database (Nolte et al., 2016).  
Plantation-style agriculture managed by foreign parties is historically no novelty, with 
similar instances having existed in Roman, medieval, colonial and modern times 
(Alden Wily, 2012). However, in post-colonial times, the policy environment 
changed to foster small-scale, family farm production in most areas of the Global 
South. The sudden surge in plantation-style agriculture since 2007 is, therefore, a 
trend-breaking aberration (Byerlee, 2014) 
The LSLA phenomenon is global in reach (Figure 2.3), with hotspots in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Constantin et al., 2017; 
Rulli et al., 2012). Land is acquired by an opaque plethora of international 
agribusinesses and investment funds (Cotula, 2012) mostly for agriculture, although 
forestry, tourism, industry, conservation projects and speculation are also notable 
intentions for such investments (Nolte et al., 2016).  
LSLAs have been problematized from different disciplinary perspectives 
(Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). LSLA intentions often fail to come to fruition, because 
frequently, land rights have been transferred to nonviable businesses, or to actors 
interested in the speculative future value of the land rights (Deininger et al., 2011).  
Violations against local land rights have been widely reported (Anseeuw et al., 2011). 
The aspiration that LSLAs would develop intensive agriculture on non-forested, 
unused land (Deininger et al., 2011) has largely been debunked, as LSLAs target land 
with these characteristics in only a quarter of land deals globally. Oppositely, most 
deals target either populated croplands (displacing local people and creating 
secondary land expansion), or forests (Messerli et al., 2014). 
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International large-scale land acquisitions 
 
Figure 2.4: Timeline and location of international LSLAs as reported in the Land Matrix 
database. LSLAs for which the location is known with at least regional precision are shown as 
dots, while LSLAs for which only the country is known are shown as blue shades. The timeline 
shows a stagnation in recent years, which may be partly explained by a data gathering time 
lag but could also indicate actual stagnation. Figures represent concluded international deals 
since 2000. 
Domestic larger-scale farms are observed in many countries and contexts. In 
general, these land systems capture a removal from family farming towards more 
capital-intensive, larger-scale farming controlled by domestic elites. Family farming 
is still the dominant mode of agricultural production worldwide when quantified in 
terms of the number of farms (Lowder et al., 2016). However, literature suggests 
that, across the globe, domestic elites are (re-)entering the agricultural sector, 
engaging in farming at larger spatial and capital scales using business models that 
diverge from family farming in numerous ways. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, DLSF is framed under the narrative of “the rise of medium-
scale farms” (Jayne et al., 2016). These are entrepreneurial farms run by domestic, 
often urban-based managers operating at a larger scale and in a more capital-
intensive way than is usual in their regional or national context. There are indications 
that medium-scale farms represent a relatively rapid urban takeover of the 
countryside. Empirical evidence on medium-scale farms comes from a number of 
national-scale case studies for Zambia (Sitko and Jayne, 2014), Malawi (Anseeuw et 
al., 2016), Ghana (Chapoto et al., 2013), Kenya (Debonne et al., 2020) as well as 
multi-country studies in West Africa (Hilhorst et al., 2011) and Southern Africa (Hall 
et al., 2017; Jayne et al., 2016). The most complete empirical study (Jayne et al., 2016) 
builds on repeated agricultural censuses (Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia) and 
finds that the share of land belonging to the smallholder segment (defined as smaller 
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(5 – 100 hectares) is growing. Newcomers in this segment are often urban-based 
individuals, and depart from the family farm business logic (Anseeuw et al., 2016; 
Sitko et al., 2018; Sitko and Chamberlin, 2015). Geographical analyses find that 
medium-scale farms are located in highly accessible areas close to major towns and 
cities (Sitko and Chamberlin, 2015). However, results of a systematic survey of 
medium- and small-scale farms in the Kenyan Rift Valley finds that the qualities 
attached to this farm size bracket in earlier studies, such as their urban origin, 
entrepreneurship, or tendency to grow non-staple crops, are only valid for a subset 
of medium-scale farms, and are also found in a subset of small-scale farms (Debonne 
et al., 2020). This indicates that, while larger, business-oriented farms may be 
overtaking the African countryside in some places, the evidence is mixed and the 
extent of this dynamic remains difficult to estimate.  
Medium-scale farms can either be characterized as an element of structural 
transformation which is part of other megatrends such as urbanization and the rise 
of supermarkets (Meyfroidt, 2017a; Neven et al., 2009), or as an elite capture akin to 
LSLA (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). The fragmented nature of landholdings under 
customary land tenure regimes in Africa has been noted as a major obstacle to the 
adoption of some agricultural technologies (notably mechanization), and the scope 
to consolidate landholdings from within a customary land tenure system is often 
limited (Asiama et al., 2019). Medium-scale farms break with customary tenure, and 
use statutory land tenure arrangements that, when backed by state power, can 
overrule existing customary land rights (Chimhowu, 2018). Whether this lateral entry 
of capital-intensive farmers is a necessary source of dynamism or a hostile takeover 
of customary spaces is an open debate (Hall et al., 2017). 
In Latin America, DLSFs are captured under the umbrella of “land concentration”, 
most notably in Argentina and Brazil. While land concentration is to a large extent a 
historical relict, it has intensified since 2000 (Gómez, 2014). In Argentina and 
Paraguay, small family farms are consolidated into larger farms, often for soy 
production, through leasing by capital-endowed individuals. These tenants lease and 
pool numerous adjacent farms, often without personally residing on-site (Elgert, 
2016; Urcola et al., 2015). In Brazil, land concentration is partly attributed to elite 
capture of land for speculative and productive purposes, enabled by unclear land 
tenure regulations (Reydon et al., 2015; Sparovek et al., 2019). Rapid concentration 
has also been noted in Uruguay, where land is transferring from individuals to 
domestic corporations (Piñeiro, 2012). To varying extents, such processes are taking 
place across the continent (for an overview, see Borras et al., 2012). 
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Likewise, a fast-paced increment of farm scale enlargement is occurring in Europe. 
The number of farms in the European Union has decreased by 25% between 2005 
and 2016. Most of the disappearing farms are small (<5 ha), and are being 
consolidated into larger farms; the only growing farm size segment is the one of 100 
ha and above (EUROSTAT, 2018). The specific dynamics of farm consolidation in 
Europe are highly context-specific, and driving factors include demography, 
economic liberalization and competitiveness, and policy biases (Bartolini and Viaggi, 
2013; van Vliet et al., 2015). A significant fraction of the resulting large farms (40% 
of 304 000 farms with an output of over 250 000 euro per year) are owned by various 
types of agribusiness holdings (EUROSTAT, 2018), signaling that European land is 
increasingly being managed and owned by business interests instead of family 
farmers. 
2.3.3. Land governance agency shift 
Value chain coordination and land control dynamics are shifting agency in land 
governance, causing a redistribution of agency over land management decisions 
(Figure 2.5). In other words, the answer to “who decides?” on land management is 
changing. As VCAs set production standards and provide access to agricultural 
inputs and technologies, they co-determine land management practices at global 
scales. This significant agency is, for example, leveraged to enforce health and safety 
standards across entire value chains, including soil and water management (Subervie 
and Vagneron, 2013). 
Land control dynamics further contribute to these agency shifts. This occurs directly, 
as land control rights are being transferred away from state actors (e.g. when LSLAs 
target protected areas or other state land) and from individual land managers. Land 
becomes controlled by actors that are more closely associated with VCAs: they are 
wholly reliant on VCAs through contracts or, in the case of many LSLAs, are owned 
by agribusinesses. 
Indirectly, land control dynamics are additionally found to override state regulations, 
either by clientelism or by unpenalized rule breaking (Cotula et al., 2011; Messerli et 
al., 2015; The World Bank, 2014), thereby significantly reducing state agency. The 
various modes of DLSFs are similarly associated with a redistribution of agency away 
from state actors. For example, African medium-scale farms managers have been 
found to dominate agricultural policy-making processes by occupying powerful 
positions in farmer organizations (Jayne et al., 2016).  




Figure 2.5: Agency shifts as a consequence of value chain coordination and land control 
dynamics. 
2.4. Agency shifts as enablers of land degradation 
2.4.1. Conversion of natural areas: ecological and institutional 
unlocking 
The scope for expansion of global cultivated areas at the cost of natural areas is 
dependent on ecological limitations and institutional rulesets (Eitelberg et al., 2015). 
Ecological limitations and institutional rulesets limit where agriculture is feasible and 
allowed, thereby safeguarding areas that are ecologically too unsuitable for 
agriculture and/or are adequately protected. We indicate below how VCAs have 
ecologically and institutionally unlocked some of these safe havens. 
First, ecological limitations can to some extent be overcome by technology-intensive 
farming systems using, for example, irrigation technology or synthetic fertilizers 
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(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001; Hall et al., 2017). This “ecological unlocking” is 
described in a number of case studies. For example, the conversion of an extensively 
used dryland area to a biofuel LSLA in Mozambique was made possible by 
developing irrigation infrastructure at a scale unattainable by local smallholders 
(Borras et al., 2011). For LSLAs, ecological unlocking has not been an accidental by-
product, but rather an explicit element of its supporting narrative to develop 
“underused”, “marginal” lands in “land-abundant areas” (Deininger and Byerlee, 
2012). 
Ecological unlocking is also a central tenet of many contract farming schemes where 
downstream VCAs provide inputs or hardware to farmers to enable them to adopt 
crops. A prime example is the rapid spread of rubber in Southeast Asia, which is 
replacing shifting cultivation landscapes and forests (Ahrends et al., 2015). Similarly, 
boom and bust dynamics build on dispersion of technologies such as hybrid maize 
and synthetic fertilizers through middle men, thus allowing crops to be grown 
outside of their ecologically suitable range, albeit only for a limited time and at the 
cost of severe land degradation (Ornetsmüller et al., 2019). 
Second, institutional unlocking denotes the diminishing power of regulation, land 
use planning, or protected areas, in limiting where agriculture can expand into. This 
further enables conversions of natural areas, again especially in the case of LSLAs. 
The apparent disregard of LSLAs to respect the integrity of protected areas or stay 
clear of valuable ecosystems (Koh and Wilcove, 2008; Messerli et al., 2015) indicates 
that institutional barriers against degradation have become largely irrelevant in an 
LSLA context. 
Many LSLAs are expansionist in nature and thereby often claim new areas beyond 
the extent of current agricultural areas at the expense of nature. Geographic analysis 
has shown that, globally, LSLAs often target forested areas (e.g. in Brazil, Papua 
New Guinea, Indonesia, Congo), and acquired areas and their surroundings are 
found to be deforested at faster rates than comparable non-acquired areas (Davis et 
al., 2015; Eakin et al., 2014; Magliocca et al., 2019). Besides forests, other important 
habitats such as savannas are lost to LSLAs, thereby undermining efforts to 
safeguard biodiversity (Debonne et al., 2019). 
In contrast to the expansionist nature of LSLAs, preliminary spatial analyses of 
DLSFs in Africa indicates that these farms predominantly develop in areas with high 
agricultural potential (Sitko and Chamberlin, 2015), and may, therefore, be less likely 
to cause natural ecosystem losses (as target areas are usually already cultivated). For 
contract farming, natural area loss is found when the short-term lucrativeness 
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and/or indebtedness drive farmers to expand their landholdings, as has been 
observed in the  Southeast Asian rubber sector (Ahrends et al., 2015), cattle rearing 
in the Brazilian Amazon (Pereira et al., 2016), or the many oil palm outgrower 
schemes in the global tropics (e.g. in Indonesia: Euler et al. (2015) and Peru: Bennett 
et al. (2018)). 
2.4.2. Introduction and incentivization of unsustainable land 
management 
Agency shifts in land governance may also enable land degradation in cases where 
the affected areas were already under agricultural use, if the agency shift incentivizes 
or introduces unsustainable land management practices. As VCAs increase their 
agency over land management decisions and land control dynamics introduce new 
actors, three causal links explain an often-observed shift to more unsustainable land 
management practices. 
First, capital and technology can significantly intensify land management. Value 
chain coordination delivers capital and technology, notably through input-providing 
contract farming. Moreover, compared to smallholder farms, LSLAs and DLSFs are 
typically more capital-intensive. Conventional agricultural intensification, while able 
to increase crop yields in the short term, can come at the expense of other ecosystem 
functions and can be unsustainable in the longer term (Deguines et al., 2014). For 
example, crop boom and bust cycles are instigated by VCAs introducing seeds and 
inputs for intensive agriculture in extensively used landscapes, leaving depleted and 
eroded soils after the bust phase (Ornetsmüller et al., 2019). Overuse of inputs and 
a switch from diverse cropping systems to monocultures has also been described for 
LSLAs (e.g. Friis, 2015; Mann and Bonanomi, 2017). A World Bank study found 
that 32 out of 33 surveyed LSLAs engaged in patently deleterious land management, 
including unsustainable mono-cropping, excessive use of pesticides, and water 
resource depletion and pollution (The World Bank, 2014). Similarly, a multi-country 
West-African study found anecdotal evidence of more soil erosion occurring in 
DLSFs relative to smallholder farmers (Hilhorst et al., 2011). 
Second, land control dynamics have introduced actors that often act as absentee, 
distant land owners/managers, creating a situation where land management 
decisions are made by people who are physically disconnected from the land they 
manage. Similarly, VCAs up- or downstream of the farm influence land management 
of farms without residing on, or near to, these farms. It can be hypothesized that 
absentee land owners/managers are less inclined to value sustainability, as they are 
protected from immediate negative effects of unsustainable practices. Corroborating 
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evidence for this hypothesis is found in several cases; in the United States, absentee 
land owners have been found to be less likely to manage against soil erosion or 
participate in soil conservation programs (Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015; Stroman 
and Kreuter, 2015); in a case study from the Philippines, Ravnborg (2003) found 
that absentee land managers were the only land manager group contesting 
restrictions on adverse agricultural practices, pushing for more lenience in the use of 
chemical inputs and opposing to land restoration projects. Contrastingly, in 
Australia, absentee land owners using their land mostly for recreational purposes 
have been found to engage in conservation efforts (Kam et al., 2019). Currently, the 
evidence concerning this hypothesis is still too anecdotal to warrant strong claims. 
Third, the agency shift may promote a short-term economic interest in land, 
undermining longer-term sustenance of productive capacity. Growing crops in 
suboptimal environments can cause severe or even irreparable land degradation, yet 
still make business sense to actors who do not rely on that specific land for their 
long-term sustenance and livelihood. This is a defining characteristic of crop booms 
(Hall, 2011; Mahanty and Milne, 2016). Furthermore, many studies have noted the 
surprisingly large amount of failed LSLAs, where production stops within a few 
years after startup (Nolte et al., 2016), often due to ecological unsustainability and 
soil depletion (Messerli et al., 2015; Schönweger and Messerli, 2015). DLSFs are 
estimated to be more embedded within their local communities and to create long-
term economic linkages, but empirical evidence is scarce (Hilhorst et al., 2011; 
Meyfroidt, 2017b). 
2.5. Responses to the agency shift 
Responses and measures to attain the LDN target may be more effective if they are 
tailored to the new global land governance contexts. Hereafter we outline how value 
chain coordination and land control dynamics can be leveraged to implement LDN 
measures at scale. First, we discuss the instruments that VCAs have at their disposal 
to avoid, reduce, and reverse land degradation. Second, we identify motivators for 
the adoption of these instruments, and how state actors and other LDN brokers can 
interact with these motivators. 
2.5.1. Instruments of value chain actors 
VCAs may use a mix of metaphorical carrots, sticks, and sermons to, respectively, 
promote LDN, penalize unsustainable land management, and foster awareness, 
knowledge, and partnership towards LDN in their value chain (Figure 2.6). 
Following Rueda et al. (2017), we organize the possible value chain instruments 
based on stringency. We further assess to what extent, and how, instruments can be 
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used in either step of the LDN response hierarchy. Instruments aiming to avoid land 
degradation must be able to purge the value chain from products associated with 
ongoing processes of land degradation. Reduction of land degradation in value 
chains can be achieved by ensuring that suppliers transition to SLM and abandon 
degrading land management practices. Land degradation reversal requires that the 
productive potential and ecological functioning of degraded landscapes is (partially) 
restored. 
 
Figure 2.6: Instruments available to VCAs to promote SLM and self-regulate sustainability take 
the form of carrots (rewarding positive action), sticks (penalizing negative action) or sermons 
(sharing information and best practices). Interventions are ordered from least to most stringent 
(left to right). There are numerous interventions that can be instrumental in avoiding or 
reducing the land degradation associated with a value chain. The scope for reversal of land 
degradation remains limited. 
Trainings are often used by agribusinesses, in a fashion similar to governmental or 
NGO-led agricultural extension (Anderson, 2008). While the overall focus of such 
trainings is usually farm yield maximization, sustainability can be part of the 
curriculum too. For example, Callebaut, a major chocolate processing company, 
assists its suppliers to enhance the carbon sequestration potential of cocoa farms, 
among others by promoting tree-shaded cocoa (Barry Callebaut, 2018; Cocoa 
Horizons, 2018). Such interventions constitute an effort to not only avoid and 
reduce degradation, but also to reverse it. 
Codes of conduct are intentions and targets set and evaluated by companies. They are 
low-stringency interventions because, while their goal is a modicum of self-
regulation, non-adherence is not penalized - and in many cases not made public. 
Their effectiveness is, therefore, entirely dependent on the internal discipline of the 
company and the extent to which the code of conduct is able to affect the core 
business model (Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016). In most cases, a supplier’s non-
compliance will not constitute grounds for exclusion from the supply chain (Lund-
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Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Unilever provides an example of a wide-ranging 
environmental code of conduct. Their Sustainable Agriculture Programme defines 
11 standards, among which are soil health, soil loss, nutrients, pest management, and 
biodiversity. Supplying farmers and companies are encouraged to comply with these 
standards, and develop strategies to book incremental progress. Despite the non-
compulsory nature of the standards, the code of conduct provides a common 
definition of sustainability and allows Unilever to track its progress (Unilever, 2019).  
Roundtables are sector-wide platforms where multiple stakeholders (farmers, 
processors, retailers, NGOs) meet to share best practices and strive towards sector-
wide sustainability (Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011). Typically, roundtables produce 
a shared code of conduct to which participating companies commit to comply. 
Examples include the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy. Their scope is similar 
to the codes of conduct for individual companies, although the focus of roundtables 
has typically been on halting rampant deforestation rather than the promotion of 
SLM practices. Roundtables can issue certificates for compliant producers, thereby 
setting stricter requirements than are provided in the national laws of producers 
(Garrett et al., 2016). 
Eco-certification is a communication tool developed to allow producers to ascertain the 
sustainability of their products to obtain a premium price from consumers with a 
sustainability preference (Defries et al., 2017). The certification is performed by an 
external auditor based on a set of criteria and allows for a label to be displayed on 
certified products. For example, the Rainforest Alliance currently certifies 1.3 million 
farmers operating on 3.5 million hectares and auditing based on 23 mandatory and 
77 flexible criteria. Criteria include nature conservation and proper agricultural input 
use (Rainforest Alliance, 2018). Whether eco-certification (or the certification issued 
by roundtables) is able to spread SLM rather than merely reward current SLM 
practitioners remains unclear (Blackman and Rivera, 2011). 
Contract conditions are clauses attached to contract farming schemes. Where contract 
farming takes the form of a production-management contract, downstream VCAs 
can demand crops to be produced under a specific land management (Abebe et al., 
2013; Bellemare and Lim, 2018). These conditions are often related to food safety, 
imposing, for example, specific food storage conditions. However, sustainability can 
be part of these conditions as well. For example, in Madagascar, Minten et al. (2009) 
reported that farmers producing vegetables under contract for European markets 
face strict requirements, and as a consequence show more sustainable management 
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of resources. Similarly, Van Hoi et al. (2010) describe input limitations imposed on 
Vietnamese farmers that produce vegetables for export.  
Retailer standards are developed to enable retailers to perform due diligence, and share 
similarities with eco-certification schemes. For example, GlobalGAP (Global 
Partnership for Good Agricultural Practices) is used by over 40 large retailers in 15 
countries (mainly in Western Europe). These retailers thereby ensure that products 
in their shelves meet all GlobalGAP criteria. The certification is very broad, 
incorporating elements of hygiene, traceability, on-farm labor, and food safety. 
While sustainability and environmental criteria are present, these are typically 
“recommended” rather than imposed. For example, GlobalGAP asks that 
consideration be given to enhancing the environment and to minimize 
environmental impact (GlobalGAP, 2017). For farmers wishing to export to the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Germany, being certified by GlobalGAP is a 
de facto requirement as virtually all retailers in these countries require it (Colen et 
al., 2012). In Vietnam, rice farmers certified by GlobalGAP and VietGAP (the 
Vietnamese certification institution) are found to use significantly less inputs 
(fertilizers and pesticides) compared to non-certified farmers (Stuart et al., 2018).  
Bans and moratoria are high-stringency tools that aim to completely remove producers 
that practice degrading land management from the value chain. The Amazon Soy 
Moratorium, for example, precludes farmers operating within recently deforested 
areas of the Amazon rainforest to sell to participating processors. Because 
participants include major processors like Cargill and Bunge, a significant part of the 
soybean sector could be cornered. If complemented by remote sensing-based 
monitoring, deforestation can be attributed to individual producers, thus creating a 
major disincentive to further degradation (Nepstad et al., 2014). However, critics 
argue that this moratorium ignores the stepwise nature of land use changes (e.g. 
where forest is first converted to pastures, and only later these pastures are converted 
to soy plantations; Arima et al. (2011). Furthermore, as soy expansion is effectively 
curtailed in the regulated area, it moves towards unregulated areas instead (Gibbs et 
al., 2015). 
Whether or not VCAs can be effective environmental stewards is heavily debated. 
In the field of forest conservation, value chain initiatives have been found to exert 
relatively minor and often unverifiable impacts, and where local effectiveness is 
evident, it is often offset by leakage of deforestation to other areas (Blackman and 
Rivera, 2011; Gibbs et al., 2015; Lambin et al., 2018). However, as an increasing 
amount of brands and companies are adopting standards, incremental positive 
changes are occurring (Defries et al., 2017). Whether or not current approaches are 
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effective, the increasingly consolidated nature of many food supply chains, where a 
handful of companies control the markets for e.g. coffee, banana, palm oil or cocoa, 
creates an imperative to interact with VCAs to develop more effective measures 
(Folke et al., 2019). 
2.5.2. Motivators for value chain action towards LDN and options 
for policy makers 
Following the previous section, we now question why VCAs would adopt 
instruments in line with the LDN target. Instruments are adopted when there is a 
business case to do so, and these can range from reactionary appeasement of 
environmental criticism to reputational business cases or the recognition of LDN as 
an inherent quality of responsible agribusiness (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2018). We 
identify four motivators that interfere with such business cases and explore the role 
of policy-making to stimulate, enable, or push VCAs (Table 2.2). 
First, to motivate VCAs concerned with building or maintaining a brand reputation, 
the link between products and their associated land degradation should be made 
transparent. Innovative tools, such as the TRASE database (www.trase.earth) are 
allowing researchers to scrutinize commitments (e.g. zu Ermgassen et al., 2020). 
However, agricultural value chains remain opaque (Keene et al., 2015; McSweeney 
and Coomes, 2020), and attributing land degradation to specific actors or products 
continues to be challenging (Paitan and Verburg, 2019). 
Second, land degradation often leads to reduced yields. Therefore, SLM can — in 
many cases— maintain or increase yields, although effects may not be immediate 
(Schmidt and Tadesse, 2019). However, for some forms of SLM and in certain 
contexts, yields will not increase but will rather be part of a trade-off against other 
co-benefits (Seufert and Ramankutty, 2017). When SLM increases yield or reduces 
risks, it is well-aligned with business interests. Governments can enable this 
motivator by supporting innovation, e.g. by providing transitional funding, 
microfinance, or linkups with research institutes. For example, the LDN Fund is a 
global initiative to provide structural funding to businesses aiming to contribute to 
LDN (Global Mechanism, 2019b; Quatrini and Crossman, 2018). However, as 
described above, institutional and ecological unlocking processes imply that, from 
the perspective of a VCA, degraded land can easily be replaced by tapping into 
frontier land. A disregard for the long-term productive capacity in a context of 
narratives of available land (Deininger et al., 2011) may therefore pose a challenge 
to triggering this motivator. Secure land tenure for smallholders and stringent land 
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zoning policies can dissuade unmitigated agricultural expansion and encourage 
VCAs to maintain or enhance the soil quality of current agricultural land.  
A third motivator is the ability for sustainability leaders to tap into niche markets, 
using certificates and labels to attest to sustainable practices. The potency of this 
motivator grows when more consumers are willing to pay higher premiums. Policy 
makers can further mainstream and regulate certificates and labels, create awareness 
among consumers, and provide financial assistance to support sustainable 
transitions and certification. However, the amount of consumers willing to pay for 
less degrading products is limited (Wei et al., 2018). Certification may help to support 
an ecological vanguard, but niche markets are easily saturated and therefore relying 
on consumer preferences is unlikely to be sufficient (Rueda et al., 2017).  
Fourth, VCAs may be pushed towards sustainability by legal requirements, taxes, or 
subsidies. These motivators are especially required to move environmental laggards 
(i.e. those who fail to find a business case for action against land degradation). 
Governments can for example turn existing voluntary certification into a minimum 
production prerequisite, thus requiring due diligence from, for example, 
supermarkets (Colen et al., 2012). More classical approaches include using land use 
planning to require or restrict specific land management in specific places 
(Metternicht, 2018), or the banning or taxing of specific practices (e.g. pesticide bans; 
Maggi et al., 2019). However, beyond issues of  attributing land degradation to 
products or companies, a major challenge lies in the globalized nature of the agrifood 
industry and the limitations of national governments in a context of international 
trade agreements (Eyhorn et al., 2019). Transnational companies may flee countries 
with strong environmental governance (Le Polain De Waroux et al., 2016). 
Supranational organizations and conventions, such as the UNCCD, may therefore 
have a role in facilitating a harmonized and sufficiently ambitious policy framework, 
as is also requested by the business community (WBCSD, 2019).  
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Table 2.2: Motivators for value chain action towards LDN, and their respective enablers, 
triggers, and challenges. 
Motivator 
 





- Scrutiny, naming and shaming 
- Value chain transparency (e.g. 
TRASE) 
- Lack of traceability and value 
chain opaqueness 
Land degradation 
reduces yields, SLM 
provides long-term yield 
stability and/or 
increases yields 
- Support SLM innovation 
(transitional funding, 
microfinance) 
- Limit agricultural expansion by 
securing land rights and 
enforcing deliberate land use 
plans 
- Provide transitional funding / 
microfinance 
- Ecological and institutional 
unlocking makes new, non-
degraded land available, 
removing the incentive to 
invest in maintenance of 
productive capacity 
- Trade-offs between SLM and 
short-term yields for many 
crops 
Access to sustainable 
niche markets 
- Support and regulate 
certification schemes 
- Increase consumer awareness 
- Saturation of niche markets 
limits potential 
Legal requirements, 
taxes and subsidies 
- Set standards, adopt existing 
certification as minimum 
requirement 
- Make specific, highly degrading 
practices illegal (e.g. pesticide 
bans) 
- Financial incentives 
- Lack of traceability and value 
chain opaqueness  
- VCAs seeking lowest 
governance denominator 
 
2.5.3. Towards a new strategy for LDN 
Governments and other LDN brokers have several ways to reposition themselves 
given the agency shifts and the implications thereof, outlined above. This 
repositioning can take three forms, which we discuss below. 
First, a re-appreciation of territorial land governance implies that state actors reclaim 
some agency at the expense of VCAs. In this, they acknowledge that the agency shift, 
if left unchecked, enables new forms of intensified land degradation. State actors 
may reclaim agency, e.g. through enforcement of environmental regulations. While 
market-based policies and instruments may have a potential to regulate value chains 
(Baumber et al., 2019), issues arising from land control dynamics (agricultural 
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expansion and unsustainable land management) remain unresolved. Therefore, 
enforcement of environmental regulations becomes necessary to reestablish the 
agency of state actors where it has shifted excessively towards VCAs. Interestingly, 
such regulations are requested by VCAs (WBCSD, 2019). For example, a survey 
among LSLAs (The World Bank, 2014) found that most LSLA managers welcome 
stricter environmental impact assessments. Insofar as these are equally applied to all 
competitors, they would enable the adoption of required SLM measures.  
Second,  a hybridization of land governance recognizes that spontaneous private 
environmental governance, while promising, is not sufficient (Dauvergne and Lister, 
2012; Lambin et al., 2014). This is especially so for LDN, where the scope of VCAs 
to turn degradation reversal into a business case is limited. Therefore, there are calls 
for governments to collaborate with private actors in hybrid land governance 
arrangements, where they complement each other’s possibilities and constraints 
(Rueda et al., 2017). Sikor et al. (2013) define such governance applied to value 
chains as flow-centered governance, which stands in contrast with traditional 
territory-centered governance. Flow-centered governance has significant benefits in 
terms of scalability. Baumber et al. (2019) assess to what extent existing market-
based instruments, such as the offsetting of damaging practices, mandates and 
obligations, grants, subsidies, or tax instruments, could be applicable and effective 
for LDN. These instruments are currently being applied in the realm of carbon 
emissions, biodiversity and other ecosystem services, and the authors conclude that 
LDN could be integrated in such existing instruments, although this hasn’t been 
done yet.  
Third, the coordination of the LDN target is primarily in the hands of the UNCCD, 
and their role may increase in importance because of the agency shift. The current 
policy dialogue to attain LDN is mostly a dialogue between state actors and the 
parties of the convention. As an example, the UNFCCC has since 2011 organized 
the Momentum for Change initiative, which takes the shape of a platform where 
businesses can share best practices in the fight against climate change. As a result, 
numerous partnerships between businesses have arisen (Hickmann et al., 2019). The 
UNCCD is finding a similar strategy, engaging with business platforms in the 
Conference of the Parties (Decision 6 COP.14), organizing seed funding for private 
LDN action through the LDN Fund (Global Mechanism, 2019b), and engaging with 
existing business platforms (WBCSD, 2019). Furthermore, the profile of LDN as an 
urgent and worthwhile international target with multiple co-benefits (Allen et al., 
2020) can be raised among business communities. Moving further on this pathway, 
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LDN could become part of existing or new sustainability standards, retailer 
standards, certification boards, and roundtables. 
2.6. Conclusion 
Our findings are based on a broad literature review in which the multiple dynamics 
in agricultural land governance are confronted with the current approach towards 
LDN. LDN does not only pertain to agricultural land, and further inquiries into 
similar dynamics in, for example, the forestry or mining sectors, could complement 
our findings. Furthermore, we note that certain aspects of the interface between land 
governance agency shifts and environmental management remain understudied. For 
example, while gender dimensions of (the efforts against) land degradation are found 
to be a key aspect of LDN (Collantes et al., 2018), there are currently no studies into 
gender dimensions of LDN in relation to the land governance dynamics described 
here. Lastly, while this chapter includes perspectives from research institutes, 
international organizations, and other grey literature, it can only serve as a proxy of 
the agency shifts described here. Continued efforts to map and track global 
agricultural dynamics could complement and improve our approximations, while a 
dialogue with stakeholders may bring additional nuance to the perspectives in this 
chapter. With these limitations in mind, our literature review has indicated that: 
1) Land governance is undergoing drastic changes, mostly manifested in a 
considerable agency shift towards VCAs at the expense of state actors and 
land managers.  
2) This agency shift can lead to conversion of natural land to agricultural land 
and incentivize unsustainable agricultural intensification, thereby 
undermining progress towards LDN. 
3) Newly empowered VCAs have instruments and business cases for actions 
aligned with the LDN target. 
The UNCCD, state actors, and other LDN brokers can reposition themselves to 
respond to this changing context in three ways: regaining control to curtail VCAs 
driving land degradation, hybridizing land governance to leverage the many tools 
and business cases VCAs have to be instrumental towards LDN, and coordinating 
an intensified dialogue between VCAs and LDN brokers to mainstream LDN in 





This work has emerged from the implementation of a 
Science-Policy Interface Objective of the UNCCD: 
Creating an enabling environment for land degradation 
neutrality. We acknowledge the discussion on this topic 
by the SPI members involved in this topic, and specifically 
Barron J. Orr, Marcelo Inácio da Cunha and Mariam 
Akhtar-Schuster for inputs to an earlier background paper 
underpinning this research. We thank Mengmeng Li for 
assistance in visualization.  
 
 65 
3. Farm scale as a driver of 
agricultural development in the 
Kenyan Rift Valley 
 
Farming in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is historically dominated by small-
scale farms (SSFs), but evidence suggests that medium-scale farms (MSFs) are 
becoming increasingly prominent. These MSFs are often portrayed as 
entrepreneurial innovators, bringing dynamism and commercialization to SSA 
agriculture without displaying the negative features of land grabbing processes. 
However, there is little empirical evidence supporting these claims. We deployed a 
survey of 319 farmers covering a wide range of sizes in the Kenyan Rift Valley. 
Results show that MSFs are not a new phenomenon in the area, and are mostly farms 
that incrementally increased in size by buying or renting additional land. 
Furthermore, we find no differences in yields for various crop types between SSFs 
and MSFs. On average, MSFs use a higher share of their land for grazing, and have 
more dairy cattle per farm but less per hectare. The average MSF has a higher 
propensity to grow cash crops and serve non-local markets than the average SSF, 
and they employ significantly fewer people per hectare. However, within-category 
heterogeneity is high for all investigated dimensions, while past decision-making and 
future aspirations reveal entrepreneurship to occur in all farm size categories. We 
conclude that only a subset of all MSFs can be characterized as entrepreneurial, while 
these qualities can also be attached to many SSFs. Hence, we find that farm scale is 
an imperfect proxy to gauge the characteristics of a farm system, and presenting 
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The African agricultural sector is undergoing major reconfigurations, as large-scale 
land acquisitions and contract farming are reorienting vast areas of land towards 
export production (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012; Otsuka et al., 2016). These high-
profile land dynamics may have obfuscated other changes that have a smaller 
individual scale but potentially a larger combined effect. This is signaled by the 
evaluation of repetitive agricultural surveys in multiple Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, which shows that the distribution of farm sizes is shifting rapidly (Jayne 
et al., 2016). After a long period of small-scale farm (SSF) domination, there has 
been an increase in land managed as medium-scale farms (MSFs) since the year 2000. 
MSFs are loosely defined as farms that are relatively larger than what is usual in their 
immediate context (Hall et al., 2017), and empirical studies for SSA tend to set the 
lower threshold to distinguish MSF at 5 hectares (Samberg et al., 2016). Observed 
trends in MSF may signal that agriculture in SSA is experiencing a watershed 
moment, as a continuation of current trends would vest the majority of land in the 
hands of MSFs in many SSA countries in the near future. This observation is in 
contrast with theoretical expectations, which generally posit that demographic and 
economic trends predicate a persistence of small-scale family farming across most 
of SSA (Hazell et al., 2010). 
The emergence of MSFs is attracting academic interest to understand the drivers and 
consequences of these developments. Farm size is an element of wider debates 
around food security, agricultural productivity, poverty, and economic growth 
(Meyfroidt, 2017b). Yet, little is currently known about the characteristics of MSFs, 
the actors owning and managing them, the drivers of their emergence, their 
geographical contexts, their environmental consequences, and the future pathways 
they may signal.  
To study this phenomenon, two general approaches are often used. First, available 
agricultural censuses are mined to distill farm size distributions and their trends. On 
a global scale, such studies reassert the dominant role of smallholders in developing 
countries in producing food (Samberg et al., 2016). Furthermore, they show that the 
majority of low- to lower-middle-income countries are experiencing a drop in 
average farm size (Lowder et al., 2016). However, reporting regional averages can 
obscure intraregional heterogeneity. Average farm sizes can decrease while the 
number of MSFs increases, and a rise in larger-scale farms can be a driver of 
decreases in farm size of the smallest farms (Masters et al., 2013). On a national 
scale, in-depth analysis of agricultural censuses illuminates MSF dynamics 
specifically (Jayne et al., 2016). These analyses not only reveal the increasing 
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importance of MSF, but also offer some preliminary insights on the types of actors 
behind MSF. Second, a number of pioneering case studies try to profile MSFs in 
SSA (e.g. Anseeuw et al., 2016; Chapoto et al., 2013; Sitko and Jayne, 2014). These 
case studies are essential building blocks to arrive at more general knowledge on 
MSFs. Traits of MSFs that are found in these studies include entrepreneurship, an 
orientation towards export or urban markets, and a capacity to assert state-backed 
land tenure claims, often at the expense of existing customary land tenure 
arrangements. The actors are often urban-based individuals with current or former 
urban employment, although examples of rural elites who successfully expand their 
farms have also been described.  
The interpretability of observed trends in national-scale agricultural censuses is 
limited, because their agronomical focus does not provide insight into other 
characteristics of MSFs, such as the background of their owners. Meanwhile, case 
studies with a focus on MSF remain scarce. Surveys have mostly sampled only MSF 
(Anseeuw et al., 2016), which allows for exploratory profiling exercises but not for 
comparisons between groups. Hence, it is difficult to assess whether MSF are, as is 
suggested, really different from SSF in aspects other than total farm area, and 
whether they truly represent a new pathway with different socio-environmental 
traits. 
Here, we aim to provide new empirical insights to assess to what extent MSF are 
different from small-scale farms (SSFs), and to what extent they represent a novel 
dynamic that may act as a driver of socio-environmental change. To that end, we 
have conducted a survey including farms of different sizes in the Rift Valley of 
Kenya. We sampled farms in an area characterized by a high agricultural potential 
and rapid urbanization, and hence a potential hotspot for the agricultural dynamics 
addressed in this chapter. Survey results allow us to compare MSFs with SSF in 
terms of the crop types they grow, the markets they serve, their labor characteristics, 
and their farm development. In addition, we surveyed a number of large-scale farms 
(LSFs) for further contextualization of these results.  
The rest of the chapter first presents a theoretical background on the developmental, 
political, economic, and agronomic debates around farm scale. Building on this 
background, research questions are formulated. We then present the survey results 
and discuss their implications for wider rural development debates, as well as the 




3.2. Theoretical background 
Because agriculture is the dominant sector in terms of employment and revenue, and 
also the primary driver of environmental degradation in most developing countries 
(UNCCD, 2017), the evolution of agricultural systems takes center-stage in both 
developmental and environmental debates. In this respect, the impact of different 
farm sizes, for example in terms of agricultural production, employment, and 
income, is highly relevant. Insights into these matters can inform the tenuous 
discussion on what constitutes an “appropriate” or “optimal” farm scale (Carr, 2013; 
Collier and Dercon, 2009). In this debate, opinions range between a vision of large-
scale, highly mechanized farms to small-scale, labor-intensive farms (Meyfroidt, 
2017b). A major agronomical dimension of this wider debate is the question on 
optimal scales of production to maximize yields. The advantages and disadvantages 
of different farming systems have been discussed extensively in literature on 
development studies (Lipton, 2006; Wiggins et al., 2010) and provide a background 
for the assessment of MSF as discussed below. 
The rich literature concerning large-scale land acquisitions could be instructive to 
explain the rise in MSF. The rapid and ongoing acquisition of large tracts of land, 
often by international business interests and investors, is an aberration that goes 
against prevailing demographic and economic trends in SSA. An incremental 
increase in farm size, accompanied and mutually reinforced by urbanization and 
productivity increases, is expected in SSA following structural transformation 
processes (McMillan and Headey, 2014). However, large-scale land acquisitions do 
not develop gradually , but appear as a result of power inequalities in global and 
national land governance, and are thereby able to claim smallholder-dominated or 
natural areas (Debonne et al., 2019; Messerli et al., 2014). MSFs could be 
conceptualized as a domestic version of large-scale land acquisitions, with national 
instead of international investors. Some commonalities are apparent, namely the 
involvement of non-local actors and the instrumentalization of power imbalances in 
land governance. Agricultural censuses show that, in SSA, a large and rising fraction 
of agricultural land is owned by urban households, who often own significantly more 
land per household than average rural households (Jayne et al., 2016). This indicates 
that MSF could be a product of urban households acquiring land resources, but 
national-scale surveys lack sufficient depth to warrant strong conclusions. Urban 
elites can mobilize capital and lobby power to acquire land, at smaller scales 
compared to large-scale land acquisitions but at larger scales than what is within the 
reach of smallholders (Hilhorst et al., 2011; Sitko and Jayne, 2014). This urban, non-
local appropriation of agricultural land is facilitated by the fluid nature of land 
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governance and land tenure arrangements in SSA. Customary land tenure, where the 
relations governing the ownership and use of land are strongly localized and where 
authority is vested in traditional authorities, remains highly important in SSA (Alden 
Wily, 2018; Higgins et al., 2018). However, African states are increasingly formalizing 
land tenure, thereby overthrowing customary institutions or creating bifurcated, 
legally pluralistic land tenure systems (Stellmacher and Eguavoen, 2011; Ubink and 
Quan, 2008). This legal ambiguity is often exploited by the lateral, urban entrants in 
SSA agriculture that constitute many MSFs. These actors are better able to navigate 
bureaucracies to acquire statutory (state-backed) land titles on customary land, in 
many cases overruling local people and their customary rulesets (Chimhowu, 2018; 
Chitonge et al., 2017). 
Counterbalancing this negative narrative of expropriation, MSF may also be seen as 
a source of dynamism (Jayne et al., 2016). For at least five decades, visions on the 
pathways to SSA economic development and poverty reduction have tended to 
include a central role for smallholders (Wiggins et al., 2010). The smallholder sector 
is the dominant provider of food and livelihoods in SSA, and those engaged in this 
sector are disproportionally more likely to be poor and food insecure (Kamara et al., 
2019). An inverse relationship between farm size and productivity is argued to exist, 
owing to diseconomies of scale and the absence of economies of scale in agriculture 
(Wiggins et al., 2010). Small farms rely on family labor, which is self-motivated to 
maximize yields, contrary to large farms where hired labor may not have such 
incentives. However, the causality or even the existence of an inverse relation is 
contested (Carletto et al., 2013; Muyanga and Jayne, 2019). 
Taking inspiration from successes associated with the Green Revolution in Asia, 
transformative agricultural modernization is argued to be the most effective engine 
for broader development (De Schutter, 2011; Diao et al., 2010). However, the 
persistence of low-input subsistence agriculture and rural poverty has led to doubts 
on this conventional wisdom (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). As the agricultural sector 
globalizes, the question is raised whether African smallholders, who typically achieve 
relatively high land productivity but low labor productivity, can be competitive on a 
world stage (Dercon and Gollin, 2014). Taking this line of thought one step further, 
MSFs could be a necessary advancement to break the developmental impasse and 
deliver technological innovation and competitiveness. 
The smallholder sector is faced with significant institutional and logistical handicaps 
in accessing markets beyond the local village market. Supermarkets and exporters 
are increasingly setting production, quality, and consistency requirements, which in 




(Colen et al., 2012). For the procurement of fresh produce for urban centers, SSA 
retailers tend to favor farmers that can deliver year-round (often requiring irrigation), 
have sufficient storage and transport capabilities, and have the necessary human 
capital to handle value chain paperwork (Neven et al., 2009). While institutional 
innovations can help overcome these challenges, e.g. in the form of cooperatives, 
smallholders often cannot meet these requirements and resort to staple crops instead 
(Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015). Instead, markets for high-value cash crops are 
often more readily available for larger-scale farmers. MSFs could thus be a solution 
for market failures apparent in SSA. Whether this is optimal in terms of, for example, 
poverty reduction vis-à-vis institutional innovations to enable smallholders is 
debatable (Hall et al., 2017). This depends, among others, on the ability of MSFs to 
create high-quality employment (Neven et al., 2009). 
Against this backdrop, MSF have been framed as a “best of both worlds” solution. 
They may be able to combine high labor productivity with better access to capital 
and markets (Meyfroidt, 2017b). Meanwhile, their local linkages are likely stronger 
compared to large-scale land acquisitions, which are mostly managed by foreign 
interests in an enclave-like fashion (Hall et al., 2017). This could provide MSFs with 
the ability to generate local benefits and mitigate negative regional impacts often 
associated with large-scale land acquisitions. In this framing, MSFs act as seeds of 
local dynamism, with a potential to create positive technological and institutional 
spillovers to neighboring smallholders (Deininger and Xia, 2016).  
It is highly relevant to gain insight into whether MSFs are a “best of both worlds” 
solution, or rather an inferior development pathway with opportunity costs vis-à-vis 
a smallholder-led pathway, or neither. Farm scale is a product of agricultural policies, 
and policy biases can drive farm scale increases or decreases. Globally, governments 
explicitly or implicitly favor larger or smaller farms (Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013; 
Byerlee, 2014). In SSA, preliminary findings suggest that MSFs tend to hold strong 
positions in agricultural lobby groups, thereby ensuring that public agricultural 
spending disproportionally favors their business model (Jayne et al., 2016). Such 
policy biases can hold significant opportunity costs: the beneficial effects of 
agricultural development on poverty reduction or food security may be much higher 
when smallholders are the focus of governance. In the context of large-scale land 
acquisitions, the empirical evidence of local benefits and threats clearly points to the 
existence of such opportunity costs (De Schutter, 2011) while for MSF, this is less 
clear (Hall et al., 2017). 
Based on the discourses and debates discussed above the research questions we 
address in this chapter are: (1) whether MSFs are a recently emerging class of 
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farmers, as is suggested by recent literature (Jayne et al., 2016); (2) Whether land 
tenure regimes are different for MSFs compared to SSFs; (3) Whether MSFs have a 
higher or lower crop productivity and different crop mixes; (4) Whether MSFs use 
different amounts and different sources of labor; (5) and whether MSFs are 
providing for different markets and are embedded in different networks. 
Furthermore, using the LSF data points, we provide further context concerning 
these dimensions. 
3.3. Survey and data analysis 
3.3.1. Study area 
The study was undertaken in, Nakuru County, Kenya (Figure 3.1). The area is part 
of the Kenyan highlands as well as the Great Rift Valley and is considered to be 
among the agriculturally high-potential areas of Kenya. People in Nakuru are 
dominantly of either Kikuyu or Kalenjin ethnic background. Within this county, a 
large variety of agro-ecological zones exists, with altitudes of sampled areas ranging 
between 1900 and 2800 meters a.s.l. Farms in the county are often integrated 
cropland-livestock operations, although a large diversity exists (Herrero et al., 2014). 
The main food crops produced include maize, beans, Irish potatoes, and wheat, as 
well as various fruits and vegetables and a thriving livestock sector (van de Steeg et 
al., 2010). 
Kenya, and the Rift Valley specifically, has had a dynamic history in terms of land 
governance and farm scales. During British colonial rule, many areas in the Rift 
Valley were part of the White Highlands, a region of settlement by British farmers 
operating large farms and ranches using newly landless Kenyans as labor sources. 
Apart from these settler areas, Kenyan farmers persisted in designated “native 
reserves”, and this colonial dichotomy forms the precursor of many farm scale 
patterns observed today (Hakizimana et al., 2017). The Swynnerton plan (1954) 
aimed to be a comprehensive colonial solution to modernize Kenyan agriculture, 
among others by issuing title deeds to promote land tenure security, providing 
technical assistance, and provide pathways to farm consolidation (Thurston, 1987). 
This plan thus forms the historical basis of the current land tenure system in Kenya. 
After Kenya attained independence, the Million Acre Settlement Scheme constituted 
a major land reform to redistribute White Highland landholdings to Kenyan families. 
This resulted in a repopulation of the area by a diverse group of farmers originating 
from a variety of Kenyan provinces, although much land was also granted to elites 
as a patronage tool (Kiplimo and Ngeno, 2016). In recent decades, population 




large, intensive farms in many former White Highland Areas and very small, 
fragmented and degraded farms in many former “native reserves” (Syagga, 2006).  
 
Figure 3.1: Map and location of the study area, Nakuru, in the Great Rift and Kenya, with sub-
counties indicated. The survey was conducted in the sub-counties Kuresoi, Njoro, Bahati, and 
Subukia.  
The study area was chosen because it has a high agricultural potential and includes 
the fast-growing and dynamic urban center of Nakuru City, which makes it a prime 
area to study dimensions of rural change (Migose et al., 2018). Parts of the county 
are used for horticulture, floriculture, and other cash cropping, which is often 
controlled by foreign interests or domestic value chain actors (supermarkets, 
processors, breweries) through ownership or contracts (Neven et al., 2009; Wanjala 
et al., 2018). The majority of farms in Nakuru county is small, averaging 0.77 ha. 
However, the majority of the land is occupied by MSFs and LSFs. Consecutive 
generational farm subdivision is increasingly creating economically unviable farm 
sizes among the SSFs. The county is relying on agribusinesses, notably horticultural 
and floricultural enterprises, to generate employment for land-poor households 
(Nakuru County Government, 2013).  
3.3.2. Survey 
A survey was conducted between November 2018 and January 2019 in sub-counties 
of Bahati, Kuresoi, Njoro and Subukia. For every sub-county, the sampling frame 
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were all SSFs (managed land <5 ha), MSFs (managed land 5 – 50 ha), and LSFs 
(managed land >50 ha)4. In line with recent other work on MSFs (Anseeuw et al., 
2016; Sitko and Jayne, 2014), and recognizing that what constitutes a small or large 
farm is highly context-dependent (Meyfroidt, 2017a), these size brackets were 
defined to represent an intermediate position between what is understood to be a 
smallholder and a large farm in the Kenyan Rift Valley. The sampling frame was 
obtained from the sub-county Ministry of Agriculture farmer registries. These 
farmer registries were subdivided based on farm size categories (SSFs and MSFs), 
and from these two lists, every nth farmer was selected to be a respondent, n being 
dependent on the population of the sub-county. The LSFs were purposefully 
sampled, and were not used in subsequent statistical analyses, but only to 
contextualize our findings. Hence, a total of 332 respondents were visited. After a 
pilot (n = 9) and subsequent revisions, the survey was conducted in Swahili by three 
trained enumerators.   
Questionnaires were conducted with the household head or another knowledgeable 
family or farm staff member. In some cases, a farm manager or accountant answered 
at the behest of an absent farm owner. Prior to conducting an interview, respondents 
were informed of the purpose and nature of the questions, and were given the 
opportunity to grant or deny consent to participate. Refusal to participate occurred 
in no more than a handful of cases, although refusal to answer specific questions 
was more common (e.g. questions concerning wages), resulting in no-data for these 
questions. Questionnaires were digitally transcribed using Kobo Toolbox. 
The questionnaire consisted of mostly closed-ended questions on (1) farm history 
and household characteristics, (2) farm owner characteristics, (3) land tenure, (4) 
farm land use, crop production, and livestock, (5) water management, (6) social 
networks, (7) markets, and (8) threats and opportunities. The survey received ethical 
approval from the nationally accredited Moi University College of Health Sciences 
/ Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital Institutional Research and Ethics Committee.  
                                                     
4 Note that different studies have defined “medium-scale” differently. Samberg et al. 
(2016), working at the scale of the Global South, distinguish medium-scale farms between 5 
and 15 ha, large-scale farms between 15 and 50 ha, and very large-scale farms beyond 50 
ha. Jayne et al. (2016), who discuss MSF for Sub-Saharan Africa, define medium-scale to be 
between 5 and 100 ha. Local case studies tailor the definition of MSF to the relevant 




3.3.3. Data analysis 
Questionnaires were subjected to a validation procedure, checking for internal 
consistency of answers, completeness, and adherence to the sampling frame. After 
validation, 319 interviews were retained, including 186 SSFs, 120 MSFs and 13 LSFs. 
The SSF and MSF data points were subsequently used for statistical analysis, while 
LSF data were only used to add context. In this statistical analysis, we compared 
SSFs and MSFs across a number of dimensions, corresponding to the research 
questions outlined above. We used two-tailed t-tests to test for differences in 
quantitative data, and χ2-tests to test for differences in categorical data. Each test is 
performed for the full SSF and MSF dataset, and additionally for the subset of SSFs 
and MSFs that were established with the current farm owner in or after the year 
2000. The latter tests provide information on whether recently established MSFs are 
different from recently established SSFs, building on the idea that recent newcomers 
are different in origin or characteristics. Statistics were performed in the R statistical 
package.  
3.4. Results and discussion 
3.4.1. Farm and farmer characteristics 
Contrary to reports of a recent surge in the establishment of MSFs in SSA (Jayne et 
al., 2014a), MSFs are not new in our study area, and there is no significant difference 
in the year of establishment of MSF and SSF (Table 3.1). Farms in both categories 
have been established throughout post-colonial history. Figure 3.2 further details 
this diversity in time of farm establishment. Table 3.1 presents key figures 
concerning the year of establishment, alongside other farm and farmer 
characteristics. 
The study area is known for an increasing land scarcity that has led to progressively 
smaller farms, in line with general trends in Kenya (Hakizimana et al., 2017; Kiplimo 
and Ngeno, 2016) and other SSA nations (Jayne et al., 2014a). Our results show that, 
in tandem with this farm fragmentation process, MSFs continue to emerge, in 
contrast with this process. This suggests that the establishment dynamics of MSFs 
show signs of continuity, as farms of this size were never uncommon. At the same 
time, it shows signs of discontinuity, because where overall trends in SSA tend 
towards ever smaller farms, MSFs continue to be established unabatedly in the study 
area. 




Figure 3.2: Year of farm establishment with current farmers. Each dot represents a survey 
respondent. 
In our study, perceived land tenure security is high overall, with 73% of respondents 
indicating that a loss of land rights is not an important risk and only 9% indicating 
this to be a moderately to very important risk. Differences in land tenure 
arrangements and security are often quoted to explain why MSFs continue to emerge 
amidst an overall trend of farm fragmentation (Chimhowu, 2018). MSFs are 
significantly more likely to have a state-backed land title for their land. However, 
having a title does not seem to influence perceived land tenure security (χ2-test: 
P=0.54). Many MSF respondents were aware of their relatively privileged land 
endowment and expressed fears of land claims by squatters, tenants, or local 
officials. The reason why MSFs are more inclined to have a title may therefore be 
that they perceive themselves to be more vulnerable to hostile land claims and 
conflicts. Another possible reason is the costs involved in obtaining a land title, 
which many SSFs may not be able or willing to pay. 
Signs that MSFs are able to leverage power differentials to acquire land are not 
apparent. MSFs are significantly more likely to have used transactional methods 
(renting or buying) to acquire land. For the full sample, transactional acquisition was 
used by 67% of respondents, although only 50% used only transactional methods 
and not relational (inheritance, marriage, intra-family transfer) methods. Hence, our 
findings suggest that, amidst an overall trend of land fragmentation, MSFs are 
consolidating land by buying or renting from fragmenting smallholder farms. This 
aligns with findings in Meru County (Hakizimana et al., 2017) and implies that a 
willing buyer/willing seller system appears to prevail. However, insofar as land 
transactions are driven by distress sales (e.g. following a failed harvest or other 




assets of a growing landless class. Whether this is occurring or not cannot be 
deduced from our survey but remains a highly relevant rural policy question. 
MSFs are more likely to have increased their farm size after establishment, and this 
difference is more outspoken for farms established after 2000. This lends credibility 
to a profile of entrepreneurial smallholders who use the land market to attain MSF 
status. MSFs are also significantly more likely to rent part or all of their farmland. 
While MSFs are more likely to have increased their land size, farm size increases are 
also found for the majority of SSFs. Although relational methods to increase farm 
size are important, transactions are the dominant method (86% of expansive farmers 
rented and/or bought the additional land). SSFs and MSFs are equally likely to use 
transactional methods (χ2-test: P=0.30). It is noteworthy that a vision of land 
redistribution via land markets and a freehold land tenure system was central to the 
colonial Swynnerton Plan (Thurston, 1987). This plan held the believe that, to 
modernize agriculture, smallholders should able to use land transactions to develop 
their farms with the assurance that their tenure status would remain upheld. These 
results suggest that such a land market is indeed at work today, although the 
importance of land titles is not as important as envisioned.  
Farm owners of an MSF have received significantly more years of formal education, 
and are significantly more likely to have received a tertiary education. However, there 
is no indication that many MSF farm owners are people who acquired capital or 
bureaucratic agility by being or having been employed in non-farm jobs, because 
they are not more likely to have been employed as public servant, business manager, 
politician or other high-profile jobs. MSF owners are more likely to live away from 
the farm, but farm owner absenteeism is low in general. MSF farm owners are not 
more or less likely to have grown up locally, and a majority of respondents indicates 
to have migrated towards their current farm (Table 3.1). Furthermore, there is no 
significant ethnic over- or underrepresentation in the MSF category (Table 3.1), nor 
are farm sizes of non-Kalenjin/Kikuyu farmers significantly larger or smaller (t-test, 
P = 0.76). This indicates that, while land issues in the Rift valley can have ethnic 
dimensions, MSF dynamics are not particularly ethnic in nature. 
From these characteristics, a preliminary generalization may be drawn: MSFs, 
though not new, are emerging alongside land fragmentation, yet power disparities or 
land tenure issues cannot fully explain this. Instead, MSFs are often successful 
expanders, using land markets to acquire land from exiting, non-viable fragmented 
farms. This dual fragmentation-consolidation process has also been found in Meru, 
Kenya (Hakizimana et al., 2017). However, it should be noted that there is diversity 
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within farm scale categories: a large minority of MSFs are more accurately typified 
as older farmers who acquired land in times when larger farms were the norm.  
The LSFs in our sample often trace their origins to colonial times, with owners 
indicating that they are either direct descendants of British colonial farmers or (have 
ancestors who) occupied high positions in colonial bureaucracies. Other very large 
farms in our sample are government-owned or collectively managed by a 
community. These arrangements are likewise rooted in the land redistribution 
programs immediately after decolonization. Among LSFs, fears of losing land rights 
were generally high except for government-owned farms. LSFs mostly had 
experienced instances of squatting or unauthorized cattle grazing on their land, and 





Table 3.1: Summary statistics concerning farm dynamics and farmer characteristics. 
Significance tests are the result of student’s t-tests and χ2 tests for, respectively, continuous 
and categorical dependent variables. 











Farm establishment, tenure and 
size dynamics 
      
Average farm establishment year with 
current farm owner 
1995 1993 - 2008 2006 - 
% of respondents without land title a 41.9 26.7 *** 57.1 31.8 ** 
% of respondents indicating land loss 
due to dispossession or poor land 
rights to be a moderate or very 
important risk 
7.0 10.0 - 10.5 15.9 - 
% of respondents who initially 
acquired all or part of their land using 
transactional methods (buying or 
renting) 
65.9 80.0 ** 60.5 70.5 - 
% of respondents leasing or renting 
all or part of their land 
30.1 45.8 *** 32.9 68.2 *** 
% of respondents that have increased 
their farmland area 
58.6 73.3 ** 53.9 86.4 *** 
% of respondents that have decreased 
their farmland area 
10.2 12.5 - 7.9 4.5 - 
Farm owner characteristics       
Mean age of farm owner 55.4 55.5 - 46.3 47.1 - 
% farms in female ownership 17.5 15.7 - 17.3 9.3 - 
% farms in dual ownership (male and 
female)  
65.0 67.8 - 65.3 67.7 - 
Farm owner mean years of formal 
education 
10.2 11.5 *** 10.9 11.6 - 
% farm owners with a tertiary 
education 
25.5 32.8 *** 28.0 35.7 - 
% farm owners ever employed in any 
other wage-paying job 
63.4 62.5 - 65.8 61.3 - 
% of farmers ever employed in high-
profile jobsb 
31.7 36.7 - 36.8 34.1 - 
% absentee farm owners 4.3 10.1 ** 6.6 18.2 * 
% farm owners who grew up locally 41.4 45.0 - 50.0 53.7 - 
% Farm owners with ethnicity other 
than Kikuyu or Kalenjin 
9.1 4.8 - 15.9 6.6 - 
- P > 0.1  *P ≤ 0.1 ** P ≤ 0.05 *** P ≤ 0.01 
a Land lease or rent is considered equivalent to titled land tenure. 
b High-profile jobs include public servant, police, politician, or business manager. 
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3.4.2. Crop productivity, crop mixes, and farm strategies 
MSF and SSF are comparable in terms of their crop productivity for each of the five 
crops for which our survey has sufficient data to allow for comparison (Table 3.2). 
This absence of difference in crop yields suggests an absence of (dis)economies of 
scale in productivity. This implies that our results do not support inverse farm size 
– productivity relationship found elsewhere (Carletto et al., 2013), nor can we find 
indications that larger-sized farms are a requirement to meet growing agricultural 
demands or to use land more efficiently (Sender and Johnston, 2004). Conceivably, 
these finding are the compound result of two counteracting drivers: smaller farmers 
may attain a yield bonus following the logic of the inverse farm size – productivity 
relationship (i.e. self-motivated family labor), and a yield penalty as they have less 
access to inputs and technologies. 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics concerning crop production and productivity. Significance tests 
are the result of student-t tests. Because not all crop are grown on all farms, comparisons of 
yields per crop are based on subsamples only.  










% of land used for staple crops 
(cereals and pulses) 
52.4 46.6 * 57.1 48.0 * 
% of land used as grazing land 16.6 28.6 *** 14.2 26.6 *** 
Number of crop types growna 4.0 3.9 - 3.8 4.2 - 


















































Number of dairy cattle per farm 
(excluding beef cattle) 
3.6 9.7 *** 4.4 9.1 ** 
Dairy cattle per hectare of on-farm 












- P > 0.1  *P ≤ 0.1 ** P ≤ 0.05 *** P ≤ 0.01 
a Crop types: Cereals, pulses, tubers and roots, vegetables, fruits, flowers, coffee and tea, grazing land. 
b Yields are reported per plot and are aggregated per farm for all plots with crop as main crop last 





While productivity is highly similar, crop mixes, as expressed by share of farmland 
dedicated to various crop groups, differ to a large extent (Figure 3.3). On average, 
MSFs are using significantly less land for staple crops. Still, the average MSF uses 
46.6% of land for staple crops (Table 3.2,Figure 3.3). Instead, MSFs often use their 
larger land endowment to accommodate cattle, as they have significantly more cattle 
per farm and a higher fraction of farmland used as grazing land (Table 3.2). 
However, SSFs are rearing cattle considerably more intensively, with 2.5 times more 
cattle per hectare of on-farm grazing land. SSFs are able to accommodate high 
numbers of cattle on limited space by deploying zero-grazing or semi-zero-grazing 
systems, thereby relying on fodder which is often bought from neighboring larger 
farmers. This highlights that different farm scales can be complementary to each 
other: zero-grazing systems labor-intensive but require little space, while fodder crop 
growing requires the opposite. Many respondents indicated an ambition to further 
intensify dairy farming, and move towards zero-grazing systems and away from 
mixed crop-livestock systems.  
SSFs are more inclined to grow vegetables (Figure 3.3), which typically has high labor 
requirements per hectare compared to cattle grazing. This suggests that, to some 
extent, land substitutes labor and vice versa, in livelihood and farm management 
strategies. Where land is relatively limited (SSFs), labor-intensive crops are more 
frequently cultivated, while labor-extensive practices with high land demands are 
more frequently applied where labor is relatively limited (MSFs, LSFs). The role of 
SSFs as vegetable growers puts them in a central position to guarantee nutrition 
security at the local level (Ogutu et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 3.3: Crop mixes on SSFs, MSFs, and LSFs, as average percentages of farm land area. 
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The average crop mixes offer an informative snapshot of current practices, but 
obfuscate the large heterogeneity within categories and do not reveal the past and 
future strategies of farmers. In Figure 3.4, respondents are subdivided into either 
staple crop farms (>75% of land is cereals or pulses), cash crop farms (<25% of 
land is cereals or pulses), or mixed farms (everything in between). Circles indicate 
share of the respondents in each category at start (five years ago for left panels, 
current for right panels), and arrows indicate transitions pursued in the last five years 
(left) or aspired for the next five years (right). A mixed portfolio with both cash and 
staple crops is dominant for SSF and MSF (Figure 3.4, circles in panels c and d), and 
a persistence of this portfolio is the most pursued and most aspired dynamic. The 
share of staple crop farms is remarkably similar for SSFs and MSFs (22% compared 
to 20%) in the current situation (Figure 3.4 c-d), and both SSFs and MSFs have seen 
a major reduction of this share in the last five years(arrows Figure 3.4 a-b). Moves 
towards cash crop-focused portfolios have been marginal in the past five years but 
are relatively often aspired, especially by SSF. Moreover, the vast majority of current 
cash crop farms intends to persist (arrows Figure 3.4 c-d). 
These observations partly resemble archetypical notions of entrepreneurial MSFs 
with a strong focus on cash crops (the share of MSFs that can be categorized as cash 
crop farms is indeed much larger than for SSFs), but also add nuance. Farm scale is 
an imperfect proxy for entrepreneurship at best, as almost half of MSFs are mixed 
farms and one in five are staple crop farms. Conversely, a large fraction of cash crop 
farms are small, implying that it is attainable for small farms to focus on cash crops. 
The most important aspired transitions for SSFs are shifts away from staple crop 
farms and towards mixed or cash crop farms. However, there is a discrepancy 
between stated future aspirations and the observed strategies in the past five years: 
while a transition towards cash crop farms is often aspired, such transitions have 
only rarely been pursued in the past five years. This has two explanations: First, 
respondents have likely not performed a feasibility analysis when expressing 
aspirations, and as such aspirations are not concrete plans. Second, aspired shifts 
away from staple crops could be hindered by financial, food security or logistical 
constraints. For example, moving away from staple crops has transition costs and 
requires market access (both to sell cash crops and to reliably buy food). Identifying 
and addressing these constraints may assure that stated aspirations have a higher 
chance to materialize in the coming years. MSFs, on the other hand, appear to have 
less dynamic aspirations and are more inclined to keep their crop mix as-is. This 
could mean that MSFs are less constrained to materialize their aspirations and 





Figure 3.4: Developments in farm types. Farms are considered staple crop farms if grains and 
pulses cover at least 75% of the farm area, and are considered cash crop farms if this share is 
below 25%. Farms in between these thresholds are considered mixed farms. Circles indicate 
share of the respondents in each category at start (five years ago for left panels, current for 
right panels). Arrows indicate share of respondents moving from category to category as 
reported for the last five years (a, b) and as aspired for the next five years (c, d).  
Over the past five years, farmers have, on average, diversified (i.e. increased the 
number of crop groups they grow (t-test, p < 0.001)). However, average aspirations 
for the future are to specialize and drop one or more crop groups (t-test, p < 0.001). 
This past diversification and aspired specialization are farm scale-independent. 
Beyond these average trends lies a large heterogeneity: 50% of respondents neither 
diversified nor specialized, and 41% diversified (Figure 3.5). Over the past five years, 
farmers have experimented with new crops beyond the typical maize-beans mix, 
which can be caused by an increased accessibility of alternative market outlets and 
input providers. Many respondents indeed indicated having started growing potato 
or vegetables as a side project. This abandonment of maize was, according to 
respondents, due in part to competition from imported maize, which reduced selling 
prices, and in part to reduced yields and weather predictability.  
Concerning aspirations for the next five years, respondents would often state that a 
certain crop is not profitable anymore and that they aspire to move land and labor 
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resources to their more profitable activities, mainly dairy, potatoes, and fruits. Yet, 
both SSF and MSF plan to change less in the near future then in the near past (Figure 
3.5 b-d). The lack of any meaningful difference in term of specialization or 
diversification between SSFs and MSFs indicates that SSFs and MSFs have similarly 
varied strategies and aspirations. 
 
Figure 3.5: Crop mix diversification and specialization for SSF and MSF, as observed in the 
past five years (left) and as aspired for the next five years (right). Crop groups are “cereals”, 
“pulses”, “tubers and roots”, “vegetables”, “fruits”, “flowers”, “grazing land” and “coffee and 
tea”. 
Relative to both SSF and MSF, LSFs are more inclined to leave some land fallow 
and dedicate somewhat more land to grazing. Potato growing is more prevalent 
among LSFs (Figure 3.3), and aspirations point to a further expansion of this crop’s 
importance among LSFs. Moreover, labor-intensive crops, such as vegetables, take 
up only a small fraction of LSF area. 
3.4.3. Farm labor and labor productivity 
Multiple results indicate that the nature and organization of farm labor is scale-
dependent (Figure 3.6). Overall, MSFs employ on average over four times fewer 
people per hectare when counting both casual (day labor) and non-casual 
(permanent or seasonally fixed labor) employment (Table 3.3). While the vast 
majority of respondents use at least some family labor, MSFs additionally source 
non-casual labor from outside the family four times more often . This signals a 
departure from the family farming system at larger scales. 31 of 319 surveyed farms 
rely only on non-family labor and can thereby be profiled as company farms rather 
than family farms. We find these company farms predominantly in the MSF (18 
farms) and LSF (6 farms) categories. The use of casual labor, expressed in Kenyan 
Shillings spent per hectare per year, is characterized by a high variability and does 





Figure 3.6: Relations between farm area and labor. Note logarithmic scale on x-axis. 
The difference between farm labor in MSF and SSF implies that, on a per-hectare 
basis, larger farms provide less employment and that the same area of land managed 
as MSFs may provide livelihoods to fewer people. This could be explained by a host 
of factors, including higher mechanization, higher labor productivity, and a less 
labor-intensive crop mix. The average SSF is closer to the typical family farm 
structure, employing less non-family or casual labor.  
Labor on LSFs shows a high diversity between the sampled farms. Some LSFs show 
very low labor use per hectare. These are either highly mechanized farms or farms 
managed by old people nearing retirement who leave much land fallow. Other LSFs 
employ relatively abundant amounts of mostly casual labor. One LSF respondent 
explicitly mentioned that he deliberately keeps mechanization levels low and labor 
levels high because hiring local labor grants him goodwill from neighboring 
communities and decreases chances of conflict. This shows that some LSF owners 
do not take their privileged position for granted and tend to have strategies to 
maintain a positive image.  
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics concerning farm labor. Significance tests are the result of 
student-t tests and χ2 tests for, respectively, continuous and categorical dependent variables. 












Total labor to land ratio 
(casual and permanent 
full-time equivalents per 
hectare) 
2.64 0.63 *** 3.34 0.75 *** 
Labor-to-land ratio (full-
time equivalents for 
permanent workers per 
hectare, averaged across 
farms) 
2.34 0.34 *** 3.07 0.35 *** 
Labor to land ratio 
(permanent workers per 
hectares aggregated over 
total land used by farmer 
group) 
1.34 0.25 n.a. 1.42 0.25 n.a. 
% of respondents using 
non-family permanent 
labor 
13.4 55.0 *** 14.5 56.8 *** 
% of respondents using 
only non-family labor 
3.9 15 *** 5.2 11.4 - 
Casual labor to land ratio 
(Kenyan Shilling spent 
per hectare per year) 
25256 20719 - 24838 35118 - 
- P > 0.1  *P ≤ 0.1 ** P ≤ 0.05 *** P ≤ 0.01 
3.4.4. Market orientation and agricultural networks 
Farmers working at different scales have a different market orientation and are 
embedded in different networks. Specifically, MSFs use a more diverse set of market 
outlets and are less likely to identify the village market as their most important 
market outlet (Table 3.4). Furthermore, they are significantly more often a member 
of a cooperative or association and are more likely to use private extension services 
(e.g. from agrochemical companies or seed farms). Contract farming is widespread 
among both SSFs and MSFs, in line with the generally high prevalence of such 
schemes in Kenya (Oya, 2012). 
Although MSF have a more diverse set of markets and more connections to 
professional organizations, the results do not clearly show a profile of strictly 
entrepreneurial, urban- or export-oriented MSFs. For 61% of MSFs, the village 
market remains the most important outlet, and this does not decrease by much for 
the more recently established MSFs. When asked to give relative weights to the 




63% of the total weight (Figure 3.7). Although this is a lower importance compared 
to SSFs (74%), this means that the majority of MSFs are dominantly producing for 
similar markets as the majority of SSFs. Export markets are marginal for both SSFs 
and MSFs5.  
The archetype of entrepreneurial, business-minded farmers can only be assigned to 
a minority of MSFs, as well as to a minority of SSFs. Among respondents indicating 
that non-village markets constitute at least three quarters of their self-assessed 
market importance (n=52), 20, 23, and 9 are SSF, MSF, and LSF, respectively. 
Insofar as this is a measure for entrepreneurship, this means that 11% and 19% of 
SSFs and MSFs respectively are entrepreneurial. This subset is not necessarily 
recently established: their average establishment year of these entrepreneurial 
farmers is statistically equal to that of the full sample. Measured this way, 
entrepreneurship may be more common among MSFs, but it is not unique or 
dominant for MSFs. 
For the surveyed LSFs, village markets are less important, with only 4 out of 13 LSFs 
serving village markets and only one identifying it as the most important market. 
Instead, factories (e.g. grain processors) are dominant, which could be due to a 
general preference of such factories to work with a few large farms instead of many 
small farms (Reardon et al., 2009). LSFs are also active on highly specialized markets, 
with respondents rearing and exporting race horses, and cultivating and distributing 
potato seed. 
  
                                                     
5 Commonly mentioned export crops include avocado, pyrethrum, cut flowers, and French 
beans.  
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics concerning market orientation and agricultural networks. 
Significance tests are the result of student-t tests and χ2tests for, respectively, continuous and 
categorical dependent variables. 











% of respondents identifying 
village market as most important 
market 
73 61 ** 76 57 ** 
Number of market outlets used  1.29 1.48 *** 1.23 1.45 *** 
Membership of farmer 
cooperative or association 
16.1 27.5 ** 15.8 29.5 - 
% using farming contracts 71.5 76.5 - 77.1 77.3 - 
% relying on private extension 
programs 
3.8 10.8 ** 2.6 13.6 * 
- P > 0.1  *P ≤ 0.1 ** P ≤ 0.05 *** P ≤ 0.01 
 
Figure 3.7: Average self-assessed importance of different market outlets. Respondents were 
asked to rank all market outlets they used, and assign numbers corresponding to how 
important each outlet is to their farm business. On average, the village market is almost three 
times as important as all other outlets for SSFs (74% of SSFs), while it is 1.7 times more 
important for MSFs (63% of MSFs). 73% of smallholders consider the village market to be the 
most important (or only) market, while this is 61% for MSFs (Table 4). 
3.5. Implications and conclusions 
In SSA, the agricultural sector continues to represent the foundation of the majority 
of livelihoods and agricultural dynamics remain the primary drivers of environmental 
change. Understanding shifts in farm systems and the consequences in terms of 
employment, market orientation, or crop production is therefore crucial. Both 
anecdotal and statistical evidence have suggested a recent increase in the amount of 
MSF in SSA. This chapter provides empirical evidence to further assess this 
development and to assess to what extent MSF are different from SSF in terms of 
their period of establishment, tenure situation, productivity and crop mixes, labor, 




scale or farm scale category, simple measures that are easily derived from census 
data, are sufficiently informative to describe an agricultural system in terms of its 
entrepreneurial qualities or its association with unequal land access, as is currently 
common (Jayne et al., 2016). 
The portraits of MSFs that we sketch based on our survey results are only partly in 
line with the archetypical MSF described in recent literature. We find that MSFs in 
our study area are not a recently emerging phenomenon, and neither are many of 
them lateral entrants in agriculture who acquire land using capital gained in urban 
employment. Such profiles are reported in our survey, but they remain a small 
minority. Instead, MSFs are often found to have been SSFs at establishment who 
have used transactional methods (renting in or buying) to acquire incrementally more 
land. Another fraction of MSFs in our survey are relatively older farmers who 
acquired land in a time when larger farms were the norm. Only a small minority can 
reasonably be portrayed as urban-based entrepreneurial farmers. The most clear 
factor to distinguish such farmers is farm owner absenteeism, which is indeed 
significantly higher for MSFs, especially the post-2000 subset of our survey. Still, this 
concerns only one in ten MSFs. These findings are in contrast with findings for 
Zambia, where MSF growth is mostly attributed to urban-based elites (Sitko and 
Jayne, 2014).  
Highly unequal abilities to acquire land, which is a major tenet of global large-scale 
land acquisitions in the global land rush (Anseeuw et al., 2011), are not apparent 
among the SSFs, MSFs and LSFs in our study area: farm size inequalities are mostly 
found to be colonial relics or the result of incremental farm size increases using 
transactional methods. A profile of MSFs as elites who are able to leverage power 
imbalances to acquire land (Chimhowu, 2018) is not dominant in our study. We find 
that MSF are more often engaged in growing cash crops for non-village markets, but 
similar profiles are far from rare among SSFs. MSFs tend to reserve more land as 
grazing land, but SSFs run significantly more intensive animal production systems, 
and innovate towards labor-intensive zero-grazing systems using limited land 
resources. Even among MSFs, the village market is most often ranked as the most 
important outlet, and close to 50% of their farmland is used for staple crops. From 
this, we conclude that while the average MSF differs from the average SSF in terms 
of markets and crop mixes, most MSFs are highly similar to most SSFs.  
Agricultural labor is a dimension for which farm size does matter, as larger farms 
provide fewer jobs per hectare and rely more on non-family labor. This implies that, 
insofar as the total agricultural area remains constant, any rise in larger-scale farms 
is associated with a decrease in rural livelihood provisioning. In the absence of a 
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considerable rise in urban and off-farm livelihoods, this will have negative effects 
such as landlessness and unemployment. Today, employment in the non-agricultural 
sectors is growing faster than agricultural employment (Timmis, 2018), but the 
World Bank (2016) qualifies these trends as a slow structural transformation at best, 
which is insufficient to drive an agricultural exodus (and thus a discernable average 
farm scale increase). 
This case study was undertaken in an area that is, in many ways, unique. The (post-
)colonial history, the specific agro-ecology and demographic dimensions are among 
many factors that set the area apart from other Kenyan or SSA sites. However, while 
each context is particular, issues surrounding rural development and the rise of MSFs 
will likely be similarly characterized by a mix of persistence and novelty. Positioning 
the rise of MSF as a new dimension of the land rush or an urban takeover of the 
SSA countryside is missing the fact that MSFs are mostly not new and often not so 
different from SSFs. Likewise, positioning MSFs as a necessary source of dynamism 
and engine of growth for the purportedly stagnant smallholder sector misses the fact 
that, in our survey and throughout SSA, entrepreneurial SSFs are appearing where 
conditions are favorable. We conclude that farm scale represents entrepreneurial or 
elitist qualities poorly, and more holistic measures should be developed to baseline 
and track farm system developments in SSA. 
Throughout SSA, colonial and postcolonial historical land governance have left 
different signatures that continue to shape current land distribution dynamics. The 
scale of farms in a region is generally determined by the height of salaries in the non-
farming economy, the crop mix, and policy biases (Byerlee, 2014). In Kenya, 
processes of land consolidation and land fragmentation (a product of the inheritance 
system which divides land across generations) are co-occurring. This is to a large 
extent a result of consecutive colonial and post-colonial land policies (for an 
overview, see Hakizimana et al., 2017). There are trade-offs between two policy 
goals: on the one hand, larger farms achieving higher labor productivity could be 
deemed desirable to achieve a competitive market position (Collier and Dercon, 
2009). On the other hand, policies could be supportive of smaller farms, that provide 
livelihoods for a growing rural population that cannot be fully absorbed by the non-
farming sectors. Our results indicate that, beyond these considerations of labor 
productivity, which are central to rural development issues, there are few other 
differences in performance between SSFs and MSFs. Farms of different scales tend 
to show high within-category diversity and tend to fulfill different functions. 




to acknowledge this, and therefore risks, respectively, to miss the dynamism in SSFs 
or to exaggerate the extent of domestic land issues. 
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4. Representing large-scale land 
acquisitions in land use change 
scenarios for the Lao PDR 
Agricultural large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) is a process that is currently 
not captured by land change models. We present a novel land change modelling 
approach that includes processes governing LSLAs and simulates their interactions 
with other land systems. LSLAs differ from other land change processes in two ways: 
(1) their changes affect hundreds to thousands of contiguous hectares at a time, far 
surpassing other land change processes, e.g. smallholder agriculture, and (2) as policy 
makers value LSLA as desirable or undesirable, their agency significantly affects 
LSLA occurrence. To represent these characteristics in a land change model, we 
allocate LSLAs as multi-cell patches to represent them at scale while preserving detail 
in the representation of other dynamics. Moreover, LSLA land systems are 
characterized to respond to an explicit political demand for LSLA effects, in addition 
to a demand for various agricultural commodities. The model is applied to simulate 
land change in Laos until 2030, using three contrasting scenarios: 1) a target to 
quadruple the area of LSLA, 2) a moratorium for new LSLA, and 3) no target for 
LSLA. Scenarios yield drastically different land change trajectories despite having 
similar demands for agricultural commodities. A high level of LSLA impedes 
smallholders’ engagement with rubber or cash crops, while a moratorium on LSLA  
results in increased smallholder involvement in cash cropping and rubber 
production. This model goes beyond existing land change models by capturing the 
heterogeneity of scales of land change processes, and the competition between 
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Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) have become a significant global land 
changing force since their proliferation following the 2008 food crisis (Deininger et 
al., 2011; Messerli et al., 2014). These transactions of relatively large tracts of land to 
agribusinesses, investment funds, and foreign governmental players have been 
welcomed as a long-overdue investment in the agricultural sector, initiating new 
value chains, introducing new agricultural technology, and creating employment 
(Arezki et al., 2011). However, others emphasize concerns over human rights, land 
rights and biodiversity losses (Cotula, 2012; Davis et al., 2015; De Schutter, 2011). 
Although data on LSLA is scarce and not flawless (Oya, 2013), the best-available 
database reports 1501 known concluded LSLAs, constituting 50 million hectares of 
land to be dedicated to food, energy, and industrial crops (Land Matrix 2019). An 
additional 20 million hectares constitute known intended land deals, marking the on-
going nature of the phenomenon. LSLA has globally targeted densely populated, 
accessible croplands, and to lesser extents also remote forestlands and moderately 
populated areas (Messerli et al., 2014). While neither plantation agriculture nor 
foreign large-scale agricultural investments are exceptional in history (Baglioni and 
Gibbon, 2013; Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006), the scale of the recent upsurge is trend-
breaking (Byerlee, 2014) and deserves the attention of land change scientists to study 
drivers, trends and impacts of the phenomenon (Messerli et al., 2013).  
The concept of land systems, human-induced transformations of ecosystems and 
landscapes and the resulting changes in land cover, provides a framework for the 
representation of the human-environment interactions on land (Verburg et al., 
2013). LSLA systems set themselves apart from more traditional trajectories such as 
smallholder intensification and conversion to urban land, for two reasons. Firstly, 
the conversion that an LSLA instigates is orders of magnitude larger than 
conversions related to traditional smallholder farming. In this way, LSLAs break 
away from the traditional approach towards studying land system dynamics, which 
typically frames changes as being small and incremental. However, these large-scale, 
abrupt conversions caused by LSLAs occur within the context of, and interact with, 
continuous small-scale incremental land system changes (Cramb et al., 2015). 
Therefore, in a LSLA context, a multi-scalar approach is necessary for the 
explanation of current and the projection of future land system changes. Secondly, 
LSLAs distinguish themselves from smallholder systems in that they are often used 
as a policy tool to reach development targets, such as increasing land productivity, 
developing land identified as idle, and extending state control over the domestic rural 
hinterland (Borras and Franco, 2012; Cotula et al., 2014; Lavers, 2012). Therefore, 
Representing large-scale land acquisitions in land use change scenarios for the Lao PDR 
 95 
 
LSLAs are often negotiated as package deals in which the investor is expected to 
develop road, water, or agricultural processing infrastructure, provide employment, 
or create technology spillovers (Lu, 2015; Schönweger and Messerli, 2015). This way, 
LSLA can be seen as an attempt at outsourcing rural development (Peeters, 2015). 
LSLAs produce commodities that are also produced by smallholders, making them 
direct competitors (Byerlee, 2014). In a context of smallholder transitions to cash 
crops, such as maize, sugar cane, and rubber (Cramb et al., 2009; Hall, 2011; 
Thanichanon, 2015), LSLAs manifest themselves as an alternative pathway to 
fulfilling the same land-based demands. 
The distinct nature of LSLAs described above constitutes a challenge to land change 
models (LCMs). In land system science, LCMs are used to study land system change 
processes, provide projections to inform policy makers, or to perform scenario 
analysis (Turner et al., 2007). However, the multi-scalar approach and the specific 
political steering of LSLAs are not adequately represented in current LCMs. Usually, 
the choice of resolution in these tools reflects the scale of the processes being 
modeled, with pixels being the units at which conversion decisions are represented 
(van Delden et al., 2011). However, LSLAs instigate an interaction of small-scale, 
pixel level changes with large-scale changes involving multiple pixels at the same 
time. Furthermore, when defining the drivers of land change, it should be 
acknowledged that LSLAs provide more than simply the  plantation products - they 
also potentially generate a host of effects that policy makers may either find desirable 
or undesirable. In recent history, countries have therefore taken on very different 
attitudes towards LSLA in their territory, ranging from permissive to restrictive 
stances, depending on the effects emphasized by policy makers (Cotula et al., 2014). 
Therefore, there is a need to reevaluate the way drivers are defined and land-use 
changes are allocated in LCMs. 
The objective of this chapter is to represent the characteristics that distinguish LSLA 
dynamics in a land change modelling framework, and use this model to explore 
different LSLA development trajectories as they interact with smallholder land use 
dynamics. To that effect we build on the CLUMondo land system model (van 
Asselen and Verburg, 2013). We augmented the CLUMondo model by adding a 
multi-cell allocation algorithm, which is able to convert multiple contiguous cells and 
thereby mimics the large-scale nature of LSLAs while preserving detail in the 
representation of other dynamics (e.g. smallholder agriculture or urbanization). To 
translate possible policies towards LSLAs (from LSLA-restrictive to LSLA-
encouraging), we represent the effects of LSLA perceived by policy makers in a 




negative depending on the scenario. To our knowledge, the resulting model is the 
first to explicitly simulate LSLA and its interaction with smallholder agriculture. To 
illustrate how LSLAs can cause different land change trajectories, we applied it for 
the Lao PDR, a country subject to many land acquisitions, as there is a relative 
abundance of data on LSLA location and types available. 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Study area 
The Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter called Laos) is a lower-middle 
income country in Southeast Asia of 6.8 million inhabitants (2015 situation). With 
an average GDP growth of 8 percent over the last decade, it is one of the fastest 
growing economies, and this growth has been driven for a third by use of water, 
mineral, and forest resources (World Bank, 2017). Poverty eradication is high on the 
national agenda, but is still a challenge, especially in remote areas (Epprecht et al., 
2008; World Bank, 2017). Agriculture constitutes a quarter of the GDP and employs 
75% of the population (2010 situation). The sector is dominated by rice-based 
subsistence agriculture, both as upland swidden agriculture and as permanent paddy 
rice fields (FAO, 2017a; Schmidt-Vogt et al., 2009). However, the agricultural sector 
is characterized by rapid commercialization (Heinimann et al., 2013). These changes 
manifest themselves in both LSLAs and smallholder transitions to market-oriented 
crops. 
LSLAs in Laos are usually granted by the government in the form of land 
concessions or leases. A nationwide inventory in 2010 identified 1.1 million hectares, 
or 5% of the territory of Laos, to be an agricultural land concession or lease 
(Schönweger et al., 2012), although not all of these projects are large-scale (defined 
in this study as larger than 100 ha). The granting of concessions and leases started in 
2000, and proliferated from 2005 onwards. In a follow-up of this inventory, Hett et 
al., (2015) found that between 2010 and 2015, the number of concessions and leases 
rose by 71% in the provinces of Luang Prabang and Xiengkhouang, showing that 
despite moratoria in 2007 (for forestry plantations) and 2012 (for eucalyptus and 
rubber plantations), LSLA continued. Only 30% of projects are foreign-owned, 
these projects constitute 72% of the total acquired area (Schönweger et al., 2012). 
LSLAs intend to produce rubber, timber, and cash crops such as sugar cane, biofuel 
crops, and coffee. 
Amidst the ongoing LSLA dynamics, changes in smallholder agriculture are 
drastically reshaping the Lao agricultural landscape. Smallholders are intensifying 
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and integrating into global markets (Ornetsmüller et al., 2016; Thanichanon, 2015), 
thereby competing in the same markets as LSLAs. The still extensive swidden 
landscapes are rapidly transforming to permanent agriculture. Additionally, 
smallholders are increasingly engaging in rubber production (Fox and Castella, 2013; 
Manivong and Cramb, 2008).  
4.2.2. Characterizing novel land systems in Laos in 20106 
We start our modelling exercise with a land system map representing the year 2010, 
based on a combination of national land cover maps, census data, and a collection 
of best-available data on LSLAs. All input data was first aggregated or resampled to 
the same spatial resolution and the same extent, to ensure consistency. We classify 
land systems, which denote typical combinations of land cover, land use, and land 
management (van Asselen and Verburg, 2012), using a hierarchical decision tree 
(Appendix A-2) yielding 15 land systems. The characterization of swidden is based 
on Ornetsmüller et al. (2018). Because recent land-use changes in Laos are 
characterized by both a rapid increase in large-scale land acquisitions and a 
smallholder transition to more diverse and marketable crops, we designed our 
classification to represent both these trajectories. An overview of all land systems is 
given in Table 4.1, and the resulting land system map is shown in Figure 4.1. Given 
the resolution of available input data, we opted for a resolution of 2000 meter. 
Details, data sources, and classification procedures are given in Appendix A-1, 2 and 
3. 
Seven out of the 15 land systems represent LSLAs. For the remainder of this study, 
we define LSLA as an acquisition (transfer of use rights) of land of more than 100 
ha, with the intention to use this land for agriculture or forestry. This definition 
includes industrial commodities such as rubber, but excludes acquisitions for mining, 
tourism, or special economic zones. While 100 ha is not particularly large in a global 
context, we use this threshold for Laos following Schönweger and Ullenberg (2009) 
because the average farm size in Laos is 1.6 ha (USAID, 2013). Hence by 
comparison, 100 ha can justifiably be considered large-scale. Spatial data of LSLA 
was obtained from the Land Observatory (Land Observatory Project, 2017) and the 
Centre for Development and Environment (Hett et al., 2015; Schönweger et al., 
2012). We classified LSLAs into seven systems based on their main produce – 
rubber, timber (e.g. teak or eucalyptus), arable crops, and coffee – and size (small 
and large, threshold arbitrarily set at 500 ha). As almost no coffee plantations are 
                                                     
6 Additional details on mapping and modelling procedures, and parameters used, are given 




larger than 500 ha, all coffee plantations are included in one class. Furthermore, we 
distinguish four smallholder agriculture systems: (1) swidden (also known as shifting 
cultivation) is a rotational system where a short cultivation phase is alternated with 
a long fallow phase. The dominant crop in the cultivation phase is upland rice (Mertz 
et al., 2009); (2) Mixed cash crop – subsistence mosaics cultivate a mix of paddy rice for 
subsistence and other crops for market purposes; (3) In cash crop focused smallholder 
systems, farmers specialize towards marketable crops such as coffee, fruits or sugar 
cane; And (4) rubber smallholder mosaics are systems with a large rubber component. 
The land system map is completed with  dense forest, urban, bare land, and water. 
 




Figure 4.1: Land system map of Laos in 2010 
We parameterize each land system with six commodities, services, or effects of land 
use it can produce in a single cell per time step (Table 4.1). A commodity or service 
can be provided by multiple land systems, and a land system can potentially provide 
multiple commodities, services, and effects at once, or none (e.g. water). The 
commodities and services are: (1) subsistence crops, which are those crops that are 
predominantly produced for consumption by the producer and her family and local 
community; (2) cash crops, which are all crops except rubber that are predominantly 




a cash crop, is represented as a separate commodity given its importance in Laos; (4) 
timber, which captures all output from forestry plantations; (5) urban area, 
representing all services the urban centers provide, including living space and 
infrastructure; (6) large-scale land acquisition itself, which is a way of quantifying the 
effects LSLAs are perceived to have by the host government. Whether the effects 
of LSLA are perceived by policy makers as positive or negative is scenario-
dependent (see scenarios below). Each plantation system therefore produces one 
unit of ‘LSLA’, allowing for the definition of explicit targets on the amount of LSLAs 
in parameterization (e.g. a target to increase the amount of LSLAs, or to cease 
granting of LSLAs). The empirical quantification of land system services is further 
described in SI-1. Note that small plantation systems also produce subsistence crops, 
because at the scale of a 400 ha cell, these systems are defined as a mosaic of 
plantations and smallholders. In contrast, large plantation systems are typified as 
monocultures. 
The land system classification and associated commodities instigate a dichotomy 
between subsistence agriculture and cash crop agriculture. For smallholders, this 
allows the simulation of market integration, while at the same time the competition 
between smallholders and LSLAs can be modeled. We empirically defined the two 
commodity groups based on proportions of land dedicated to cash crops, derived 
from the Agricultural Census (see Appendix A-3). Commodity production figures 
where then calculated using typical yields reported by (FAO, 2017b). 
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Table 4.1: Overview of land systems and their land system commodity production or services. 
Calculations and data sources are given in Appendix A. 
Group Land System Land system commodities and services (production per 400 ha 
grid cell) 











260 ton 358 ton    1 unit 
Small Rubber 
Plantation 
142 ton  81 ton    1 unit 
Small Forestry 
Plantation 
237 ton   312 m3  1 unit 
Large Arable 
Plantation 
 1265 ton    1 unit 
Large Rubber 
Plantation 
  286 ton   1 unit 
Large Forestry  
Plantation 
   1100 m3  1 unit 
Coffee 
Plantation 
47 ton 1600 ton     1 unit 
Smallholder 
Systems 













142 ton 345 ton 207 ton    
Urban 
System 
Urban     400 ha  
Forest 
System 
Dense Forest       
Static Land 
Covers 
Water       
Bare Land       
 
4.2.3. Model description and implementation 
To simulate land system changes until 2030, we applied the CLUMondo model (van 
Asselen and Verburg, 2013). CLUMondo allocates land system changes in response 
to an exogenously defined demand for commodities, services or effects in yearly 
time steps, using an iterative allocation procedure. In the model, alternative land 
systems are competing for space, based on the suitability of locations for each land 
system, the current land system configuration, and the competitive advantage of 
each system to supply the demands. The characterization of a land system includes 




the land systems it can convert into, and the system’s resistance to conversion. Yearly 
changes in demand for the defined land system commodities and services drive land 
system conversion in the model. See Appendix B-6 and van Asselen and Verburg 
(2013) for an in-depth explanation of the model. 
We empirically determined location suitability following the assumption that the 
physical and socio-economic characteristics of the current locations of land systems 
reflect the suitability for these systems (e.g. when more rubber is needed, rubber-
producing systems will emerge in areas which have a suitable climate and/or soil for 
rubber tree growth and that are accessible to markets) (Van Dessel et al., 2011). The 
relations between these location characteristics were identified using a logistic 
regression analysis. We selected a set of 28 maps as candidate explanatory variables, 
covering climate, soil, terrain, accessibility, ethnicity, and natural hazards. Candidate 
explanatory variables were checked for multicollinearity, and pairs of variables that 
correlate too much (Pearsons r > 0.8) were not used in the same model. Details on 
variables and fitted logistic regression models can be found in Appendix A-5. 
As a consequence of the heterogeneity in scale of land change processes in a context 
of LSLA, a multi-scalar approach is warranted. We made two specific adjustments 
to the standard modeling procedures of CLUMondo: multi-cell allocation and wider-
region suitability assessment (Figure 4.2). 
Firstly, recognizing that the large plantation systems in our application change on a 
multi-cellular basis, we developed a multi-cell allocation algorithm. This algorithm 
allocates multiple contiguous cells (patches) of a single land system, without 
deviating from the competition-based iteration algorithm and conversion rules. The 
algorithm accepts for each land system the desired patch size (stated as the maximum 
distance from a central cell), the minimum suitability each cell has to have to be 
included in a patch, and the minimum amount of cells included in each patch in 
order to be retained. For example, a land system can be parameterized to have 
patches with radius equal to 1 cell, a minimum location suitability of 0.5 and 
minimum number of cells included equal to 4. In that case, CLUMondo will find a 
seed cell at a location with high suitability for that land system and try to allocate all 
nine cells within the radius distance (i.e. a 3x3 kernel), but will be restrained by 
general conversion rules (e.g. water cannot be converted) and by the minimum 
suitability (cells with suitability lower than 0.5 for the land system will not be 
included). If after applying these rules, the patch has four cells or more, the patch is 
allocated. Otherwise, it is discarded and another location for a patch of that land 
system is found.  




Figure 4.2: Model framework 
Second, when allocating large contiguous land systems, location suitability should 
reflect the suitability of the wider area and not simply that of a single pixel in the 
model. A single suitable cell surrounded by unsuitable cells is not a prime location 
to consider for a large scale land system. Therefore, logistic regression models that 
quantify the suitability for large scale land systems use versions of the explanatory 
factors that have been smoothed using a moving window focal analysis (9 cell 
window). Each factor has a normal layer, which quantifies a factor (e.g. flood risk) 
at that cell location and is used for regressions of small-scale systems, and a 
smoothed layer, which quantifies the average of that factor in the wider area around 
that cell location and is used for regressions of large-scale systems.  
For our implementation of LSLAs in the model the parameters are provided in Table 
4.2. We set the radii and minimum amount of cells per patch to correspond to the 
current average size of LSLAs in Laos. The minimum suitability quantifies the extent 




selectiveness is too high, no location that meets all criteria will be found. Therefore, 
we manually calibrated minimum suitability by adjusting it downwards until the 
iterative allocation procedure could find a solution.  
Table 4.2: Multi-cell allocation parameters for large plantation systems 




Minimum amount of 
cells (400 ha) in patch 
Large Arable Plantation 2 0.3 10 
Large Rubber Plantation 1 0.3 6 
Large Forestry Plantation 3 0.1 34 
 
Because a commodity can be produced by different land systems in different 
quantities, a change in demand for the commodity can be resolved by seven land 
system change processes that summarize the possible dynamics between LSLAs and 
smallholders when these two producer types are in competition (visualized in 
Appendix A-6). Smallholder intensification occurs when one smallholder system 
converts into another smallholder system that produces more of the commodity (e.g. 
from swidden to cash-crop focused smallholder system for the cash crop 
commodity). Smallholder disintensification is the opposite (a smallholder system 
converts into another smallholder system that produces less of the commodity in 
question). LSLA takeover is the conversion of smallholder systems into LSLA 
systems, which can result in a net gain or net loss of commodity production, depending 
on the smallholder system that is being converted. LSLA expansion or smallholder 
expansion occurs when, respectively, LSLA or smallholders put dense forest systems 
to commodity-productive use. In our application, we restricted some trajectories that 
are hypothetically possible as they are deemed to be unlikely. Specifically, we 
restricted the conversion from LSLA to other land systems (i.e. LSLAs do not 
disappear), because the high capital investment and long contract times make such 
conversion unlikely in our time frame. 
4.2.4. Scenarios for land system change 
We illustrate our model functionality using three contrasting scenarios of future land 
system change in Laos. These scenarios are characterized by (1) a high governmental 
encouragement of LSLA, (2) a moratorium on LSLA, and (3) no specific LSLA 
policy. The scenario storylines build on the notion that policy biases for or against 
plantation agriculture are a strong (but not the only) determinant of the occurrence 
of large-scale agriculture (Byerlee, 2014). The scenarios are highly contrasting and 
serve to show a wide range of alternative trajectories, rather than a most likely future. 
A complete overview of all parameters and their calculations is given in Appendix 
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A-6. As shown in Table 4.3, we assume that demands for rubber, cash crops, 
subsistence crops, and urban area are equal in the three scenarios. In all scenarios, it 
is assumed that there is an interest in LSLA in Laos, i.e., LSLA in Laos is a “seller’s 
market” and the amount of LSLAs in Laos can be controlled by the Government of 
Laos (GoL). 
In a first scenario, ‘High LSLA’, the GoL aims to include LSLA in their development 
strategies by granting land concessions. Policy makers thus perceive or emphasize 
mostly positive effects of LSLA and therefore offer attractive conditions for land 
investors. In the past decade, this strategy was indeed followed under the 
denominator of ‘Turning Land into Capital’ and was seen as a way to increase rural 
accessibility to markets and infrastructure (Lestrelin et al., 2012; Schönweger et al., 
2012). This scenario continues on the land capitalization track by parameterizing the 
model to quadruple the area of LSLAs by 2030 compared to 2010. 
The second scenario, named ‘Moratorium’,  imposes a moratorium on new LSLAs 
starting from 2010. Existing LSLAs are allowed to continue operation and are not 
cancelled. While such a moratorium has not been issued in reality in 2010, it has in 
2007 (for new timber plantations) and in 2012 (for new rubber and eucalyptus 
plantations) (Hett et al., 2015). Scenario two is a stylized, extreme version of these 
experiences, where the moratorium encompasses all LSLAs and is assumed to be 
effective on the ground. Here, we assume policy makers perceive negative effects of 
LSLA, which they want to stop. The demand for LSLA is kept constant at the 2010 
level. Timber demand is also kept constant because smallholders cannot, in our 
model implementation, substitute as a producer of this commodity.  
The third scenario, ‘No LSLA Policy’ creates a situation without restrictions or 
requirements for the area of new LSLAs (i.e. this specific land system effect is 
dropped, increasing the degrees of freedom the model has in allocating land 
systems). Policy makers are assumed to be indifferent and/or ineffectual towards 
LSLA, and do not intervene in the competitive dynamics between LSLAs and 
smallholders. This scenario highlights the competition between smallholders and 






Table 4.3: Increase in demands of land system services until 2030 as a percentage of demand 
in 2010. 







High LSLA 160 % 120% 200% 110% 182% 400% 
Moratorium 100% 120% 200% 110% 182% 100% 
No LSLA 
Policy 
160% 120% 200% 110% 182% n.a.  
A: average yearly growth rate of 4.1%, based on calculations of   on UN projections 
4.3. Results 
The three scenarios provide land system projections for Laos in 2030. After a general 
overview, the results from the three scenarios are presented in terms of the simulated 
land systems changes and the processes leading to these changes. 
Figure 4.3 shows the resulting land system maps in 2030 under the three future 
scenarios. The maps show three quite different land system patterns, even though 
the demands for most land system commodities and services are similar across all 
scenarios. Zoomed maps show how plantation systems are allocated, with small 
plantation systems allocated in the standard single-pixel mode. Large plantation 
systems are allocated using the multi-cell allocation algorithm, with sizes varying 
following Table 4.2. Figure 4.4 shows that the extent to which different land change 
processes contribute to the fulfillment of rubber and cash crop demands varies 
highly. This section describes detailed results per scenario, in terms of the simulated 
land system patterns and the land change processes that contribute to the fulfillment 
of the commodity demands. 




Figure 4.3: Land systems in 2030 under three scenarios. Zoomed maps visualize how scenarios 
differ locally and the ways in which the multi-cell allocation algorithm creates distinctively 




The High LSLA scenario is parameterized to quadruple the area of LSLA by 2030. 
The immediate effect of this policy is proliferation of LSLAs, both by expansion 
into dense forest systems and takeovers of smallholder farmland. This is the only 
scenario where LSLA takeovers result in a reduction of cash crop and rubber 
production (Figure 4.4). Smallholder intensification is almost non-existent in this 
scenario, while some disintensification takes place. Smallholder expansion is 
negligible for rubber, but contributes significantly to the additional cash crop 
production. However, this entails only conversions from dense forest to either 
swidden (2.01 million ha) or mixed cash crop subsistence mosaics (1.04 million ha) 
systems, with expansions into cash crop focused systems being non-existent. This 
means that smallholders are driven to subsistence agriculture (i.e. swidden and mixed 
subsistence – cash crop systems), because LSLAs occupy a major part of the cash 
crop market as well as the land. However, these subsistence-based land systems also 
produce some cash crops in our model, according to the empirical characterization 
of these systems (Table 4.1). Therefore, smallholders still contribute in the provision 
of cash crops (Figure 4.4). A surprising effect of an LSLA promotion is thus an 
increase in swidden extent by 18%.  
The Moratorium scenario restricts LSLA proliferation, thus requiring the demands 
for cash crops and rubber to be met by smallholders only. Under this scenario, the 
Chinese border area undergoes a transformation from swidden and dense forest to 
rubber smallholder mosaics, and Southern Laos loses dense forest systems to mixed 
cash crop – subsistence mosaics. While smallholder expansion is the dominant 
process, this scenario also results in the most pronounced intensification by 
smallholders. Intensification is predominantly attained by conversions from swidden 
to other smallholder systems producing more cash crops and/or rubber, resulting in 
a net reduction of swidden extent by 11%. 
In the final scenario, where no specific policy related to LSLA is in place, LSLAs 
supply only 18% of the increase in cash crop demand and 46% of the additional 
demand for rubber, compared to 48% and 98% for cash crops and rubber 
respectively in the High LSLA scenario. This result is significant: in the absence of 
policies, the land system changes are the result of the empirical characterization of 
land system suitability in combination with land system specific parameters. This 
result shows that neither smallholder nor LSLA systems are superior in terms of 
competitiveness in the model (i.e. the model is not significantly biased towards a 
specific production method). Instead, the merit of one system over the other is 
spatially heterogeneous. Small rubber and arable plantations are allocated 
significantly less in this scenario compared to the High LSLA scenario (see detail 
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boxes in Figure 4.3). This indicates that without an explicit policy demand for 
LSLAs, small plantation systems are only marginally competitive. Under this 
scenario, swidden extent decreases  only by 3%. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Contribution of different land system change processes to fulfilling the demand for 
cash crops (a) and rubber (b) in all three scenarios. Terminology for different land system 
change processes is given in text. The demand for both commodities is the same in all 
scenarios. 
4.4. Discussion 
4.4.1. Interactions between smallholders and LSLA 
Our three scenarios show that, while the demand for rubber and cash crops can be 
provided by both smallholders and LSLAs, the encouragement or discouragement 
of LSLA results in very different spatial patterns of land system change. In our 
model, the distribution of the production between smallholders and LSLA depends 
only on the policies that govern LSLA. While LSLAs have specific economic (dis-
)advantages, especially related to processing infrastructure and labor organization, 
policy biases for or against LSLA have historically been decisive in this distribution 
between LSLA and smallholder production modes in Southeast Asia (Byerlee, 2014). 
The scenarios laid out here indicate some possible consequences of these policies 
on land system changes. 
Results highlight that while smallholders and LSLAs are spatially segregated, they 




therefore shown to go far beyond the immediate enclosure of large tracts of land. 
The notion that LSLAs interact with smallholders has been identified for individual 
case studies (e.g. Baird and Fox, 2015; Friis et al., 2016). These local studies have 
provided insights concerning consequences of LSLA on land systems, livelihoods, 
or local environments. Our study reveals larger-scale links between LSLA and 
smallholder agriculture through competition in common markets and land 
resources. 
The model projects a decrease of swidden extent in the Moratorium scenario, and 
an increase in the High LSLA scenario. Decreasing swidden extent has been a policy 
goal in Laos for decades (Lestrelin et al., 2013). These results highlight that swidden 
extent may reduce mainly through smallholder intensification processes, where 
smallholders increase production for commodity markets by transformation from 
swidden agriculture to permanent cropping, but also retain some level of production 
for subsistence needs. However, everything else being equal, LSLAs are projected 
to impede smallholder intensification and market integration, and lead to a 
continuation of subsistence farming, and specifically swidden farming by 
smallholders. Other authors have identified increased accessibility and market 
integration as major drivers of swidden transformations (Cramb et al., 2009; Vliet et 
al., 2012). However, there are limits to converting swidden into cash crop or rubber 
producing systems, related to biophysical and cultural limitations and labor needs, 
making conversion to agroforestry and tree crops more likely pathways of 
intensification (Cramb et al., 2009; Ducourtieux et al., 2006; Vongvisouk et al., 2014). 
The model partly reflects these constraints using biophysical and socio-economic 
variables in the suitability calculations. In any case, smallholders will require 
organization, capital (seedlings, processing capacity), support (credit, agricultural 
extension programs) and infrastructure development to engage with cash crops or 
rubber (Ducourtieux et al., 2006; Vliet et al., 2012). This should be seen as a 
prerequisite for the smallholder transformations to occur as simulated in the 
Moratorium scenario. 
4.4.2. Modelling the dynamics of LSLA 
We identified two specific characteristics of LSLAs that are relevant for their 
representation in land change models: heterogeneity in the scale of land change 
processes, and the additional, policy-driven, demand for the (avoidance of the) 
effects of LSLAs irrespective of the goods and services produced. Both are explicitly 
included in our presented modelling approach. The newly developed multi-cell 
allocation algorithm can represent the different spatial extents covered by particular 
land systems, which is necessary when the interaction between LSLAs and 
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smallholder systems is addressed. The CLUMondo approach allows the inclusion of 
multiple demands for goods and services that drive land system changes. However, 
the presented application is the first in which demands for specific types of land 
systems are included, in addition to the still existing demand for agricultural 
commodities. 
The multi-cell allocation algorithm gives adequate flexibility to simulate LSLAs with 
varying sizes (see for example the difference between large arable, forestry, and 
rubber plantations in zoomed maps, Figure 4.3). The minimum suitability threshold 
can furthermore be used to simulate how much attention is given to land suitability 
in including individual pixels inside LSLAs, where a low threshold indicates an 
‘anything goes’ attitude, while a high threshold reflects that some attention is given 
to the quality of individual pixels. Unless more is known about underlying processes, 
the choice of these settings is arbitrary.  
Simulation results are shaped by the amount of change and the location of these 
changes, and uncertainties or inaccuracies may appear in both (van Vliet et al., 2016). 
A crucial modeling step is linking current land system locations with underlying 
factors that determine the location choice. In the case of LSLAs relatively little is 
known about location choice (Messerli et al., 2014) and our empirical analysis is 
based on a relatively low number of plantations (396 projects split up in seven land 
systems) covering a low number of cells per system. The pixels involved are, due to 
the patch character of LSLAs, highly autocorrelated and regression models may 
suffer from overfitting. Nevertheless, the approach is well-suited to embed empirical 
evidence into the parameterization of the model. Similarly, because the exact 
delineation of LSLA in Laos is not known precisely, the values for the production 
of commodities might be over- or underestimated as well. On-going efforts to 
delineate granted, surveyed, allocated and ultimately developed area (Hett et al., 
2015) can serve to fine-tune such analysis.  
Results indicate that, in all scenarios, the majority of the increase in production of 
rubber and cash crops may be attained by cropland expansion (to mixed extents by 
smallholders and LSLAs), entailing the loss of dense forest. While this signals that 
the commercial pressure on land may endanger current forests, the extent of this 
deforestation cannot be directly read from the land system change maps. A land 
system should be interpreted as a mosaic of various land covers, of which tree cover 
is one. Therefore, systems other than dense forest also contain tree cover, and net 
tree cover loss is contingent on the mosaic compositions. For example,  LSLAs are 
often underused and therefore LSLA systems likely contain significant shares of 




In our model, we assume that the governance of LSLA, or lack thereof, does not 
affect the national-level demand for commodities. However, while cash crops and 
rubber can be produced by smallholders as well as LSLA, their production does not 
necessarily respond to the same market demand. Countries and companies acquiring 
land are often specifically looking to control large tracts of land or speculate on 
future use. This interest in the control over land itself, rather than the specific land-
based commodities, is referred to as ‘control grabbing’ (Borras and Franco, 2012; 
Hall et al., 2015), and may limit the assumed interchangeability between smallholder 
and LSLA production. 
Differences and interactions between LSLA and smallholder agriculture in our 
model are to the extent possible based on existing literature. Some hypothetical 
differences and interactions have not been included. Firstly, there is an ongoing 
debate on whether the advantages of a larger scale trump the disadvantages. Large 
operations are arguably better at organizing supply to a processing plant or 
pioneering a crop in a new area, while smallholders enjoy significantly lower costs 
of labor management, and often acquire higher yields due to higher-precision 
management for different crops (Byerlee, 2014; Cramb et al., 2016). Empirical 
studies on this debate indicate that throughout Southeast Asian history, there has 
been a transition from large-scale to small-scale agriculture, making the recent surge 
in LSLA an aberration (Bissonnette and Koninck, 2017). Our model does not 
explicitly include any (dis-)economies of scale in the production distribution of crops 
(see Deininger and Byerlee (2012) and Hall (2011) for an in-depth discussion). 
Second, we have not included potential synergies between LSLA and smallholders 
(e.g. contract farming schemes). In such schemes, plantations may offer capital, 
technique, and marketing, while smallholders provide labor and land (Cramb et al., 
2016; Shi, 2008). However, how and to what extent such synergies result in land 
change processes is unclear and could be addressed in future research. 
4.4.3. Implications for model-based land change assessments 
Since 2007, LSLA has globally become a significant land system change trajectory 
(Nolte et al., 2016). The interactions between LSLA and smallholders have been 
studied in local case studies (e.g. Friis et al., 2016; Hall et al., 2017). However, 
interactions at a larger scale have received far less attention (but see Baird and Fox, 
2015). Smallholders around the globe are stepping up as producers for the world 
markets of rubber, biofuel crops, and other cash crops, responding to the same 
global demands as LSLAs (Bissonnette and Koninck, 2015; Cramb et al., 2015; Fox 
and Castella, 2013). The current study highlights the different potential roles of 
LSLA and smallholders in land system change trajectories under different scenarios. 
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Rather than aiming at predictions of the future, these scenarios form a boundary 
object for discussing the option space for governments in dealing with high 
pressures on their land-based commodity markets and the different land system 
futures that may emerge from such choices, without forming normative judgments. 
Whether rubber and cash crop demand are met by smallholders, LSLAs, or a 
combination of both makes a strong difference in the emergent landscapes and the 
future of rural livelihoods.  
Given the high impact LSLAs have on livelihoods, commodity markets, biodiversity 
and forest cover, globally, it is paramount to include them in model-based land-
change assessments. Building sophisticated scenarios of LSLA dynamics will 
continue to be challenging given their regime shift-nature (Müller et al., 2014). 
Additionally, these systems respond to global commodity prices, which can be hard 
to predict. At the same time, LSLA-agnostic projections may lead to naive 
projections of future land change dynamics that ignore the changes in agency 
governing land change. 
A few challenges remain. Firstly, it is widely reported that many allotted LSLAs are 
not actually planted or abundant for reasons of low commodity prices, local 
resistance, or speculative intentions of the land investor (Liao et al., 2016). 
Therefore, land system changes simulated here will in many cases be merely a legal 
change, while actual land cover change could be limited or restricted to 
deforestation. More detailed, local scale assessments could provide further insights 
in these dynamics. Furthermore communities that have been expropriated or 
otherwise affected by LSLAs may give rise to indirect land use changes. These lower-
scale impacts on livelihoods and labor are thus a key to further understanding the 
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5. Future governance options for large-
scale land acquisition in Cambodia: 
Impacts on tree cover and tiger 
landscapes 
This chapter investigates how large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) can be 
governed to avoid underuse and thereby spare room for other land claims, 
specifically nature conservation. LSLA underuse occurs when land in LSLAs is not 
converted to its intended use. Taking Cambodia as a case, we map converted and 
unconverted areas within LSLAs using remote sensing. We develop three scenarios 
of alternative LSLA policies until 2040, and use a land system change model to 
evaluate how governing the underuse of LSLAs affects overall land use. Specifically, 
we evaluate the impact of these policies on future tree cover, the size and spatial 
integrity of natural areas, and the potential these natural areas can offer to meet the 
conservation target of a successful tiger reintroduction. In 2015, only 32% of LSLA 
area was converted. Simulations suggest that both interventionist (reclaim 
unconverted areas) and preventive (avoid non-conversion) policies dramatically 
reduce underuse. Interventionist policies perform best in limiting tree cover loss and 
in preserving natural areas, but preventive measures lead to significantly less 
fragmentation. Noninterventionist policies (no enforced policies) make tiger 
reintroduction in the Eastern Plains impossible. Preventive policies with well-
enforced protected areas succeed in creating the largest potential for tiger 
reintroduction. Our results suggest that Cambodia can reconcile LSLAs with tiger 
reintroduction in the Eastern Plains only when using preventive land use policies. In 
the  absence of such policies, tiger survival in the Eastern Plains is unlikely and only 
the Cardamom or Virachey forest may offer such potential. 
 
This chapter is published as: 
Debonne, N., van Vliet, J., Verburg, P.H. (2019). Future governance options for 
large-scale land acquisition in Cambodia: Impacts on tree cover and tiger landscapes. 





Following the 2007-08 crises in food, fuel, and finance, demand for the control over 
land resources has surged (Arezki et al., 2011). Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) 
are the prime manifestation of this demand, resulting in the reported acquisition of 
over 49 million hectares of land globally, predominantly in developing countries 
(Land Matrix, 2019) The rapid proliferation of LSLA has spurred societal and 
academic debate on the desirability of these investments.  
Some dismiss the idea that LSLAs can provide benefits that outweigh the negative 
social and environmental effects and the opportunity costs they incur and argue 
against optimizing land governance as it will not solve the fundamental problems 
with LSLA (Borras and Franco, 2010a; De Schutter, 2011). Others argue that LSLA 
is a necessary way to meet growing agricultural commodity demands. In this line of 
reasoning, LSLAs hold the potential to close yield gaps and increase labor 
productivity by bringing technological improvements to rural areas that have 
hitherto seen little rural innovation (Collier and Dercon, 2009). Countries with large 
land endowments may benefit from LSLAs provided that they streamline the 
process in a transparent way and with sufficient land governance guardrails 
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). 
The fundamental discourse legitimizing LSLA, the notion that ‘unused’ or ‘waste’ 
land should be allocated to more efficient (large-scale) producers to boost global 
agricultural production, is scrutinized in a number of ways (De Schutter, 2011; 
Scoones et al., 2018). Firstly, the existence of ‘unused’ land is doubted, because often 
such land is in common use (D’Odorico et al., 2017; Eitelberg et al., 2015). Marking 
land as ‘waste’ land is an underappreciation of the many services land can supply 
(Borras et al., 2011b). Second, the alleged higher efficiency of larger-scale farm units 
is not supported by empirical evidence. Instead, small owner-producers outperform 
corporate farms in all but a few crops, and even for crops where e.g. post-harvest 
processes warrant large-scale supply, it can suffice to organize smallholders in 
cooperatives (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012; Holden and Otsuka, 2014). Third, the 
local livelihood and land system impacts of LSLAs are often deemed unacceptable 
(Friis et al., 2016). Fourth, the secondary positive effects that are claimed to accrue 
from land investments, such as employment, poverty reduction, or food security, 
often do not materialize or are insufficient to compensate for lost opportunities 
(Nolte and Ostermeier, 2017; Oberlack et al., 2016; Rulli and D’Odorico, 2014). The 
core of this debate is a choice between two development pathways: a pathway of 
smallholder enablement or a pathway of scale enlargement and foreign investment. 
While LSLAs can be an engine of agricultural production growth, the enablement of 
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small farmers has the same potential while also providing stronger gains in rural 
poverty alleviation and development. From this perspective, LSLA is loaded with a 
high opportunity cost (De Schutter, 2011). 
Amidst this debate, a less discussed aspect is the governance and functioning of 
granted LSLAs. While LSLAs are granted as large, contiguous areas intended for 
commercial agriculture, a significant share of areas claimed by LSLAs is not 
converted to its intended use. This is problematic as land resources are becoming 
scarcer and more contested. Underuse of LSLAs is caused by a host of factors. 
Often, land is acquired for its speculative value. Although the extent of mere 
speculative land acquisition is unknown, it has global significance (De Schutter, 
2011). In other cases, investors lack agronomic or logistic capacity and knowhow, 
or meet effective opposition from local land users (Buxton et al., 2012; Schönweger 
and Messerli, 2015). Agronomical challenges become especially significant when new 
crops are pioneered (Pearce, 2012; Wendimu, 2016). 
The implication of LSLA underuse is a potentially inefficient land use distribution. 
Unproductive LSLA areas could instead be farmed by smallholder farmers or 
designated as natural areas. While the full extent of underuse is unknown, the Land 
Matrix reports 7.5 million hectares of failed LSLA deals globally. For 918 deals, the 
productive use is known, revealing that only 56% of the area of those deals is 
converted to its intended use, and only 24% of LSLA projects converted all area 
they acquired (Land Matrix, 2019). More reliable figures of LSLA underuse are not 
available, highlighting the need for empirical research to inform policy. Even when 
unconverted LSLA areas are still being farmed by smallholders, the LSLA creates 
insecure land tenure conditions for these land users. This means that the original 
land use/cover (e.g. forest, smallholder agriculture) persists, but land ownership and 
tenure become highly insecure. This insecurity is problematic in its own right, but 
also potentially creates second-order negative effects such as lower land productivity 
(Higgins et al., 2018). Large tracts of land are effectively locked in by high transaction 
costs (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012), and cannot easily be rededicated to e.g. 
smallholder agriculture or nature conservation. 
Countries hosting LSLAs are now faced with the challenge of governing these novel 
land tenure arrangements. This is a pertinent, yet rarely addressed issue: new tenure 
systems demand new regulatory frameworks, and effective management may have 
the potential to maximize LSLA benefits while minimizing its negative impacts. 
Most academic work on LSLA has scrutinized the discourses by which LSLAs are 
(un)justified (e.g. De Schutter, 2011; Scoones et al., 2018), the motives of 




or the impacts of LSLAs on local and national socio-ecological systems (e.g. Davis 
et al., 2015; Oberlack et al., 2016). Such studies tell a precautionary tale and warn 
against the undesirable outcomes and missed opportunities associated with an LSLA 
pathway. We do not argue against these analyses, but depart from this debate by 
considering governance options for those countries that, despite the 
abovementioned issues, have already embarked on an LSLA pathway nonetheless. 
Such countries must deal with a different problem set: how to govern novel land 
tenure arrangements and deal with a new type of land user. This challenge has two 
interrelated sides: first, policy makers may wish to grant more land as LSLAs, raising 
questions concerning the amount, size, and location of new projects. Second, 
effective regulation of existing LSLAs can be challenging in the absence of best 
practices. Because land resources are limited and claimed for a multitude of 
purposes, the management of LSLA has often come at the cost of other land users 
(Messerli et al., 2014), and competitive interactions with smallholder farmers at the 
national level have been identified (Debonne et al., 2018). Moreover, as LSLA is 
having an impact on forests and natural habitats (Davis et al., 2015), countries with 
an environmental policy agenda should reconcile their LSLA policies with their 
environmental policies, and have the tools to do so. 
Countries have established a number of governance approaches to manage the 
amount of new LSLAs and regulate existing LSLAs. In terms of amount of new 
LSLAs, policies range from moratoria on all or specific types of LSLAs, to active 
stimulation of new LSLA (Debonne et al., 2018; Sperfeldt et al., 2012). Those 
countries accepting and/or stimulating LSLA are using various regulatory 
frameworks to control location and use of existing and new LSLAs, which we group 
into three categories. First, some host countries opt for a noninterventionist policy, 
where land acquirers do not need (or are not enforced) to meet any requirements. 
There are no prior checks on the suitability of the granted land for the intended 
purpose or the overall feasibility of the project, and LSLA underuse is not penalized. 
Noninterventionist governance has for example been reported in Myanmar and 
Zambia where existing regulations are only rarely enforced because responsible 
administrations are underfinanced and legal pluralism (the co-existence of formal 
and customary law) undermines formal regulations (Byerlee et al., 2014; Nolte, 
2014). Second, interventionist policies demand from land acquirers that they present a 
plan detailing the intended land use conversions and their timing. Failure to adhere 
to these plans can result in the revocation of the contract. This policy is for example 
used in Madagascar and Mozambique, where the LSLA performance and adherence 
to land use plans is checked after 5 years and 2 years, respectively, and the contract 
can either be extended or voided (Andriamanalina and Burnod, 2014). Such policies 
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are especially implemented to avoid speculative use of the acquisitions (Nolte et al., 
2016). Third, as host governments become more experienced with LSLA and land 
is becoming scarcer, there are signs that countries are increasingly considering local 
populations and biophysical suitability of the land for the intended use (Messerli et 
al., 2015). This creates the perspective for a preventive policy style, where host 
governments allocate LSLAs on land suitable for the intended purposes, and only 
when the aspiring investors can present solid business plans.  
Cambodia is one of the countries where the governance challenges instigated by 
LSLA have become pertinent. Land is claimed for commodity production by 
domestic and international producers, but also for biodiversity conservation and 
urban expansion. Cambodia has granted approximately 2.3 million hectares of 
agricultural LSLAs, using the Economic Land Concessions system (LICADHO, 
2017). LSLAs are intended for the production of, among others, rubber, sugar cane, 
cassava, fast-growing tree species and palm oil (Sophal, 2015). The de jure policies 
regulating LSLAs theoretically contain safeguards against LSLA underuse and 
excessive environmental damage. Among others, a maximum size of 10000 ha per 
LSLA is set, environmental and social impact assessments should be conducted, 
protected areas are off-limits, and contracts can be revoked. However, the de facto 
policies before 2012 have been implemented less stringently. LSLAs have been 
granted in protected areas, maximum areas have been exceeded, and LSLAs were 
often used only to extract timber. Underuse of LSLAs is reported to be a large 
problem (Löhr, 2011; Neef et al., 2013; Oldenburg and Neef, 2014). This has lead 
the Government of Cambodia to launch Order 01 in 2012, which includes a full 
review of currently existing LSLAs and a ban on new LSLAs (Sophal, 2015). 
Meanwhile, Cambodia hosts a large stock of tree cover, often within large, 
contiguous natural areas. These natural areas contain a wide range of globally 
endangered species (WWF, 2018). 34% of Cambodia’s territory is officially protected 
(World Bank, 2018), although this protection is often not effective (Souter et al., 
2016). In the context of the WWF Tx2 project, which aims to double the global 
population of wild tigers (Panthera Tigris) by 2022 (Wikramanayake et al., 2011), 
Cambodia has committed itself to reintroduce the currently extirpated tiger. This 
reintroduction requires, among other factors, a large contiguous habitat and 
therefore constitutes a large claim on land resources (Gray et al., 2017). 
The objective of this chapter is to assess to what extent and how Cambodian LSLA 
policies can be reconciled with their nature conservation ambitions. This assessment 
is carried out using a forward-looking land system change model, able to project 




land system changes to future tree cover, area and integrity of natural areas, and the 
ensuing potential of a successful tiger introduction. Land change models are valuable 
tools to explore the possible impacts of land policies in the future, and find out 
which policies may succeed in reaching stated targets. Currently, some LSLAs have 
been revoked or downsized following Order 01, but there are currently no protocols 
or guidelines on the management or use of the land of reclaimed LSLAs (Grimsditch 
and Schoenberger, 2015). With such large areas of land in the balance, Cambodia’s 
policies on these issues will likely have a highly significant effect on land use and the 
environment, with perpetuating effects in the future. 
5.2. Methods 
To assess how LSLA policies will shape future land system patterns in Cambodia by 
2040, we use CLUMondo, a land system change model that can explicitly address 
LSLA (Debonne et al., 2018; van Asselen and Verburg, 2013). The model is 
described in detail in Appendix B-6. In the following sections, we first develop a 
land system map for 2015, distinguishing the productive use of LSLAs. Next we 
explain the modeling of future land system changes until 2040. Lastly, we present 
and parameterize three LSLA policy scenarios. 
5.2.1. Mapping large-scale land acquisitions as land systems in 
Cambodia 
We characterize Cambodian land systems based on their land cover composition as 
well as their land management regime. Land systems combine information on land 
cover, land use, and land management. They capture the different purposes land has 
and to what extent specific combinations of land cover, use, and management can 
fulfill demands for these purposes (van Asselen and Verburg, 2012). Land systems 
are classified at a spatial resolution of 1000m, because this best captures the land 
change processes of interest and the detail of available data. The starting land system 
map depicts the situation in 2015 for mainland Cambodia. We operationalized the 
classification using a decision tree that combines a 2015 land cover map (Miettinen 
et al., 2016), a forest classification (Open Development Cambodia, 2016a), and the 
spatial delineation of LSLAs (Open Development Cambodia, 2016b). The resulting 
land systems are defined in Table 5.1. A detailed procedure is presented Appendix 
B-1 and B-2. 
To be able to reflect differences between LSLAs, we use the Cambodian LSLA 
spatial database by Open Development Cambodia (2016), and mapped the areas that 
are converted into a plantation. We interpreted LSLAs to be ‘converted’ when (1) it 
falls within a mapped LSLA area (Open Development Cambodia, 2016b) (2) a 
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plantation-like land cover pattern is present (large-scale monocultures planted in a 
noticeably structured way), and (3) the land was converted after the contract date of 
the LSLA. We used high resolution Google Earth data and Landsat time series with 
yearly images to perform the visual interpretation. We further subdivided used 
LSLAs into annual crops, forestry, and perennial crops, based on their intended 
production as stated in the LSLA database. Unconverted LSLAs are subdivided into 
forested and other unconverted LSLAs , based on forest cover (Table 5.1). Other 
unconverted LSLAs may be fallow, or in use for smallholder agriculture, but this 
was not classified in more detail. 
Table 5.1: Land systems and explanation. The decision tree and specific data sources are 
provided in Appendix B-1. 
Land system Description 
Water Rivers and lakes 
Floodplain/Mangrove Floodplains or mangroves 
Urban Cities and towns based on Miettinen et al. (2016) 
Converted annual crops 
LSLA 
Plantations located within an LSLA and intended for the 
production of annual crops (cassava, sugar cane, maize, 
and others) 
Converted forestry LSLA Plantations located within an LSLA and intended for the 
production of timber (acacia and teak) or paper pulp 
Converted perennial crops 
LSLA 
Plantations located within an LSLA and intended for the 
production of rubber or palm oil 
Forested unconverted 
LSLA 
Areas claimed as LSLA but not currently in use as a 
plantation, covered with forest 
Other unconverted LSLA Areas claimed as LSLA but not currently in use as a 
plantation, not covered with forest 
Evergreen forest Tropical evergreen forest 
Deciduous forest Deciduous dipterocarp forest, also known as tropical dry 
forest 
Cropland Smallholder cropland dominantly used for paddy rice 
cultivation and to lesser extent for the production of 
annual and perennial crops or timber  
Cropland – Evergreen 
forest mosaic 
Variant of the Cropland system in mosaic with evergreen 
forest 
Cropland – Deciduous 
forest mosaic 






5.2.2. Modelling land system changes in response to multiple 
demands for commodities and services 
The CLUMondo model (van Asselen and Verburg, 2013) is used to simulate future 
land system changes until 2040. CLUMondo combines information on local 
suitability for different land systems, conversion rules, and future demands for land 
system commodities and services, and uses an iterative procedure to allocate land 
systems in order to meet these demands. Conceptually, the model assumes that if 
there is an increase in demand for a commodity or service, land systems producing 
this commodity or service will appear where the biophysical and socio-economic 
context is most suitable for those land systems. Suitability is quantified using logistic 
regressions performed with eighteen socio-economic and biophysical factors 
Appendix B-3. Importantly, because land system can produce zero to many 
commodities and services, and any single commodity or service can be produced by 
multiple land systems, they drastically increase the complexity of the model. Each 
time step, the model essentially aims to supply all the land-based goods and services 
that are provided as exogenous inputs while maximizing the total allocation 
likelihood defined by the suitability and conversion resistances. The resulting land 
system changes (e.g. the choice between agricultural intensification or expansion 
pathways) are the result of a numerical optimization procedure balancing these 
demands, constraints, suitability and other specifications (van Vliet and Verburg, 
2018). Within each time step (year), land use changes are simulated in an iterative 
procedure. Each cell is initially given the land system that is (1) allowed in that 
location (depending on original land system and location) and (2) has the highest 
transition potential (suitability) on that location. Then, the amount of commodities 
and services this new landscape produces is calculated, and based on the imbalance 
between demand and supply, land systems producing undersupplied demands are 
given a higher transition potential and vice versa. This is repeated until all demands 
are fulfilled within a margin of 5%, while the overall average deviation is below 1%.  
In our application, each land system produces, in varying quantities, five defined 
commodities and services: annual cash crops (cassava, sugar cane, and others), 
timber, perennial crops (predominantly rubber, but also palm oil), and rice. ‘Urban’ 
is a land system service grouping all urban functions such as residential functions. 
LSLAs are assumed to specialize in one of three commodity groups (annual cash 
crops, perennial cash crops or forestry). Smallholder systems also produce these 
commodities, but focus mostly on rice. Furthermore, smallholders are assumed to 
experience increasing yields, representing partial closures of the yield gap. We 
control the area of new LSLAs added each year by defining a specific policy demand 
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for LSLA, and allocate LSLAs using a multi-cell allocation algorithm to represent 
them as large contiguous entities (Appendix B-6). A detailed description of the 
quantification of demands and productivities is given in Appendix B.  
5.2.3. LSLA policy scenarios towards 2040 
We developed three scenarios to address alternative LSLA governance options for 
Cambodia and their possible consequences. We explain these scenarios with 
storylines and present model parameters that differ among scenarios in Table 5.2. 
The first scenario assumes no reform or no implementation of a reform and is 
therefore noninterventionist, while the next two scenarios assume a policy reform 
towards an interventionist and a preventive LSLA policy, respectively. 
Hands-off: In this scenario, a noninterventionist approach towards LSLAs is 
assumed. No restrictions are in place to regulate LSLA. Upon acquiring land, there 
is no penalization if the investor does not develop a plantation, making it possible 
to leave the land undeveloped. We assume that each year, between 40000 and 60000 
ha of new LSLAs are granted, and each individual LSLA is between 8000 and 12000 
ha large. In the last 15 years, the average yearly area of new LSLA amounted to 
111239 ha. Our estimates are therefore conservative, because (1) since 2012, 
Cambodia has signaled a less expeditious LSLA policy (Oldenburg and Neef, 2014), 
and (2) we assume the already high pressure on land in Cambodia (Löhr, 2011) 
makes a continuation of past trends unlikely. In this scenario, LSLA contracts are 
permanent and cannot be revoked or downsized. This scenario resembles a 
continuation of the LSLA policies prior to the 2012 Order 01, where LSLAs were 
granted without any effective management efforts (ADHOC, 2014; Dwyer et al., 
2015). 
Penalization: In this scenario, land acquirers are required to develop the acquired 
land within three years after the LSLA was granted. If they fail to do so, the contract 
is voided for the unconverted areas. These areas will convert to a non-LSLA land 
system. This scenario simulates a continuation of the interventionist policy 
effectively introduced by Order 01 in 2012, when the revision of granted LSLAs 
resulted in the downsizing or outright revocation of unconverted LSLAs. These 
areas where then granted to smallholders as Social Land Concessions, or (re-) 
integrated into protected areas (Oldenburg and Neef, 2014; Schoenberger, 2017). As 
LSLA contracts are revoked, we assume that the demand for commodities produced 
by LSLAs in Cambodia (timber, annual and perennial cash crops) decreases. This 
process mimics the globalized nature of the markets for these commodities: if land 
is not available or used in Cambodia, we assume production will move elsewhere. 




in the next simulation year cannot exceed 50% of the total unconverted LSLA area. 
If this threshold is exceeded, the demands for the three commodities are evenly 
lowered until the criteria is met. 
Proactive granting: In this scenario, Cambodia takes a preventive stance by 
granting smaller concessions on highly suitable land only. New LSLAs cannot be 
allocated within protected areas. Furthermore, new LSLAs are only granted if there 
is sufficient market demand for the commodities LSLAs produce. Specifically, only 
when the expected demand for LSLA area instigated by commodity demands in the 
next year exceeds 50% of the current LSLA stock new LSLAs can be granted. Note 
that in this scenario LSLA availability is adjusted upward based on commodity 
demand, while in the Penalization scenario commodity demand is adjusted 
downward based on LSLA availability. 
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Table 5.2: Scenario parameters. Maximum vacancy time is the number of years an LSLA is 
allowed to be unconverted before its contract is revoked. The LSLA size and minimum 
suitability are controlled by the multi-cell allocation algorithm described Appendix B-6. 
 Hands-off Penalization Proactive 
granting 
Protected areas 
None or not 
effective 
None or not 
effective 
No LSLA in 







Indefinite 3 years 3 years 
LSLA size 8000 – 12000 ha 8000 – 12000 ha 600 – 900 ha 
LSLA minimum 
suitability 
Very low (0.3) Very low (0.3) High (0.5) 
New LSLA area 
yearly 
40000 – 60000 
ha 



























5.2.4. Scenario impact assessment 
5.2.4.1. Impact on tree cover 
We quantify the total tree cover change during the simulated period. Conceptually, 
a land system is composed of various land covers, among which is tree cover. We 
quantify average tree cover for each land system and assume this will remain 
constant. This is operationalized using overlay analysis of the initial land system map 
with a tree cover map by Open Development Cambodia (2016a). We analyze total 
tree cover at the end of the simulation to assess the effectiveness of different policies. 
We also break down total tree cover into tree cover situated in natural, LSLA, and 




5.2.4.2. Impact on core natural areas and tiger reintroduction 
potential 
We assess how land system changes impact core natural areas by defining a core area 
as a forested area (evergreen or deciduous land system) that is at least 5 km away 
from any large (>300 ha) unnatural disturbance. Non-core natural areas are defined 
as edge areas, and we assume that disturbance and edge effects pose a threat to 
biodiversity there. 5 km is frequently used as a distance to define core areas (Thatte 
et al., 2018). Further details on core area delineation are presented in Appendix B-4. 
In a next step, we evaluate the impact of the modeled natural area dynamics on the 
potential of a tiger reintroduction. Tiger reintroduction success depends, amongst 
other factors, on the availability of a sufficiently large contiguous natural area. For a 
reintroduction to be successful, it is estimated that a habitat must be at least 0.2 Mha. 
The risk for human-tiger conflict is high in Cambodia, with low support rates 
reported for coexistence with tigers in potential tiger reintroduction sites (Gray et 
al., 2017). Therefore, we assume that tiger reintroduction is only feasible within the 
core natural areas, as defined above. Evergreen and deciduous forest systems can 
sustain 3 and 10 tigers/10000 ha, respectively (Wikramanayake et al., 2011). Using 
these figures, we quantify how many tigers can potentially be sustained by the 
remaining core areas larger than 0.2 Mha in 2040, in case other inhibiting factors 
(poaching, human-wildlife conflict, adequate prey densities; see Gray et al., (2017)) 
are dealt with. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Cambodian land systems and large-scale land acquisition 
in 2015 
In 2015, Cambodia consists of a central valley of cropland systems, and a number 
of large and relatively intact patches of evergreen or deciduous forests (Figure 5.1a). 
The Eastern Plains have been fragmented by a number of LSLAs, mostly for 
perennial crop production. Other natural areas marked in Figure 5.1a form relatively 
undisturbed core areas. 
The majority of the land included in LSLAs in the year 2015 is not in use for their 
intended production (Figure 5.1b-c). Only 32% of all LSLA area is used 
productively, while the other 68% remains in its original state. Yet, the fractions 
differ between LSLAs, and according to the intended use. Area-wise, only 18% of 
forestry LSLAs, 33% of perennial cash crops LSLAs, and 55% of annual cash crops 
LSLAs were in use. The total area of undeveloped LSLAs is 1.15 Mha. 




Figure 5.1: a) Cambodian land systems in 2015. Numbers mark the Cardamom forest (1), Prey 
Lang Forest (2), Virachey Forest (3), and the Eastern Plains Deciduous Forest (4). b) LSLA 
areas detailing the c) Productive use of LSLAs. Production group is determined by the stated 
intention in the LSLA database.  
5.3.2. Cambodian land systems from 2015 to 2040 under 
different LSLA policies 
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of LSLA productive use in the three scenarios, and 
Figure 5.3 shows the scenario results for the year 2040. 
In the Hands-off scenario, the total area of LSLA rises from 1.95 Mha to 3.03 Mha 
by 2040. 2.06 Mha (68%) of these LSLA areas are converted to plantations. The 
fraction of LSLAs converted to plantations rises over time as a consequence of the 
parameterization assumptions: the yearly area of new LSLAs is lower than the area 
required to meet yearly commodity demands. The LSLA areas present in 2015 are 




of the unconverted LSLA areas in 2015 are never converted, because these areas are 
not very suitable for the growth of any of the commodity types. Furthermore, new 
LSLAs are allocated mostly in lowland forests, such as the Prey Lang National Park, 
which is almost completely converted to perennial LSLA, and large parts of the 
Eastern Plains. 
In the Penalization scenario, the total area of LSLA decreases to 1.8 Mha in 2040. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the area of LSLA decreases sharply until 2022, when the area 
of unconverted LSLAs stabilizes at about 0.1 Mha (6% of total area), while the area 
of converted LSLA increases steadily. The policies simulated in this scenario manage 
to remove surplus LSLA areas that are not suitable for plantation use. However, 
because of the assumed feedback on the commodity demands, the total area of 
converted LSLAs is lower than in the other two scenarios (1.7 Mha in this scenario 
versus 2.1 Mha in the other two scenarios). As in the Hands-off scenario, large parts 
of protected areas are lost to LSLA. 
In the Proactive Granting scenario, the total area of LSLA increases slightly, to 2.3 
Mha, of which 0.16 Mha (7% of total area) is unconverted. Because the area of 
granted LSLAs is parameterized to match closely the area needed for the production 
of demanded commodities, the converted LSLA area is higher in this scenario as 
compared to the Penalization scenario. The same quantities of commodities are 
produced as in the Hands-off scenario, but the amount of unconverted LSLA is 
significantly lower. The results further show that commodity demands can be met 
while protecting 34% of the Cambodian territory. In the other two scenarios, LSLA 
encroachment into protected areas leads to the conversion of Prey Lang Forest, as 
well as large areas of the Eastern Plains, into plantations (see Figure 5.3). The 
assumed effective nature protection in this scenario moves plantation development 
outside of protected areas. 
 




Figure 5.2: Evolution of vacant and used economic land concessions 
5.3.3. Scenario impact assessment 
5.3.3.1. Impact on tree cover 
Table 5.3 shows the impacts in terms of tree cover. We present tree cover in three 
categories: (1) tree cover in LSLA systems, (2) tree cover in natural systems 
(deciduous and evergreen forest systems), and (3) tree cover in all other systems. 
The highest area of total tree cover is achieved under Penalization scenario (7.6 
Mha), 0.4 Mha more than under the Hands-off scenario. The fraction within natural 
land systems differs more starkly. In the Proactive Granting scenario, 20% more tree 
cover area resides within natural systems as compared to the Hands-off scenario, 
and this difference increases to 26% under the Penalization scenario. Tree cover 
within LSLA systems is minimal under the Penalization scenario, where 50% less 







Table 5.3: Tree cover (Mha) in 2015 and 2040 under three simulation scenarios broken down 
into three categories: (1) LSLA land systems, (2) natural land systems, which is evergreen and 
deciduous forest systems, and (3) all other land systems. 
 Tree cover area included in different land systems 











2015 5.6 1.0 1.2 7.8 
2040 - Hands-off 4.6 1.2 1.4 7.2 
2040 - Penalization 5.8 0.6 1.2 7.6 
2040 - Proactive 
Granting 
5.5 0.8 1.1 7.4 
5.3.3.2. Impact on core natural areas and tiger reintroduction 
potential 
The three policies impact the core natural areas and the ensuing potential for a tiger 
reintroduction differently (Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). The Hands-off scenario results 
in a 19% loss of total natural area, and a 46% loss of core natural areas. The decline 
in average and median core patch size indicate that this scenario results in reduced 
extent and integrity of natural areas. The Penalization scenario results in the highest 
total natural area, but 74% of this natural area is situated at edges and 35% of core 
natural areas is lost. The Proactive Granting scenario limit core natural area loss to 
19%, and average and medium patch sizes increase due to the loss of smaller, 
unprotected patches, leaving a smaller number of large core areas. 
Table 5.4: Core, edge, and total natural (evergreen and deciduous forest systems) area (Mha) 
   Natural area 












2015  2.6 4.4 49394 1583 7.0 
2040 - Hands-off 1.4 4.3 28513 980 5.7 
2040 - Penalization 1.7 4.9 37375 1526 6.6 






In 2015, there was sufficient core natural area for 956 tigers, spread over four 
potential areas. The Eastern Plains deciduous forest, which has been identified as 
the main candidate for tiger reintroduction (Launay et al., 2012), is the landscape 
with the highest tiger carrying capacity, supporting up to 481 tigers. 
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Our simulation results show that, while the total core natural area faces significant 
drops, the size of individual patches of core area declines even more rapidly, making 
many too small to be viable tiger landscapes (Figure 5.3; Table 5.5). In all scenarios, 
a few core natural areas remain able to support a tiger population. However, all 
scenarios have less suitable tiger habitat conditions then what is found in the year 
2015, as a result of a net loss in natural land systems. The potential for reintroduction 
in the Eastern Plains disappears in the Hands-off scenario and significantly shrinks 
in the Penalization scenario, due to strong fragmentation (Figure 5.3).  
Table 5.5: Tiger carrying capacity in potential tiger landscapes in 2015 and in 2040 under three 
alternative scenarios. Location of natural areas are given in . 
 Tiger carrying capacity in core natural areas 










2015 265 95 115 481 956 
2040 – Hands-off 203 0 107 0 310 
2040 - Penalization 225 0 111 250 586 






Figure 5.3: (left) Land system projections for 2040 in three scenarios. In the Proactive Granting 
scenario, the mapped protected areas are effective. (right) Impact on natural areas and tiger 
reintroduction candidate areas. 




5.4.1. Cambodian land systems in 2015 
We present the first rigorous national-scale effort to estimate LSLA productive use. 
In 2015, 68% of mapped LSLA areas are not used productively. Üllenberg, (2009) 
reports 90% non-use in Cambodian land concessions in 2009, but no clarity is given 
on how this number was calculated. This underuse of LSLAs represents a major 
problem for Cambodian land governance. If the previous land users were small 
farmers it may mean that these farmers were evicted or live in a precarious land 
tenure situation. In other cases, LSLAs claim forested areas, which has been proven 
to form a high risk of deforestation even if they are not used productively (Davis et 
al., 2015). In 2015, 0.9 Mha of forest systems, 12% of all Cambodian forest areas, 
are therefore at higher risk of loss. Non-use is particularly problematic as it defeats 
the purpose of the Economic Land System policy, i.e. “to use land more optimally” 
(Oldenburg and Neef, 2014). If Cambodia anticipated positive economic effects to 
accrue from these investments, underuse may significantly scale back the expected 
benefits. The underuse problem is currently being addressed following the issuance 
of Order 01 in 2012, which, among others, aims to seize undeveloped parts of ELCs 
(Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015). 
5.4.2. Scenarios of large-scale land governance 
Our objective was to assess the potential conflict between Cambodian LSLA policies 
and its nature conservation ambitions, thereby confronting two disparate large-scale 
land claims. The policy options embedded in the presented scenarios do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of all policy interventions. Their storylines are designed 
to be contrasting in terms of policy approaches, thereby demarcating the option 
space for countries aiming to govern existing LSLAs and allocate new LSLAs. Each 
scenario is associated with several governance issues, which we briefly discuss here.  
The policy option to neither penalize nor prevent LSLA underuse, captured in the 
Hands-off scenario, has been prevalent in many countries because it benefits elites 
and requires little state capacity. In a penalty-free playing field, land acquirers are 
inclined to clear-cut acquired land for valuable timber, or simply leave land vacant 
for its speculative future value (Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015). This often 
means that land acquirers can profit without investing in cultivation. However, a 
noninterventionist governance style may be hard to sustain as popular protest 
organizes and international pressure mounts. This is why many countries have had 




The Penalization scenario contains mechanisms to void contracts for the LSLA areas 
that have not been converted to productive use. This is indeed a policy on paper in 
many countries, including Cambodia since 2012 (Oldenburg and Neef, 2014). 
However, considerable difficulties can arise in the implementation of such a policy. 
Sunken costs and transaction costs are often too high. The state and judicial capacity 
to administer and judge disownments is frequently not in place (Burnod et al., 2013; 
Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). In Cambodia, as in many LSLA-targeted countries, 
domestic elites with a vested interest in maintaining a noninterventionist approach 
make a full-fledged interventionist LSLA governance unlikely (Beban and Gorman, 
2015). Still, public protest, combined with oftentimes disappointing gains in e.g. 
employment and tax revenue from underused LSLAs can garner support for 
intervention and disownment on a case by case basis, as exemplified by 
Schoenberger, (2017). 
The Proactive Granting scenario assumes that there is foreknowledge about future 
commodity demands. The implementation of Proactive Granting takes the form of 
sincere vetting of business plans prior to the allocation of land. Theoretically, 
Cambodia grants LSLAs using competitive solicited proposals which should 
guarantee that land is granted to the most capable investor. However, in reality this 
regulation may never have been applied (Oldenburg and Neef, 2014). Proactive 
Granting  requires skilled state capacity, not hampered by conflicts of interest. Even 
if such capacity exists, the volatility of commodity markets will create uncertainties 
for the aspiring land owner as well as for the granting agency. The limitation imposed 
in the model, stating that only highly suitable land should be granted, will require 
agro-ecological knowledge. Furthermore, while our model assumes perfect 
protection of protected areas, the level of protection may range from ‘paper park’ to 
strict no-go zones (Ferraro et al., 2013). However, because of the rather low number 
of LSLAs, a ban of LSLAs in protected areas is likely relatively feasible by 
coordinating between responsible agencies. This step has been taken by the 
Cambodian government, as the Ministry of the Environment was ordered to cease 
granting LSLAs and is now coordinating with the Ministry of Agriculture to align 
their land policies (Souter et al., 2016). 
In all scenarios, it is assumed that LSLAs will be present in the future, and new 
LSLAs will be granted (this is our point of departure). Scenario model results for 
Laos suggest that, if smallholders sufficiently diversify towards export commodity 
production, the country can meet both domestic and world market demands, making 
LSLAs superfluous (Debonne et al., 2018). This result is corroborated by historical 
analyses for Southeast Asia that situate LSLA as a trend-breaking phenomenon in a 
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region characterized by a transition from plantations to smallholder systems since 
the end of the colonial times (Bissonnette and Koninck, 2017; Byerlee, 2014). 
Furthermore, the Penalization and Proactive Granting scenarios have redistributive 
mechanisms, as unconverted LSLAs are assumed to be reclaimed by either 
smallholder or natural land systems. However, LSLAs that have been converted to 
their intended use as a plantation are not assumed to be returned to smallholders or 
natural areas. Cancelling and redistributing all LSLAs is an interesting though 
experiment, but falls beyond our scope for a model-based approach. 
5.4.3. Impacts of LSLA policy scenarios 
Scenario results suggest that, if not penalized or prevented, LSLAs will be left 
underused. The majority of unconverted land in the Hands-off scenario (87%) has 
been unconverted since the beginning of the simulation in 2015. This is because of 
the relatively low suitability of these lands for any plantation agriculture, and in 
retrospect these areas should likely never have been granted. Penalization measures, 
to some extent active under Order 01 since 2014 (Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 
2015), manage to minimize LSLA underuse until 2040 in our scenarios. However, 
while penalization of existing, unconverted LSLAs may return land to the land 
market, avoiding underuse altogether is preferable as this can abate negative impacts 
of LSLAs. The Proactive Granting scenario shows that when LSLAs are only 
granted if there is demand for the commodities they intent to produce, underuse can 
be avoided. By granting smaller LSLAs with higher minimum requirements in terms 
of suitability, non-use is further avoided. 
The impacts on tree cover indicate that Penalization measures perform best to limit 
tree cover loss, saving  0.4 Mha more tree area then under Hands-off policies. This 
is partly because, in this scenario, commodity demands are lowered in response to 
LSLA revocations, ultimately easing the pressure on land in Cambodia. However, 
because we assume this demand will leak to other countries, these leakage effects 
may cancel out the tree cover savings in Cambodia (Lambin et al., 2014), making the 
result uncertain on a larger scale. Overall, tree cover losses remain limited because 
the yield increases by smallholders instigate a land sparing effect (Phalan et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the tree cover loss from natural areas is partly compensated by tree 
cover gain within agricultural mosaics. However, this assumes that these mosaics are 
appropriately managed. Importantly, the Hands-off scenario not only results in the 
lowest tree cover, but the share of tree cover residing in (unconverted) LSLA land 
systems is highest in both absolute and relative terms. Davis et al. (2015) have found 
that Cambodian LSLA areas are characterized by accelerated deforestation, making 




Changes in natural areas differs more strongly between scenarios. While a 
Penalization scenario results in more natural areas, these areas are more fragmented 
compared to Proactive Granting. This indicates that, while the penalization measures 
are able to maximize natural areas, the integrity of natural areas can only be preserved 
by effective protection measures. We found that, currently, a tiger reintroduction is 
feasible in terms of habitat, as has also been found by Gray et al., (2017). In addition, 
while all scenarios yield a possibility to accommodate tigers in 2040, the number of 
tigers that can be sustained in core natural areas ranges from 310 in the Hands-off 
scenario to 920 in the Proactive Granting scenario. Hence LSLA policies 
considerably affect the potential size of the tiger population and the chance of a 
successful reintroduction. This assessment of reintroduction potential is modest by 
design, and only evaluates habitat size and integrity. The Virachey, Eastern Plains, 
and Cardamom natural areas extend across the border, and therefore may host more 
tigers than estimated here. Oppositely, because we only mapped known LSLAs and 
did not include plantations outside of official LSLA areas, the tiger estimates may be 
too high. These biases are consistent across scenarios, making comparisons between 
scenarios valid. More detailed assessment frameworks, relying on landscape genetics 
(Thatte et al., 2018) or population viability analysis (Tian et al., 2011), can serve to 
fine-tune this assessment. 
Lastly, while we did not assess social impacts of our scenarios, we note that such 
impacts exist and are significant (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017a). Cambodian LSLAs have 
been associated with brutal evictions (Schoenberger, 2017). Furthermore, LSLA can 
intensify competition over land resources and instigate loss of commonly used land 
is (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017b; Friis et al., 2016). Such consequences might be more 
dire under the Proactive Granting scenario, because LSLAs move outside of 
protected areas and into smallholder agricultural areas. This is another leakage effect 
(Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009) that intensifies competition between smallholder and 
LSLA systems. Whether and to what extent such competition leads to dispossession 
and other undesirable social effects is dependent on a large number of factors and 
processes in the livelihood context of the target population (Oberlack et al., 2016). 
Because of the range of potential socioeconomic consequences, as well as the myriad 
of contextual factors that moderate the relation between our land use scenarios and 
their socioeconomic impacts (Messerli et al., 2015), these could not be quantified 
with sufficient certainty. Therefore, we focused our analyses on the landscape 
impacts only while acknowledging the importance of establishing further insight in 
the socioeconomic impacts. 
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5.4.4. Implications for land use policies 
The connection made here between two largely disparate areas of governance (forest 
and wildlife conservation versus LSLA) showcases that integrated land management 
is needed to reconcile multiple large-scale claims on land. The goal to reintroduce 
tigers in Cambodia is jeopardized by LSLA development. While the reintroduction 
plan is specifically aimed at the Eastern Plains deciduous forests, there are three 
other viable candidate areas (Cardamom forest, Prey Lang Wildlife Sanctuary, and 
Virachey National Park). In the absence of protection measures, our scenarios show 
that Prey Lang is almost fully converted to plantations, and the Eastern Plains 
deciduous forests fragments to the point that the sustenance of a tiger population is 
unlikely. The Cardamom forest and Virachey National Park show a remarkable 
stability in the absence of protection, because these areas are not very suitable for 
commodity production. This in turn is caused by their poor accessibility, rough 
terrain and/or poor soil drainage. For protecting the other areas the current capacity 
of responsible agencies to enforce protection has been too low to be effective in the 
past, and the additional funding that is necessary for capacity building is not on the 
agenda (Souter et al., 2016). This leads to two options: (budget for) protection 
capacity could be significantly increased, as is also suggested by Launay et al., (2012). 
Alternatively, the Cardamom Forest and Virachey National Park could be the target 
areas for reintroduction of tigers instead of the Eastern Plains. These areas are less 
suitable for reintroduction at face value, because they consist of evergreen tropical 
forests which have a lower tiger carrying capacity. However, as a consequence of 
their agricultural unsuitability, they are more stable reintroduction zones in the 
longer term.  
Habitat availability is only one factor contributing to the potential for tiger 
reintroduction. A sufficiently large habitat will still require enough prey animals, and 
will have to be protected from poaching and other threats (Gray et al., 2017). These 
factors are not included in our assessment, making the reported tiger carrying 
capacities theoretical upper limits. Our assumption that only core natural areas are 
suitable habitat may be contested by reports that tigers are observed to roam in 
sparsely populated areas (Thatte et al., 2018). However, human-tiger conflict is likely 
in Cambodia (Gray et al., 2017), making the restriction to core areas necessary for 
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The objective pursued in this thesis is to develop concepts and methods to integrate 
new actors and scales of agriculture into land system science. The different chapters 
represent progress in identifying and representing new actors and scales, in 
comprehending their relative agency in environmental and developmental questions, 
and in their potential as transformative powers. Land system science serves as an 
integrative platform throughout this thesis. I identify three major new actor 
constellations in agriculture: LSLAs, MSFs, and VCC. I then address knowledge gaps 
concerning each of these actors with the aim to make progress on systems, target 
and transformation knowledge. Specifically, questions addressed are: 
RQ1: What are the land system characteristics related to new agricultural 
actors? 
RQ2: How can new agricultural actors, and associated scales of land system 
change, be integrated in land system models? 
RQ3: What are the objectives of new actors in agriculture and how do these 
objectives align or misalign with environmental or rural development 
objectives? 
RQ4: How do new actors and arrangements in agriculture provide 
opportunities for environmental management and rural development? 
Each chapter of this thesis acts as a standalone research endeavor with chapter-
specific questions. The following paragraphs in this synthesis highlight how the 
findings of these chapters represent progress in systems, target, and transformation 
knowledge domains. I reflect on how the work presented in this thesis builds and 
relates to the state-of-the art in each domain, and envision future research. 
6.1. Systems knowledge proceedings 
Systems knowledge concerns insights in the state, dynamics, drivers, and impacts of 
a land system dynamic. This thesis addresses two challenges to improve systems 
understanding concerning new actors and scales of agriculture. The primary 
challenge is to conceptually link the multitude of ongoing processes of agricultural 
change. A second challenge is to represent new actors in sufficient detail and extent, 
thus pushing the limits of what current (spatial) data and models can deliver. 




two research questions of this thesis: to characterize new actors and scales of 
agriculture as land systems, and to integrate them into land system change models. 
Concerning the first challenge, the search for a common denominator for the actors, 
I provide conceptual foundations to existing work that links LSLAs with other 
dynamics. This existing work is mostly empirical and is situated in the wake of the 
research rush on LSLAs. It finds other, similarly rapid dynamics occurring in rural 
landscapes across the globe. The pioneering studies on MSFs (Anseeuw et al., 2016; 
Jayne et al., 2016; Sitko and Jayne, 2014) all explicitly relate MSF dynamics to LSLA 
dynamics, stating that the former may combine to a more widespread and important 
process compared to the latter. VCC is similarly dialectically discussed in relation to 
LSLA, and is hypothesized by some to be a preferable alternative to LSLA (Cramb 
et al., 2016; De Schutter, 2011). In contrast with this line of thought, Derek Hall 
(2011) positions the boom-and-bust variant of VCC as complementary, not 
alternative to LSLAs, and argues that VCC can be a way to instrumentalize 
smallholders in predatory land control acquisitions. The work by Ruth Hall et al. 
(2017) evaluates the performance of LSLAs, MSFs, and VCC (respectively 
plantations, medium-scale commercial farming, and contract farming in their study), 
for the first time bringing all three dynamics together, yet without conceptually 
linking them explicitly. 
The second challenge, to represent new actors in sufficient detail, concerns both the 
representation of the state of new actors (in datasets or land system maps) as well as 
their land system dynamics (in land system models). For MSF and VCC, the only 
indications of their location and extent are given in census interpretations (Jayne et 
al., 2016) or estimates (Otsuka et al., 2016). For these two actors, major efforts are 
still needed to categorize and conceptualize them, i.e. by documenting them in field 
surveys (e.g. Hakizimana et al. 2017; Bellemare and Lim 2018). For LSLA, datasets 
are more developed (Anseeuw et al., 2013), especially for specific countries (e.g. 
Open Development Cambodia 2016). Still, LSLAs are most often represented 
without spatial information, or using only point data (Eckert et al., 2016). They are 
not represented as land systems, which would imply a characterization of their land 
use/cover, socio-economic qualities, technology use, and more. Furthermore, 
despite their global significance as a force of land system change, most land system 
models do not account for them (Rounsevell et al., 2012; Verburg et al., 2019a) or 
do so at a local scale only (Hailegiorgis and Cioffi-Revilla, 2018).  
Building on the state of the art, briefly outlined above, I address the first challenge 
by conceptually linking the processes of LSLA, MSF, and VCC. In Chapter 2, I 




Through this lens, we gain a more holistic view of agricultural dynamics. The chapter 
introduces this concept, and finds that LSLAs, MSFs, and VCC all represent, to 
varying extents, a relinquishment of agency from individual land managers and states 
to value chain actors. This agency shift is nearly complete in the case of LSLAs, 
where land control is almost fully transferred to the acquiring party leaving almost 
no agency for states or individuals. In the case of VCC, the extent of the agency shift 
depends on the type of contract, and in the case of MSFs, a narrow empirical basis 
provides mixed lessons.  
Chapter 3 aims to broaden the empirical base for MSFs, and finds that these farms 
are indeed more likely to engage in non-local value chains, although this is not unique 
to this farm scale category, nor did I detect a particularly recent emergence of 
commercially-oriented MSFs. Chapter 4 represents LSLAs and smallholders as two 
possible policy pathways for Laos, both able to deliver goods to world markets but 
with very different direct and indirect land system consequences. This chapter builds 
on the idea of LSLAs and VCC as connected and, to a large extent, interchangeable 
strategies to engage with global markets. By pitting these two pathways against each 
other in a spatial model using scenarios, the environmental and societal trade-offs 
of specific policy pathways are made explicit. 
To improve the representation of new actors and scales of land system maps and 
models (i.e. the second systems knowledge challenge), this thesis contains steps 
forward for each actor according to the knowledge gaps they face. For LSLAs, this 
implies a more nuanced representation of these mega-farms as land systems and a 
major effort to include their dynamics in national-scale land system models. For 
MSFs, I provide much-needed empirical data, and for both MSF and VCC, I scope 
the existing literature to find spatial patterns.  
In Chapter 4, I innovate land systems modeling so that it can account for scale-
differentiated land system dynamics. In this way, the non-incremental nature of 
LSLAs can be represented and simulated, alongside and in interaction with general 
incremental dynamics. It also inquires whether, for example, a rubber plantation 
system is characterized by the same spatial drivers as a rubber smallholder system, 
and finds this to be only partly so. In chapter 5, I innovate the representation of 
LSLAs as land systems by adding thematic cartographic detail. LSLAs are often 
represented primarily by their size, which disregards the fact that large areas 
incorporated in land deals remain unconverted (Deininger et al., 2011). By mapping 
converted and unconverted areas within land deals for Cambodia, we gain insight in 
the land use/cover within LSLAs. By embedding this newly-acquired knowledge in 




smallholders and the environment on a national scale (as Chapter 4 finds), a failure 
to mitigate non-conversion adds another issue to the problematic: an inefficient land 
use distribution which undermines biological conservation targets. Sophisticated 
remote sensing findings have since echoed these conclusions for Cambodia 
(Magliocca et al., 2019).  
For MSFs, I contribute to the ongoing effort to broaden the empirical knowledge 
base (Chapter 3), but unlike previous case study work, I not only profile MSFs, but 
also contrast their characteristics with those of a representative sample of small 
farms and a panel of large farms. Chapter 3 corroborates findings of previous case 
study work in Sub-Saharan Africa to some extent, but also reveals that there is a 
wide variety of MSFs (and SSFs) which should not be overlooked. In Chapter 2, I 
aim to generalize the MSF dynamics, studied uniquely in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 
similar processes occurring worldwide, by scoping a wider range of literature on 
agricultural change. While each continent, and arguably each country and region, has 
its own peculiarities, I argue that land concentration in Latin America and farm scale 
enlargement in Europe have similar features.  
For VCC, I address the general lack of a global overview of its occurrence by 
mapping the current state of literature on contract farming in Chapter 2. This 
exercise reveals the global nature of contract farming, and invites further inquiry into 
the diversity, drivers and impacts of contract farming and VCC.  
The research into these agricultural changes is far from finished, and major gaps 
remain, particularly concerning MSFs and VCC. Both processes still suffer from 
definitional vagueness, calling for further reinforcements of conceptual 
fundamentals. My thesis calls into question the usefulness of MSF as a conceptual 
boundary object, noting that farm scale is a poor proxy for the entrepreneurial 
qualities often attached to the farm category. This does not mean that processes of 
commercialization, elite land capture or other non-incremental rural change do not 
occur outside of LSLAs. Indeed, such processes are well-described for Sub-Saharan 
Africa without reference to MSFs (e.g. "emergent farmers"; Sitko and Jayne 2014; 
"new customary tenure"; Chimhowu 2018). As future research builds more rigorous 
conceptualizations, I foresee that land system science will continue to play a valuable 
role in tracking and benchmarking these processes, to then assess drivers and 
impacts.  
For VCC, I note that recent research has made progress to link the actions across 
value chains to damages to the environment (Laroche et al., 2020; Paitan and 




deteriorate once value chain actors engage with it has improved (Ornetsmüller et al., 
2019). However, as my thesis touches upon, there are examples to be found of value 
chain actors improving land system sustainability. The contexts in which these 
positive impacts are manifested remain poorly understood. 
For LSLAs, ever-increasing coverage of databases may allow for land system change 
studies similar to those presented here to be conducted in other countries and 
continents. Recent research is indeed combining findings from Cambodia, a 
particularly data-rich country with which my thesis engages, with similar empirical 
work in Ethiopia, Peru, and Liberia (Liao et al., 2020).  
6.2. Target knowledge proceedings 
Target knowledge concerns the agency, decision-making processes, and the 
distribution of benefits and negative consequences related to land systems. As stated 
above, agency shifts are what conceptually bind LSLA, MSF and VCC together (i.e. 
they all potentially represent a shift towards more value chain actor agency). The 
chapters of this thesis examine how this agency shift results in the emergence of new 
configurations in decision-making. This thesis addresses target knowledge in two 
ways: by modeling how LSLA policies counteract and undermine other land use 
policies, and by reflecting on the implications of agency shifts towards value chain 
actors for environmental policy making. These target knowledge proceedings 
address the third research question of this thesis: What are the objectives of new 
actors in agriculture and how do these objectives align or misalign with 
environmental or rural development objectives? 
Concerning LSLAs, a major target knowledge gap identified at the onset of this 
thesis is the poor understanding of land governance conflicts at the national level. 
The sheer size of even an individual LSLA is large enough to make conflicts with 
other land use policy domains highly likely, but this is rarely acknowledged or 
prevented by host governments (Rudel and Meyfroidt, 2014), even though these 
governments are not powerless bystanders but rather active participants in most 
LSLA deals (Cotula, 2012; Wolford et al., 2013). This is especially remarkable given 
that a targeted land governance that allots LSLAs only to “unused”, “idle” or 
“available” land has been a major justifying narrative in favor of LSLAs, used by 
land acquirers and host governments (Deininger et al., 2011). As suggested by 
Messerli et al. (2013), identifying who has the power to define what constitutes “idle” 
land, and how such decisions are made, is a key target knowledge question, with 




Concerning the general agency shift instigated by the combined effects of LSLA, 
MSF and VCC, this thesis builds on work by, among others, Sikor et al. (2013), who 
describes how land governance is shifting from a territorial, governmental affair to 
a globalized value chain affair. I also root my contributions in research on corporate 
environmental sustainability (Dauvergne and Lister, 2012; Rueda et al., 2017). In 
Chapter 2, I argue that value chain actors increasingly make direct land management 
decisions. For VCC agreements, this power to decide is manifested in, for example, 
the prerequisites for entry into contracts, and the provision of agricultural inputs to 
farmers. LSLAs command a far larger power by exerting full control over land 
management, often unrestrained by effective regulations (The World Bank, 2014). 
To what extent this applies to MSFs as well remains unclear.  
Chapter 5 shows the use of land system modeling to make key trade-offs in land 
governance pertaining to LSLAs tangible and spatially explicit. The chapter opposes 
two high-profile, large-scale land governance projects in a land system model for 
Cambodia: pro-LSLA policies and nature conservation policies (specifically to 
reintroduce tigers). Relative to Chapter 4, this model enhances target knowledge 
representation by adding the decision-making of LSLA managers. LSLA managers 
often decide not to fully convert their concession areas into plantations. The model 
in Chapter 5 captures this dynamic from the manager’s perspective (responding to 
market demands and land suitability) and the governmental response to this issue 
(using scenarios of regulation). 
I conclude that, as value chain actors gain importance in the direct decision-making 
concerning land management, this implies that land can increasingly be managed 
through agricultural value chains rather than through governmental policy making. 
This presents a number of threats, foremost the misalignment between value chain 
priorities and environmental or societal priorities. If left unmitigated, as is arguably 
the case in many LSLA instances, this raises a host of issues of environmental and 
social unsustainability (see Chapters 2, 4 and 5). On the other hand, value chain 
actors act globally, and, as Chapter 2 highlights, they have a uniquely powerful 
position to catalyze policies at a large scale. Environmental policy making should 
innovate to engage with these actors, by nurturing existing business cases for private 
environmental action and triggering motivators for such action. At the same time, 
private land governance, where value chain actors self-regulate, cannot suffice to 
enact sufficiently strong environmental policies. The case of Land Degradation 
Neutrality shows that, even if value chain actors are committed to environmental 
stewardship and use tools to avoid and reduce land degradation, they do not 




state actors should not be complacent towards the general trend of agency shifting, 
and may need to reassert their role as land policy enactors if they wish to pursue 
large-scale, ambitious environmental targets. These findings align with similar 
conclusions for the case of international climate change policy making, where 
Hickmann et al. (2019) similarly conclude that an increased engagement by 
international organizations with non-state actors is beneficial to the effectiveness of 
policy brokering.  
Considering the importance of land systems to the attainment of many Sustainable 
Development Goals (Metternicht, 2018; Roe et al., 2018), a deeper understanding of 
the objectives and agency of all actors, and specifically value chain actors, will only 
become more important. Next steps in this line of work include more groundwork 
to gauge the objectives of value chain actors. Land system scientists have mostly 
projected objectives of actors based on their measurable actions, not on their 
expressed intentions. Research that considers the heterogeneous profiles, intentions, 
priorities and capabilities of new actors in more detail is still scarce (but see e.g. 
Schönweger and Messerli (2015) for coffee land acquisitions in Laos, or Neven et al. 
(2009) for Kenyan supermarkets). As we continue to paint a sharper picture of the 
objectives of new actors, these insights can be confronted with societal and 
environmental targets to find synergies and conflicts. A final outstanding issue is the 
practical implementation of the high-level policy recommendation in my thesis. 
Chapter 2 ends with the recommendation for international organizations such as the 
UNCCD to collaborate more closely with value chain actors. Research into 
environmental policy making can articulate how this can be done in practice in an 
effective way, without allowing for an overly privatized land governance. Similarly, 
where Chapter 5 reveals land use policy conflicts involving LSLAs and suggests 
governance options to better align conservation with LSLA in Cambodia. I 
acknowledge that such stylized scenarios may have an exploratory and normative 
role, but fail to do justice to the inherent complexity of policy making. Here, again, 
land system science can contribute by, among others, participatory modeling 
(Bourgoin et al., 2012), to make synergies and conflicts tangible and negotiable.  
6.3. Transformation knowledge proceedings 
Transformation knowledge concerns the identification of alternative pathways of 
land system change, and the search for leverage points to steer developments 
towards such alternative pathways. The transformation knowledge proceedings 
presented in this thesis aim to answer the last research question: How do new actors 
and arrangements in agriculture provide opportunities for environmentally 




Land system science is increasingly engaging with transformations towards 
sustainability (Filatova et al., 2016; Meyfroidt et al., 2018; Müller et al., 2014), 
studying transformations either in retrospect or as scenarios (Ramankutty and 
Coomes, 2016).  
This thesis provides two lines of research concerning transformation knowledge: 
first, I reflect on possibilities to leverage increased value chain agency over land 
management decision-making towards sustainability (Chapter 2). The chapter shows 
the various tools that value chain actors are able to deploy with their increasing 
agency, categorized as either carrots (incentives towards adherence), sticks 
(punishments for non-adherence) and sermons (building capacity, raising awareness, 
etc.). While I provide examples of the use of these tools to avoid, reduce, and reverse 
land degradation, I note the lack of demonstrable impact quantification, as is also 
remarked by Defries et al. (2017). Furthermore, I note that the effectiveness of value 
chain actors to act in the interest of sustainability hinges heavily on their motivation 
(financially or intrinsically) to do so. Transformative change driven by value chain 
actors will depend on the weight of sustainability in corporate decision-making, and 
the possibility to act without undermining a company’s competitive position. While 
specific companies are found to pioneer in this regard, it should be noted that, in 
the case of LSLAs specifically, I find that, even if their proliferation implies more 
agency for value chain actors, this power is not combined with a broad-scale interest 
to take up environmental responsibilities, as short-term interest appear to 
consistently trump notions of stewardship (see also The World Bank 2014). I 
conclude that, going forward, a sustainability transformation may be achieved by 
value chain actors operating in tandem with re-empowered governmental actors 
(similarly stated by Lambin et al. 2014). 
Second, I represent the specific transformative power of LSLAs in the scenarios 
developed for land system change models. Both Chapter 4 and 5 demonstrate that, 
because of their sheer size, policies concerning LSLAs have far-reaching, 
transformational consequences. The model for Laos finds that a moratorium on new 
LSLAs going forward could result in a smallholder transition to cash crops and 
rubber. This corroborates the hypothesis that, at national-to-global scales, LSLAs 
foreclose smallholder transitions and could reinforce a lock-in effect of subsistence 
agriculture (Jayne et al., 2014b). This model is the first to explore this hypothesis 
with spatiotemporally explicit simulations. Chapter 5 goes further by presenting 
innovative scenarios. LSLAs have been justified and even branded as being of 
limited harm, because they would target idle land without competing with other 




and interventionist a government needs to be to transform LSLAs to the least-
damage pathway they presented themselves to be. In order to accommodate tiger 
sanctuaries and preserve tree cover, the Cambodia government would need to 
actively regulate LSLAs and proactively balance land concessions with commodity 
demands, while maintaining a zero-tolerance policy on encroachment into protected 
areas. Even this would still risk the foreclosure effect identified in Chapter 4. By 
highlighting these policy challenges, chapters 4 and 5 question the possibility of an 
LSLA pathway to yield environmentally and developmentally sustainable benefits, 
and substantiate the claim by De Schutter (2011) that LSLAs are unlikely to be an 
optimal pathway compared to smallholder-driven development. The scenarios and 
their outcomes are not intended as predictive estimates of land system change, but 
rather as a concretization of  normative imaginations of transformation. Normative 
perspectives in land system science are increasingly call for (Nielsen et al., 2019; 
Rounsevell et al., 2012), and by confronting relatively extreme policy scenarios, the 
potential for transformation towards sustainability is made tangible. 
6.4. Concluding remarks 
Land system science is an evolving field, and covers a wide range of methodological 
(Verburg et al., 2015) and conceptual (Meyfroidt et al., 2018) approaches. This thesis 
uses several of these tools to approach new actors and scales: methodologically, I 
use field surveys, remote sensing, meta-analysis, scenario-building and modeling to 
gain a better understanding of new actors and scales. Conceptually, I bring together 
perspectives from the fields of, among others, land use change, nature conservation, 
sustainable land management, and livelihood sustainability. This use of land system 
science as an integrative, multi-method platform runs like a thread throughout the 
thesis and constitutes its main academic contribution. By containing inquiries at the 
global, national, and local scale, and by approaching new actors and scales with a 
wide range of perspectives and methodologies, I have contributed to integrate new 
actors and scales of agriculture into land system science, thus presenting a step 
forward towards the objective of this thesis. The insights, datasets and modeling 
tools that are the product of this work can feed into future land system science 
research in a myriad of ways: The framing of new actors and agency shifts can give 
conceptual foundations to future research, data produced in this thesis, such as 
survey data and land system maps, can be taken up for further analysis, and the scale-
differentiated land system models are certain to find applications in other domains 
of land system modeling.  
While the objective of this thesis lends itself primarily to academic applications, the 




well. The understanding that land management, as a decision-making process, is 
increasingly being dominated by value chain actors, is of particular use to policy 
makers aiming to enact sustainable land management or leverage land management 
in the fight against climate change. Insights from this thesis concerning the threats 
and opportunities of the agency shift have been integrated in the IPCC Special 
Report on Land and especially in the UNCCD Science-Policy Interface report on 
land governance, to which I contributed (Arneth et al., 2019; Verburg et al., 2019b). 
Furthermore, while the land system models of Chapters 4 and 5 are not a suitable 
standalone communication or planning tool for policy makers, their use in 
moderated workshops in Laos and Cambodia demonstrated their potential as an 
integrative land use planning tool for groups of experts. Beyond their technical use, 
these models and the insights they produce confront society with the finite nature 
of land, and therefore the finite option space in land use planning. In a rapidly 
changing world where demands on land and the stakeholders involved are 
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Appendix A-1: Land system classification input data sources  
Parameter Source Spatial 
resolution 
Time 
Land Cover – Bare 
land, Water, 
Urban, Tree Cover 
 ) Polygons 2010 / 2002 
Large-scale land 
acquisitions 




Upland Rice Ratio Agricultural census 





2010/11   
Village 2011 
Cash crops area 
fractions 
Agricultural census 






Appendix A-2: Land system classification decision tree. Numbers indicate priorities (e.g. a cell 





















































1 - Is Swidden
2 – Rubber
Cover > 25%














Appendix A-3: Smallholder agriculture classification 
In the land system classification decision tree, a cash crop focused smallholder 
system is defined as a cell where the fraction of the area that is covered by cash crops 
is larger than 25%. For this purpose, the sum of area fractions as reported in the Lao 
Agricultural Census 2010 for the following crops is calculated. 
Coffee Banana Mango Cassava 
Tea Cashew Pineapple Sugar cane 
Cabbage Durian Plum “Other fruits” 
Cucumber Lemon Tamarind  
Avocado Longan Sweet corn  
 
Similarly, smallholder areas where rubber covers over 25% of the area are classified 
as rubber – permanent smallholder mosaic. For swidden, we reclassified the land 
system map by  . This map represents a number of swidden systems with differing 
intensities and forest cover, which we reclassified to a single swidden system. 
Appendix A-4: Land system service calculations 
For all 15 land systems, the provision of each of five land system services (wood, 
rubber, cash crops, subsistence crops and urban area) was quantified. These services 
remain constant in all scenarios, whereas the LSLA service is scenario-dependent. 
Exception to this is the wood service in the Moratorium scenario which is kept 
constant, because smallholders cannot substitute as a supplier in our application. 
In a first step, area breakdowns of land covers per land system were empirically 
established. In the cases of urban, water, dense forest and bare land,  it was assumed 
that these land systems are covered 100% by their respective land covers. The same 
assumption was used for all large plantation systems. For small plantation systems 
(including coffee plantations), overlay analysis using the actual polygons of the 
plantation and the  plantation land system cells was performed to determine the 
average area percentage of LSLAs within LSLA land system cells.  Similarly, the area 
dedicated to cash crops by smallholders was quantified by overlaying the agricultural 
census (GoL, 2011) with the land system raster. The same operation was used to 
calculate average tree cover of land systems, using the national land cover map (GoL 
2010). Subsistence crops were calculated as the remainder area for each land system. 
For LSLA in Laos, it is known that the granted area (the polygons used in this study) 
is often much larger than the allocated area, which is again larger than the developed 




(Luang Prabang) and 12% (Xiengkhouang) of their granted area (Hett 2015). 
Expansion beyond the granted area also occurs but is much more rare. As there are 
no nationwide statistics, we quantified productive use for LSLAs by overlaying a 
forest map (GoL, 2010) with arable plantation polygons. This way we established 
that, for small arable plantations, on average 18% of the granted area is covered with 
trees and therefore not used productively. For large arable plantations, 45% is 
similarly not used productively. As the same method cannot be used for rubber, 
coffee or wood plantations, as the land cover map records these land uses as tree 
cover, we used the same number for all small and large plantations respectively, 
where coffee plantations are considered small plantations.  
Next, typical yields were used calculate the average services output per land system. 
These yields are assumed to be constant across all cells belonging to the same system. 












Area-weighted average for the main 
cash crops: permanent crops (excl. 
rubber), maize, sugar cane, cassava 
and paddy rice. Paddy rice weight 
adapted to count only 20% as cash 
crop. Yield figures obtained from 
(FAO 2017). Lower yield for 
smallholder reflect presumed lower 
access to inputs and technology.  




Rubber   plantations, 
Rubber permanent 
smallholder mosaic 
Typical values from Manivong & 
Cramb (2008). Higher yields for 
LSLAs reflect presumed better 
technology. 
Wood 5 m3.ha-1.yr-1 Forestry plantations Typical mean annual increment yield 





2.6 ton.ha-1.yr-1 All smallholder 
systems, 
All small plantations, 
Coffee plantations 
Weighted average of 1.7 ton.ha-1yr-1 
(typical for low-input upland rice, 
Saito et al., 2006) and 3.59 ton.ha-1yr-1 
(paddy rice, FAO 2017) 





















3 Terrain Ruggedness 
Index (m/m) 




























7 Minimum temperature in 








8 Maximum temperature in 
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19 Ethno-linguistic family (4 
families) 





20 General accessibility 












21 Domestic market 
accessibility (travel time 











22 International market 
accessibility (travel time 
to district border 
crossings, airports, 




































26 River flood hazard (cm 
of flood with 100 year 
return interval) 

















Heath map at 
2000m resolution 
# USGS (2004)  
*Fick and Hijmans (2017)  







Land System Contributing factors AUC 
Urban Gen. Access (+) 0.993 
Small Arable Plantation Dom. Access (+); Pannual (+); River flood hazard (-) 0.839 




Small Forestry Plantation Dom. Access (+); Topsoil gravel (+); Dist. to border 
(-) 
0.829 
Large Arable Plantation River flood hazard* (-); Slope* (-) 0.963 
Large Rubber Plantation Int. Access* (+); AWC* (+); Lao-Tai* (-); 
TColdestMonth* (+) 
0.811 
Large Forestry Plantation Int. Access  (+); TAnnual* (+); PAnnual* (+); Poorly 
drained soil* (-) 
0.749 
Dense Forest Gen. Access ; PopDens (-); Lao-Tai (+) 0.704 
Swidden Gen. Access (+); PAnnual  (-);  Lao-Tai (-); Slope (+); 
Topsoil gravel (+) 
0.752 
Rubber Smallholder Mosaic D m. Access (+); PAnnual (+); Dist. to China (-) 0.900 
Cash Crop -Focused 
Smallholder 
Gen. Access (+); TAnnual (-); PAnnual (+); Topsoil clay 
(+); AWC (+) 
0.730 
Mixed Cash Crop - 
Subsistence Mosaic 
Gen. Access (+); Lao-Tai (+); Population Density 
(+) 
0.686 
*Average of 3x3 cell neighborhood  
 
Appendix A-6: Model parameters: Processes through which changes in demand for cash crops 
or rubber are resolved in the CLUMondo application. Arrows indicate processes that are 
allowed in the application, while other processes being restricted in our model. See main text 




















The Allowed land systems changes matrix sets which land system changes are 
allowed (indicated by a Boolean 0 or1). The 102 in the reforestation column indicates 
that this change is allowed after at least 2 years. More information can be found in 






The Conversion order matrix. indicates the relative competitive advantages of land 
systems to provide land system services. Increasing numbers indicate higher 
competitive advantage. A 01 indicates that the land system is not considered when 
increasing or decreasing total supply to meet demands. The LSLA service is not used 











-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Urban land 
-1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 
Small Arable Plantation 
-1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 
Small Rubber Plantation -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 
Small Forestry Plantation 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
Large Arable Plantation 
-1 2 -1 -1 -1 1 
Large Rubber Plantation -1 -1 2 -1 -1 1 
Large Forestry Plantation 
2 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
Coffee Plantation 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Dense Forest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swidden 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Rubber Smallholder Mosaic 
0 0 2 0 0 0 
Cash Crop Focussed Smallholder 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Mixed Cash Crop - Subsistence 
Mosaic 
0 1 0 1 0 0 






The Conversion resistance table indicates the resistance a land system has to 
changing into a different land system. 
Land System Conversion resistance 
Water 1 
Urban land 1 
Small Arable Plantation 0.8 
Small Rubber Plantation 0.8 
Small Wood Plantation 0.8 
Large Arable Plantation 0.9 
Large Rubber Plantation 0.9 
Large Wood Plantation 0.9 
Coffee Plantation 1 
Dense Forest 0.4 
Swidden 0.3 
Rubber Smallholder Mosaic 0.7 
Cash crop-Focussed Smallholder 0.7 
Mixed Cash Crop - Subsistence Mosaic 0.5 
Bare Land 1 
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Appendix B-2: Land system classification procedure 
The input data for the land system classification are as follows: 
Input data Source Format 
Water (Open Development 
Cambodia, 2016a) 
Landsat land cover 
classification for 2014 






(Miettinen et al., 2016) Land cover 
classification at 250m 
resolution 
Economic land 




of Economic Land 
Concessions 
Economic Land 
Concession: used area 
Author’s own mapping 
based on 
interpretation of 
Landsat time series 
and Google Earth 
imagery. See SI-1C 
Polygon delineations 
of ELCs in use as 
plantations 
* General forest cover calculated following tree cover densities in various forest 
types reported in Miettinen et al., (2016), as follows: 
General Forest Cover = Lowland Evergreen + Lower 
Montane Evergreen + Upper Montane Evergreen + 0.6 x 
Regrowth + 0.25 x Lowland Mosaic + 0.25 x Montane Mosaic 
+ Lowland Deciduous + Lower Montane Deciduous 
** Cropland cover calculated following cropland fractions reported in Miettinen et 
al., (2016), as follows: 
0.92 x Lowland open + 0.77 x Lowland mosaic + 0.40 x 




First, all inputs are represented in a raster with a resolution of 1000m, using 
resampling and rasterization operations. These rasters represent the fraction within 
each cell that is covered with the land cover/use it represents (e.g. the water raster 
represent fraction water cover in each 100ha cell. 
Then, the decision tree is implemented using a series of conditionals on each raster 
cell.  
Appendix B-3: Modelling future land system changes 
Land systems produce a defined quantity of land system commodities, services, and 
effects. We assume land system productivity is equal in all cells of the same land 
system (e.g. all cropland – evergreen mosaic cells produce the same amounts of 
commodities). The commodities produced by a pixel of a specific type depend on 
the land cover composition. We combined these compositions with typical yields 
for the specific commodities, derived from World Bank (2015). We assume that used 
LSLA areas are monocultures and therefore only produce their intended crop type. 
The resulting productivity numbers are given below. 
Cambodian farmers have a large potential to increase yields, so our model assumes 
yields to increase yearly in smallholder systems. The extent to which yields are 
assumed to increase are quantified using expert estimates. This procedure is detailed 
below. We furthermore assume that used LSLA systems have already closed these 
yield gaps, given their access to capital and technology (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012).  
The projection of future demand for commodities and services builds on existing 
projections by the World Bank and the United Nations, and is detailed below. We 





Land system production of goods and services: 














0 Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Floodplain / 
Mangrove 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Urban 0 0 0 0 100 0 
3 Converted annual 
crops LSLA 
158 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Converted forestry 
LSLA 




0 0 114 0 0 0 
6 New forested 
LSLA 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
7 New Other LSLA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8 Forested 
unconverted LSLA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Other unconverted 
LSLA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Evergreen Forest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Decidious forest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Cropland 10 1 6 153 0 0 
13 Cropland - 
evergreen forest 
mosaic 
5 1 3 75 0 0 
14 Cropland - 
deciduous forest 
mosaic 




Projection of future yields by smallholders: 
Projection of smallholder yield. We assume yields of smallholders will increase 
linearly every year, thus partially closing existing yield gaps. The following 
assumptions are operational: 
Commodity Yield 
increase 
2015 – 2040  
Source and assumption 
Rice 30% Estimation by the World Bank (2015) based on 
comparison with comparable rice varieties in 
neighboring countries 
Annual cash crops 58% Closure to 75% of the attainable yield of sugar 
cane, soy, cassava, and maize according to 
(Mueller et al., 2012). 
Perennial cash crops 14% Rubber yield increase from 1137 ton/ha (World 
Bank, 2015) to 1300 ton/ha (Manivong and 
Cramb, 2008) 






Projection of future demand for land system commodities and services: 
The following assumptions are operational concerning future demand for 
commodities and services. Demands for annual cash crops, perennial cash crops and 
timber can deviate in scenario 2 (Penalization), where the cancellation of non-used 
LSLA areas results in a decrease of commodity demand due to leakage effects. 
Commodity Demand 
increase 
2015 – 2040  
Source and assumption 
Rice 41% we combined growth figures from the OECD-
FAO Rice Projection (OECD/FAO, 2017) 
between 2015 and 2026, and Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma (2012), between 2031 and 2040. We 
interpolated the gap period between 2026 and 
2031, which is not covered by these projections. 
Annual cash crops 100% Extrapolation of a 2013-2030 World Bank 
projection of cassava, maize, and vegetables to 
2040 (World Bank, 2015) 
Perennial cash 
crops 
152% Linear extrapolation of 2002-2015 rubber 
production figures (World Bank, 2015). Rubber 
production has boomed in the past decade 
(Ahrends et al., 2015), making any projection 
highly speculative. However, given the high 
amount of immature rubber plantations (World 
Bank, 2015) and the high potential for palm oil 
expansion (Colchester et al., 2011), we believe 
that linear extrapolation of the high past growth 
trends is a justifiable estimation. 
Timber 100% Assumption 
Urban 97% Projections made by the United Nations 










Conversion resistance of land systems: 
The conversion resistance parameter quantifies the difficulty to change an existing 
land system cell into another land system.  
Nr. Land System resistance 
0 Water 1 
1 Floodplain 1 
2 Urban 1 
3 Used annual crops LSLA 0.9 
4 Used forestry LSLA 0.9 
5 Used perennial crops LSLA 0.9 
6 New forestedLSLA 0 
7 New other LSLA 0 
8 Forested unconverted LSLA 0.4 
9 Other unconverted LSLA 0.4 
10 Evergreen forest 0.5 
11 Decidious forest 0.5 
12 Cropland 0.7 
13 Cropland - Evergreen forest mosaic 0.7 
14 Cropland - Deciduous forest mosaic 0.7 
 
Allowed conversions: 
Allowed land system conversions are indicated with “1”. Non-allowed conversions 
are indicated with “0”. “-10x” indicates that a land system may only exist for x years. 
“10x” indicates that the conversion is allowed only if the land system has been 




   






We use the CLUMondo neighborhood effects algorithm to make the transition 
potential of certain land systems higher or lower when they are in the vicinity of 
certain influencing land systems. Specifically: 
 New urban areas are more likely in the vicinity of existing urban areas 
 New used ELCs are more likely in the vicinity of existing used ELCs of the 
same commodity type. 
Appendix B-4: Core area and potential tiger area delineation 
Core areas are delineated by converting the land system maps to polygons. These 
polygons are classified as ‘natural area’ (evergreen and deciduous forest, as well as 
unconverted forested LSLAs) and non-natural area (all other land systems). Very 
small patches (< 300 ha) of non-natural area within a larger natural area are filtered 
out and merged with the larger natural area polygon that surrounds it.  
Using these natural area polygons, we use buffer operations to distinguish core and 
edge natural areas, where core natural areas are natural areas situated at least 5km 
from non-natural areas. To deal with natural areas adjacent to country borders, we 
assumed that the natural area extends across the border using a mirroring algorithm. 
The procedure relies on a Python (arcpy) script, which will be shared with interested 
readers on request. 
Tiger areas are those core natural areas that are larger than 2000 km2. 
Appendix B-5: Logistic regression 
Accessibility calculations: 
We calculate accessibility as travel time to source points. We use four sets of source 
points: 
1) Village centers (MapCruzin, 2018) to calculate general accessibility  
2) Major cities and towns, a sub-selection of villages, to calculate domestic 
market accessibility 
3) International markets: all provincial capitals, ports, airports, and border 
crossings, to calculate international accessibility 
4) Economic corridors: A cross-border infrastructure project to interconnect 
the Mekong (GMS, 2018), including extensive road constructions, to 




To calculate travel time, we first create a friction surface. This friction surface is 
calculated using travel speeds: 
- Water (Miettinen et al., 2016): 0.25 km/h 
- Roads  
o Primary: 70 km/h 
o Secondary: 30 km/h 
o Other: 10 km/h 
- Off-road: 
o Smooth terrain (<4 degrees): 8 km/h 
o Rugged terrain (4 – 25 degrees): 5 km/h 
o Very rugged terrain (>25 degrees): 2 km/h 
Using this friction surface in combination with the source points, we use the ESRI 










Domestic market accessibility 1000 m Own processing See Appendix 
General accessibility 1000 m Own processing See Appendix 
International market accessibility 1000 m Own processing See Appendix 
Economic corridor accessibility 1000 m Own processing See Appendix 






Resampled to 1000 
m 
Elevation 90 m SRTM# 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 
Slope (Degrees)  90 m Own processing 
Calculated from 
Elevation 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 
Minimum temperature in the coldest month 30 arcsec worldclim.org* 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 
Maximum temperature in the warmest month 30 arcsec worldclim.org* 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 
Average Precipitation 30 arcsec worldclim.org* 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 
Precipitation in the driest month 30 arcsec worldclim.org* 
Aggregated to 1000 
m 








Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 






Resampled to 1000 
m 
# USGS (2004)  
*Fick and Hijmans (2017)  





Resulting logistic regression models: 
We use logistic regressions to relate current (2015) land system distribution to the 
explanatory factors detailed in above. All factors are significant (P < 0.05). Area 
Under the Curve (AUC) values indicate reasonably good to excellent fits.  
Land System Contributing factors AUC 
Urban Dom. Access (+) 0.993 
Converted arable crops LSLA Slope (-); Econ-cor. Access (+); AWC (-); PAnnual  (+) 0.756 
Converted forestry LSLA Econ-cor. Access (+); Slope (-); Topsoil gravel (+);  
PAnnual  (-) 
0.660 
 
Converted perennial crops 
LSLA 
Dom. Access (+); PAnnual  (+); Topsoil gravel (-); 
Slope (-); Tannual (-) 
0.717 
Unconverted LSLA Int. Access* (+); Tannual* (-); Slope* (-); Drainage* (-) 0.630 
Evergreen forest Slope (+); PAnnual  (+) 0.886 
Deciduous forest TAnnual (-); Slope (-) 0.763 
Cropland Gen. Access (+); Slope (-); AWC (+); Topsoil gravel 
(-) 
0.842 
Cropland – Evergreen forest 
mosaic 
Gen. Access (+); PAnnual  (+);  Topsoil sand (-); Elev 
(-) 
0.612 
Cropland – Deciduous forest 
mosaic 
Gen. Access (+); Elev. (-); Topsoil clay (-) 0.597 
*Aver ge of 5x5 cell (2500 ha) neighborhood window 
Appendix B-6: Functionalities of the CLUMondo model 
CLUMondo is a forward looking land system change model. Land system changes 
are assumed to occur in response to exogenously defined demands (in this 
application: annual crops, timber, perennial crops, rice, urban area, and large-scale 
land acquisitions). A land system can deliver one or more of these demands, or none, 
and each demand can be fulfilled by one or more land systems. 
Using logistic regressions, suitability surfaces are generated for each land system. In 
this, it is assumed that the current locations of a land system are suitable for that 
land system. By describing these locations using socio-economic and biophysical 
factors, and by establishing statistically significant quantitative relations between the 
occurrence of a land system and these factors, a suitability surface can be created.  
The model assumes there is a competition between land systems. Specifically, when 
a given set of demands can be fulfilled by many combinations of land systems, 
CLUMondo iteratively calculates the optimal spatial combination to meet all 
demands. In the first iteration step, CLUMondo allocates on each raster cell the land 
system that has the highest transition potential, equal to the suitability. The resulting 
allocated land systems may overproduce or underproduce certain demands. 
CLUMondo then increases the transition potential for land systems producing 
underproduced demands, and vice versa. Using this altered transition potential, 




transition potential. This is repeated until all demands are met within a 5% margin, 
and the overall average deviation from the stated demand is less than 1%. 
The basic functionality of CLUMondo is expanded in a number of ways. Firstly, a 
conversion matrix defines which land system conversions are allowed. We can for 
example restrict the conversion from water to any other land system, as this is 
unlikely. In this application, the conversion from a used LSLA to any other land 
system is restricted because it is assumed to be unlikely within the simulated time 
frame. The conversion matrix can also be used to define that a conversion can only 
occur after a land system has been present for a given number of years, or that a 
land system can only exist for a given number of years. The latter is used in this 
application to limit the existence of unconverted LSLAs for up to three years in the 
Penalization and Proactive Granting scenarios. Second, conversion resistance can be 
used to quantify the difficulty of converting a land system to something else. For 
example, because urban land systems are generally difficult to convert, they are given 
a high conversion resistance, while forests may be more easily converted. Third, 
neighborhood effects can be added to the transition potential. For example, new 
urban land systems are more likely to appear close to existing urban areas. We use 
these effects to increase the transition potential of used LSLAs in the vicinity of 
same-kind used LSLAs. Lastly, the multi-cell allocation algorithm allows for the 
allocation of multiple contiguous cells of the same land system. This functionality is 
useful when certain land systems typically convert larger areas than others. In this 
application, LSLAs are allocated using this algorithm. Refer to Debonne et al (2018) 
for more information. 
A full description of the model functionality can be found in van Asselen and 
Verburg (2013). The model is available at www.environmentalgeography.nl.  
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Council) which had the broad goal of enhancing spatial land system change models 
by explicitly accounting for decision-making.  
The Environmental Geography group later merged with the Institute for 
Environmental Studies (IVM), where Niels found a home among risk scientists, 
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Now follows what is arguably the strangest of all academic texts: the 
acknowledgements. For one, it is the only part of this booklet that has not been 
reviewed by anyone. No reviewer 1 or 2 to squeeze the soul out of this writing, 
no promotor with constructive comments to come to terms with, no learned 
opponent, not even a diagonal spell-check by my girlfriend. Still, it is well-known 
that these words are likely going to be the most-read of this book. 
Yet how to proceed? Do I take the classical approach, thanking my promotors 
first (they certainly deserve that), after which friends, family, committee, funders 
and colleagues follow in short succession? Surely that would do the trick, but 
such a bullet-point approach does not do justice to the journey that has led me 
to this point. This achievement is the result of hard work, great people, lucky 
circumstances, and coffee. I believe a chronological order will be most suitable. 
1. The road towards starting a PhD 
I wouldn’t go so far as to say that I always wanted to be a scientist, but my 
favorite characters in any cartoon I read as a child were always the savant 
inventor-scientists who knew everything about everything. Growing up brings 
the realization that being well-versed in every field from engineering to 
anthropology is not possible (for me), but becoming a discipline-combining 
geographer is as close as I could get to this aspiration. My parents have been a 
constant gentle push for me, although I cannot pinpoint one specific upbringing 
trick they applied on me. It’s a combination: it was instilled into me that whatever 
I do, I should do it with a passion. Family dinners often became lively debates 
where we were encouraged to participate from a young age. But setting aside 
such anecdotes that sound logical with the benefit of hindsight, the overarching 
point is that my mother and father have been, and are, my examples, my 
enablers, and while they never set out a course for me, they kept me on it. I had 
the added benefit of having two great stepmoms, Roos and Saara who have been 
there for me along the way. Saara is the designer of the beautiful cover of the 




My siblings have inspired me, driven me, and supported me. As an organizer for 
society’s most vulnerable people and as a doctor, my brother and sister are both 
firmly rooted in “the real world”, and I look up to them a lot. This rootedness 
led them to rebuke my often somewhat high-minded arguments on 
sustainability, they kept my thinking in check (or at least tried). Apart from 
pushing me off my ivory tower once in a while, Elise and Laurens were simply 
there whenever I needed them. This is true for my little sister Lenke in equal 
measure, who has been a joy in my life. Add two stepbrothers, Aaron and Joshua, 
in the mix, and my family became the perfect nursery to fully develop myself. 
I met my girlfriend, Marthe, when I was 17. This tends to surprise people, 
because we continued to study the same bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 
Leuven, and are now direct colleagues at the IVM. She is probably the one 
person without whom I would not have started, let alone finished, a PhD. She 
gave me the courage to go for it, and kept me going when the going got tough. 
A geographer herself, she has been a sparring partner, a critical reviewer, and a 
sounding board.  
It is interesting to see that, like me, my brother and sister both managed to find 
their true love at age 17-ish. This gave me a long acquaintance with Delphine 
and Bram, whom I have grown to see as equal parts sibling and friend. Thanks 
for being there. Bram, I wish you were here. 
While I cannot thank my family and girlfriend enough, it should be mentioned 
that nothing comes for free. My education so far has been costly, yet neither I 
nor my family have paid the majority of that cost. Flemish tax payers have 
funded most of my education, and European tax payers have kindly funded my 
PhD. While I cannot be mistaken for a patriot, this is one thing that Belgium 
gets right: high-quality education is practically accessible to all with no 
differentiation based on wealth or social class. It is my firm belief that this should 
be the case everywhere.  
Continuing this chronology, a key character in this story is prof. Anton Van 
Rompaey, who supervised my MSc thesis. While enjoying a beer in the darkness 
of a blacked-out brothel in Southwest Ethiopia (there are more stories here), he 
was the first to casually mention that a PhD could be something for me. Some 





often ponder how things would have been if one of these proposals would have 
been successful, but failing that, I ended up in Amsterdam. 
2. The PhD 
I have had the honor to pursue my PhD in what is by all standards a leading 
research group, led by Peter. I continue to be amazed by the sharpness of Peter’s 
mind. Meetings consistently provided new ideas, better clarity, creative framings, 
and a lot of to-do’s. Yet besides that, I appreciate him most for his genuine care 
as a leader towards his employees. When my PhD almost came to a crashing halt 
due to mental health issues, Peter was exactly the kind of boss I needed him to 
be. When the pandemic pushed all of us to our limits, he went over and beyond 
to keep us healthy and sane in our work. 
Jasper took on the role of day-to-day supervisor. Our weekly meetings were 
always great, and mostly ended severely off-topic as we discussed books, politics, 
and more. Such conversations, while arguably not strictly productive, were 
formative to me. I was encouraged to pursue my specific interests, and Jasper 
was always there with advice and encouragement. Jasper has also been great at 
finding and arranging amazing opportunities for me. It was in large part due to 
his brokerage that I found myself in workshops in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, 
and that I was able to go on field work in Kenya.  
It cannot be understated how much I have appreciated my colleagues. There is 
simply too much to say here, too many stories and anecdotes. I want to thank , 
in no particular order, Ziga, Joona, Astrid, Christine, Harun, Marthe, Samantha, 
David, Koen, Katharina, Cecilia, Jonas, Sarah, Franzi, Adenew, Karina, Jonas, 
Claudia, Vita, Yue, Verena, Jac, Sean, Emma, Christian, Leen, Kina, Perrine, 
Bep, Rebecca, Job, Mengmeng, Floris, Rosa, Anna, Nynke, Brian, Reinhard, 
Willem, Marleen, Jens, Timothy, Eric, Anais, Toon, Ted, Hanna, Mark, Hans, 
Marije, and so many more, for the many afternoon ice creams, pizza Fridays, 
nighttime city explorations, directing me home when I got lost during such 
explorations (shout-out to Reinhard), book club dinner parties, and movie 
nights. For showing me that I am still among the worst soccer players alive, but 
still letting me play. For the amazing trips to Slovenia, Vienna, and Terschelling. 
For the great bouldering sessions. For every coffee break that lasted too long, 




anything else. For being there and asking me how I’m doing. Truly, this 
paragraph could become a thesis on its own. 
During the first one-and-a-half year of my PhD, I lived on a farm. I developed 
a fond relation with my landlords, Heleen, Matthijs, and Elvira, who became a 
sort of surrogate family. They gave me invaluable insight in the day-to-day reality 
of farming. And they serve the best andijvie-stamppot. 
The academic work I did could only be done because of the excellent support 
by an army of support staff. A specifically important person is the secretary, and 
I have enjoyed three great ones, Barbara, Marjolijn, and Corrie. Thanks for 
running the place the way you did/do! Beyond that, the cleaning staff, the 
maintenance workers, the IT support, and the range of administrative workers 
that are needed to keep a university going have been a great contribution to this 
thesis. A special shout-out goes to Rabi, wo makes the best pizzas. 
3. The PhD defence 
In the final stretch of this PhD, I sincerely thank my reading committee. It is an 
honour to have an eminent group of scholars critically read my work and meet 
me with their remarks. As I write this, I’m already looking forward to it.  
I’m curious how this will go, but I need not fear because I will have two great 
paranymphs by my side: Bep and Katharina. With a team like that, I’m rather 
confident that things will work out.  
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